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## **Diplomacy, Alliances and War: Anglo-American Perspectives on History and Strategy in the September 11<sup>th</sup> Era**

*A Joint University of Texas-Austin and King's College London Conference*

### **Panel 5: Present and Future**

**Panelists:** Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, Kori Schake

**Discussants:** Gary Schmitt, Martyn Frampton

**Moderator:** John Bew

**November 2, 2013 | 10:15 AM – 11:45 AM  
The University of Texas at Austin**

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**[Note to Reader: When possible, speakers are identified by first name. If not, then Respondent is used for panelists and discussants, and Audience is used for attendees.]**

**[Begin File: Panel 5.mp3]**

**Moderator:** Okay, ladies and gentlemen, let's get going with the final panel. I have an absolute deadline cutoff point for 12:15, mainly because we've got to see football, but also because Dame Pauline has a flight to catch, so I will be abrupt and ruder than I normally would be during the course of the moderation of the panel and on the questions. I just want to begin by saying how engaging and effective the last panel was. It really touched on some of the issues we want to continue with in this panel. I also had an absolute moment of horror when my introductory remarks were stolen by James Ellison, because I too have been in the LBJ Library, looking at discussions of the Special Relationship and that discussion of 1968 about the issues affecting Britain's world role, and America's perception that Britain neither had the money or the gumption or the desire to maintain that world role.

One thing James didn't mention is there's an additional sort of note of optimism in the files of the American Ambassador, which said Britain did at least have an emancipationist pop culture, which may help it lead a march towards European unification. That obviously didn't happen, but it was a sort of more positive note in the Special Relationship. There was also — and I hurriedly found this in my files — another document from 1968, which I guess captures what we're trying to do with this conference. It was a document on performance and dreams of the future, a whole file on performance and dreams of the future, and it had discussions of Asia, of European policy. But I plucked out the section on the Middle East, because I guessed we're going to be addressing the Middle East during this panel.

So performance and dreams of the future in 1968, a national security document in the LBJ files, calls for a more relaxed political stance to the Middle East. It says, "Historians of the Middle East will view these years in one of two ways: as the climax of a 20-year rebalancing of local and international forces at the end of the colonial era; or as another episode in the struggles of that transition." It identifies a settlement of the Arab/Israeli dispute as a key to solving political conflict in the Middle East. So hopes in performance and dreams of the future may be naive, but at least we know that people have traditionally thought of it in broader strategic terms.

It's on that note that we turn to the panel, which as I said will continue the discussion of the U.S./UK Special Relationship, but also I think specifically in the context of the threat that has defined the last ten years, which is the jihadist threat, and how that might change

going forward, and what historical lessons we have from the period and the way we have dealt with it so far. I'm very happy to introduce the panelists. I will do so very briefly, because you have their biographies in your conference pack, and because we're short on time.

Speaking first will be Kori Schake, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, a Foreign Policy Advisor to the McCain and Palin campaign, and Deputy Director for Policy Planning at the State Department and much more. Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones of Hutton Roof will follow Kori. She has a highly distinguished career as a diplomat and has held a number of absolutely crucial positions in the security apparatus of the British state: Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Political Director of the Foreign Office, Minister for Security and Counterterrorism, and I think importantly and absolutely for today's discussion is also the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Cyber Issues, which you may touch upon. Gary Schmitt, my old friend, I think it's our ten-year anniversary today.

Gary: It's a special relationship.

Moderator: It is a very special relationship. It maybe predicated the whole —

[Multiple speakers]

Moderator: It's been a great ten years. I'm not going to give you much more of an introduction; just to say Gary's a well-known strategist and the Director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and has held a range of positions in government, including during the Reagan Administration. Finally, Martyn Frampton from Queen Mary University, who is the author of two excellent books on Irish Republican terrorism and a third co-written book — which is much better than both of those, because I co-wrote it with him — called *Talking to Terrorists*. He's actually subsequently shifted his focus towards British engagement, American and British historical engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam going right back to the '20s. Martyn — I should say I think an important footnote — is also becoming a relatively accomplished Arabic language expert, and I think that might also feature in some of the discussions going forward. I'll hand it over to you, Kori, first.

