{"id":415,"date":"2013-12-02T18:57:01","date_gmt":"2013-12-02T23:57:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.clementscenter.org\/clements-graduate-fellow-published-in-diplomacy-statecraft\/"},"modified":"2023-06-06T12:07:17","modified_gmt":"2023-06-06T16:07:17","slug":"clements-graduate-fellow-published-in-diplomacy-statecraft","status":"publish","type":"press","link":"https:\/\/www.clementscenter.org\/press\/clements-graduate-fellow-published-in-diplomacy-statecraft\/","title":{"rendered":"Clements Graduate Fellow Published in Diplomacy & Statecraft"},"content":{"rendered":"
Article abstract: Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin’s visit to Britain in April 1956 was the first by the new Soviet leadership to a Western bloc country after Josef Stalin’s death. It presented British policy-makers with a unique opportunity for insight and discussion. However, British self-deception regarding their scope for independent action as well as excessive focus on events in the Middle East hampered efforts to build a rapport with Khrushchev and Bulganin. This analysis explores the planning and conduct of what turned out to be a fruitless diplomatic initiative. The visit illustrates British and Soviet policy at the time, as well as Britain’s already clear position as the junior partner in the Anglo-American “special relationship” on the eve of Suez.<\/p>\n