Kori: It sounds like I am if not alone, I'm largely alone in thinking that the U.S./UK Special Relationship is likely to deepen and become more distinctive in the future. The reason is because of the nature of our own societies, and the nature of the threats that we are facing are actually going to highlight the ways in which we are different from others. The U.S. and UK are like each other and not like the rest of societies. Let me start by maybe saying a little bit about my experience at the Special Relationship, because there's been a lot of talk about the sentimentality of it and about practicalities of it, and actually this panel is an exemplification of it.

When I was the NATO Desk Officer in the Joint Staff in the year of our lord 1990 or thereabouts — which is literally the lowest level of job that you can hold in that institution. There's nobody junior to me in the entire place. Pauline Neville-Jones was the equivalent of the Under Secretary for Policy, and yet she not only knew who I was; she would chew me out in the hallway when we were making bad choices. That interestingly enough actually increased my stature in the American government. It's the way — that British ability to identify unimportant factoda [phonetic] in the American system and

actually increased their influence in our own system. That is unique to the British/American relationship. It is also unique to the British/American relationship that you can identify the American government in waiting and invest in them while they are out of power, which actually increases our willingness to make time for you when we are in power. Only the British in my experience have been smart enough to do that.

Kori: The third thing I'll say about the Special Relationship is that I was for several years the poor slob on the NSC who had to manage the day-to-day frustrations of the allies who had troops in Iraq. It was really striking to me how different Britain was from the 50-some other countries who would all come in and complain about their problems and the stupidity of our policies and their self-defeating nature, because the British alone — the British did that. Everybody did that, but the British alone would actually identify potential solutions and get started on executing those solutions.

Again, everybody talks about the Blair memo after September 11th, but the British alone had actually figured out what was in our interest and your interest and set about doing it. The United States, the Bush Administration might not have actually gone to the UN after September 11th. We certainly would not have gone to NATO for the invocation of Article 5 after September 11th. The British went ahead and did both of those things, not only because it was good for us, but because it locked an administration prone to aggressive unilateralism into seeing the benefits of a multilateral and institutional approach. That's the elegance that Britain brings to its relationship with the United States that nobody else does. I very much hope that my own government gets that good at that, because the nature of the challenges we are facing, the ability to reach beyond governments and into the policymaking framework and into the societies in which we are operating is actually something the United States, because of the nature of the challenges that we are all facing, needs to get good at.

I'm going to spend a couple of minutes talking about a case study of the Special Relationship from a time in which there was no sentimentality attached to it. Why does the Palmerston Government in the years 1861 to 1863 not recognize the Confederacy? Because I actually think, although this predates the Special Relationship, it gives some sense of why it's different and matters. So, lots of reasons that the British government in the American Civil War ought to have recognized the Confederacy. The economics argued for it in a mercantilist sense. There was this cultural affinity between the British aristocracy, namely the British ruling class, and that kind of way of life and planter aristocracy of the American South. Moreover, there had to be a nearly irresistible satisfaction to endorsing in Southern State secession, the very argument that Britain's rebellious colonies in 1776 had made to break away from Britain. For someone who was in my judgment pretty anti-American — Palmerston — that had to be really tempting.

[Unintelligible 0:10:42] forces the British navy had for a long time had been making the argument that blockades needed to be respected around the world, and was the main beneficiary of both the law and the norm of that. There was a quite strong abolitionist sentiment in Britain, which would've made the Confederacy a difficult thing. There was a sense of the kind of stampeding concern about newly urbanized industrial populations. The case study of this is Manchester textile workers. Lincoln writes this famous letter, because they support the North in this when they have every reason in the world to support the South. It kind of taps into the social upheaval of industrialization, which proceeds faster in Britain economically but faster in the United States politically, because

we're expanding to the West, and you see the Eastern establishment hoping that westward expansion can diffuse the political strength that the Southern States have in the Congress, all this kind of stuff.

Kori:

But predominantly the reason that Palmerston himself gives for why they don't recognize the Confederacy: even with all of the concern about who the United States is — this is Jefferson's boisterous sea of liberty. It's the rabble running the country, and what that looks like to Britain is kind of mob rule in America. It's a future they do not want to see for themselves in Britain, and they're scared of the way that urbanization and industrialization appear to be empowering the average man. The reason Palmerston gives are that the United States at that time, the North in particular, had the widest political franchise. That is, men could vote, right? So what Palmerston's worried about is that if he recognizes the Confederacy, his efforts domestically to prevent the expansion of the franchise in Britain, he would enable his critics — this is what he says — if there is an alignment with the South.

The second thing is that the patterns of emigration from Britain to the United States at that time are predominantly Scotland and Ireland to the Northern United States. What Palmerston fears is that if he recognizes the Confederacy, aligns Britain with the Confederacy, he says it could make controlling Scotland and Ireland more difficult for the British government. That is, who the United States was as a political culture, as an immigrant culture, as a wide political franchise actually constrained the foreign policy choices of the global hegemon of that day. That's actually hugely consequential. Britain's ability to understand the way that who the United States is can reflect back into Britain's ability to govern Britain is what dominates this choice. I want to argue to you that this ability to intrude into other societies is actually going to grow more important because of the way the global order is changing. That is, governments are losing the ability to act. They're losing the monopoly of violence. They're definitely losing the monopoly of information.

What that will do is weaken governments and enable individuals. Societies of empowered individuals where governments frequently lack the ability to control the rest of the populations — i.e., Britain and the United States — are dramatically advantaged in the way that the international order is changing. Let me just give you my favorite example: Jody Williams. A New Hampshire housewife gets on the Internet and starts the global Campaign Against Landmines, which has caused the American defense establishment such a nightmare over the course of the last ten years or so. What is different about Britain and America as political cultures, as economic cultures, as societies is a risk tolerance that is actually substantially different, even from the other advanced Western democracies. The example that springs to me actually is banking. There's a reason that banking is centered in Britain and the United States, and it goes to what Walter Russell Mead talks about: the financial esprit, by which he means recklessness, default, all that kind of stuff.

Greenspan in his new book tries to defend the choices that he made as the head of the Fed, and what he says is that governments cannot prevent bubbles; they cannot prevent financial crises. All we can do is build the robustness of our societies to deal with them when they happen. I actually think that's a reasonable metaphor also for the threats we are facing in the international order. The resiliency of our societies becomes even more important because of the nature of these threats, and the resiliency of Britain and the United States are actually different because of empowered individuals, because of bossy

women like Jody Williams, because of our ability reach past — because of who we are as cultures, to reach past governments and affect the discourse inside societies. The United Kingdom does this much better than the United States does. The United States needs to up our game.

Kori: Let me just in closing suggest an example where we're not actually giving ourselves credit for winning — and we are winning — and that is in jihadism. The narrative of jihadists comes into play at the nexus of poor governments and Islamism. This is where we are seeing the threats emerge that we are scared of, and it takes both. There are Muslim societies that are successfully managing modernity. There are poorly governed societies that are failing to do that. It requires the nexus of both of them for jihadism to take hold. A big part of why the narrative takes hold is because these are societies that cannot shield themselves from the stampeding influence of globalization, and the United States and the United Kingdom exemplified that. We've come to be blamed for that, whether it's the financial crisis in Asia in the 1990s or, god forbid, American culture thriving through the Middle East.

The jihadist narrative is that Western societies, that this pervasive influence that the U.S. and UK exemplify is inherently corrupting to their social values and that governments are incapable of protecting their society from it. Only the violence of jihadism can produce that kind of protection, but they are actually losing the argument in the so-called Muslim world. Let me close by giving you one bit of data that I think is illustrative. Pew did a poll in Muslim societies. When they went to Lebanon, Palestinian territories, and Pakistan, their respondents were all Muslim, so it's not Christians or Jews or others in that society. What they asked in the year 2003 and again in 2011 was support for Osama bin Laden and his policies. In Indonesia in 2003 support was at 59 percent for Osama bin Laden. By 2010 it's at 26 percent, a loss of 33 percent of public support. In the Palestinian area 72 percent in 2003 support Osama bin Laden; 34 percent in 2011, a loss of 38 percent. Even in Pakistan you see a loss of 25 percent of public support, and that's consistent across these countries.

What that suggests to me is that Muslim moderates who believe governance is at the core of managing the challenges of modern society are themselves winning this argument, and even for all of our mistakes and all of our blunders in the way that we have engaged the so-called War on Terror, we are making progress there. It's amenable policy. It's amenable to our ability not just to deal with the government of Pakistan, but to actually past the government of Pakistan and into other societies. I think we actually ought to have more confidence than we do about that. The last thing I'll say is that Edmund Burke was right and continues to be right when he said that the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for the moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again. A society is not to be governed that must perpetually be governed. It should, I think, only add poignance to this that it was Britain's rebellious colonies in North America he was talking about.

Pauline: Do you mind if I go [unintelligible 0:21:15]? Ladies and gentlemen, I slightly wonder, after this morning's lively panel and what Kori has just said, what else there is to add, but I will have a try. The exam question we were given was the present and future state of UK/U.S. relations. Well, we've talked a lot about that. I've got one or two thoughts to add to the debate we had this morning, and then the whole question of how we move forward in an era where terrorism still haunts us. History offering lessons learned suggests that we

should derive wisdom from this. I wonder. Well, we'll try. It becomes very clear from what I heard this morning — and unfortunately I wasn't here yesterday — is that the UK as a sort of act of policy of long-term strategic consequence has invested very heavily in its relationship with the United States. We go through vicissitudes, but I don't think that fundamental orientation has at any point really changed.

Pauline: It's sometimes been a challenge. I think the nearest we got to a change in my experience was when Edward Heath was Prime Minister, who did announce that it was going to be Europe, and he actually offered the U.S. some slights, which didn't go down terribly well. Well, this era didn't last very long for a variety of reasons. He wasn't particularly popular in his own country, and we reverted. It is, I think, the default position for the UK. I don't actually, for all of the problems that I do see ahead — and I agree with the vast amount of what Kori's just said, but I am less optimistic, I have to say, about our position in relation to terrorism, but I'll come back to that. I think we will go on in that posture, and part of the UK argument with the European Union, which has to do — I wish I thought it was only to do with the direction its going, rather than the conclusion that some of my compatriots draw, which is it's going the wrong way, and therefore we ought to withdraw. I think that would be a pretty dangerous thing for us to do, but it's done against an informed position of having a relationship with this country. So I think we do regard ourselves as having a bedrock in our rear, if I can put it that way.

The relationship goes through periods of intensity, doesn't it? We heard a lot this morning at any rate about Bush/Blair. I think Reagan/Thatcher was just as intense actually, not so much spoken about, and that may reflect perhaps the generation of people in this room. It was certainly part of my experience, and it was set against the background of both of the leaders having actually not totally support inside either their own country or indeed in some cases inside their own party, as the fate of Mrs. Thatcher eventually showed. I use the word "intensity," because I think it's appropriate. A question I would like to ask the Americans here is, "Does Obama do intense?" It's not clear to me that actually he does do intense. I'm not sure I'd say David Cameron does intense to be frank. I think these are two quite cool characters. However, what they have not been faced with is a dramatic event of 9/11 or some of that kind. I have to say I don't believe that Blair/Bush would've developed the way it did had we had not had 9/11. I think 9/11 transformed the circumstances for them.

This was a companionship that went in to try and deal with this situation and went through the vicissitudes together. That hasn't actually occurred in the present relationship. We are still both of us very much on the track of the policies that were laid down there. There have been some variations, but nonetheless I think there isn't yet something that has actually done that welding. Will it happen? I don't know. What is the relationship like? Well, it seems to me that it's close; it's friendly; it's sustained by a personal relationship, which certainly does work, and Syria was part of that. I'll come to that in a moment. It's essentially sustained by all the structures that we have noted and the intermeshing and the embedding that goes on between us. What it hasn't perhaps at the moment had is that gearing upwards which personality or events can give it.

I personally believe that we live in a very unsafe world. The chances of us getting through the next ten years without some frightful terrorist event seem to me to be quite low, and I would think that we will again be tested, and I should think [unintelligible 0:26:30] forces together again. I'll just say a little bit about UK attitudes. We are obviously the country

that's the smaller of the partners. I don't know whether I can call us being on the back of the tandem, but anyway we do see ourselves enmeshed in this relationship. We fuss about it more, I suspect, than the U.S. would need to. You can get in the UK two sets of sentiments running side by side. One is, "This relationship doesn't have the driving force it used to. Is it really worth it?" That is usually attributed to decline in the UK status, its power, its influence. Now, that disparity has been growing over a very long time as the relationship goes on. There's the other one, which is more, "Don't like the direction in which this relationship is going," and that's usually attributed to UK subservience to U.S. policy, and you can see that that cropped up in the wake of Iraq.

Pauline:

I think Iraq does still cast a very big shadow. I'll say a bit more about that. The Blair legacy out of the period we were discussing last night and this morning does hang over. On the UK end of the relationship it does hang over that relationship, and it plays an active, unseen, ghostly role in the Syria vote. Why is that? Well, distrust of politicians. Do they really tell the truth? Do they tell us everything? The Dodgy Dossier, because if you remember, the maneuver that was conducted, which was the UK was going to have a vote and get some Parliamentary support, be the ally, and the U.S. can take action, and it fell apart. It fell apart partly because the government didn't prepare the ground properly. Parliament is these days a great deal more unruly. It's a whole a variety of reasons, which relate to coalition government but also changes in the way Parliament actually operates in the committee system. The effect of the Dodgy Dossier — if you remember, the intelligence assessment of who had chemical weapons and who had used them was actually one of the key bits of government evidence, written in government code, so not understood by the public for what it was actually saying, and distrusted.

The government's careful not to alter any of the language, but it meant actually that it didn't have the desired effect. People who should've been on side definitely were not, and we got the terrible sort of [unintelligible 0:29:27] in Parliament, and the opposition has something to answer for as well. My point however is that I think that legacy was operating here in a way that was deeply unhelpful to mustering support, confidence, and national consensus behind politicians. Why is that important? Governments can go on pursuing policies that actually don't have full support inside their populations. It was rightly mentioned, the big demonstrations we had in the UK over the Iraq war. In the end there is a comeuppance. There is a price, and I would say in some respects that actually the Syria vote was precisely that. Finally, the comeuppance came. So travel back a bit, and when this coalition government came to power, I was working as David Cameron's National Security Advisor in Opposition. We did declare ourselves on the side of needing — and this refers to something I was saying earlier — to restore the integrity of UK policymaking, this whole business of did we appear to be subservient. We did that quite deliberately.

My personal motives were twofold. One was that actually if you did go on with giving people the impression that you only ever did other people's bidding, it wasn't actually a way of selling your own policy. You had to be able to demonstrate that it's actually in the UK interest; therefore it had to be a UK policy made in the UK for the UK. I'm secondly also worried — and this was the going legacy, which is another thing that is now coming home to roost, which was an increasing feeling that actually the UK couldn't do this any longer. Afghanistan loomed here — too much effort. It's just too big. It's undoable. Why are we doing this? In any way is it in our international interest? So there was quite a movement when we came into office for drawing up the drawbridge, actually shrinking back.

Pauline: So the government was saying, “No, we aren’t going to continue to play a global role,” some of which is actually — people laugh about it. I mean, there is sort of internal lack of conviction at the moment, though the government as you all have seen goes on trying to do just that. I would say that the relationship is in good heart. I am not so confident that some of the public that I would like to see for the policies that we are trying to pursue actually exist. I want, if you don’t mind, to say something about what you and your peers, particularly Brits, think about the U.S. at the moment, because that’s also another area where I think there is cause for anxiety [unintelligible 0:32:34]. We’re accustomed to seeing the U.S. demonstrate two crucial facets: one, ability and willingness to use power; and secondly, the shining light on the hill, the beacon of values. I would say both of those have been put in doubt.

The Syria episode is seen certainly in Europe as being hesitation on the part of the U.S. willingness to use power, which is against of the background of — it may not be correct analysis, but anyway a popular view of what happened in relation to Libya. I can certainly tell you that in other parts of the world there is real anxiety. You go to the Gulf countries, and they are as jumpy as anything now about whether the U.S. will actually be there when things happen. I’ve just been in Japan, and the same thing is there. I got very closely cross-questioned about Syria by them, and they didn’t make any secret in private. They were discreet, but they didn’t make any secret as to their anxiety about actually did the U.S. pivot really mean anything for them. That’s obviously rather [unintelligible 0:33:54], but they were very fussed. I think it’s not only in the UK that there is anxiety on that score. Then of course the second thing is we are of course [unintelligible 0:34:06]. It’s the question of the values and being the shining beacon.

Yesterday a phrase was used which I hadn’t heard before, which I think does rather encapsulate what I’m worried about. I think it was [unintelligible 0:34:26] who referred to the national security state, the Patriot Act, and now of course what is pouring out through the Snowden pipeline, which both brings us together — I think it brings us together, but we need to defend the legitimacy and the need for what we are doing, but it tends to divide us from our populations. That is our problem. Sir David Omand and I, we’re two of the voices, and very few voices actually, trying to demonstrate to people why this activity, this intelligence relationship is extraordinarily valuable to us, and why it is necessary to do it. It us uphill work, ladies and gentlemen. We do not have popular opinion behind us. On the contrary, it’s against us. It’s worried about privacy. It’s worried about Big Brother. It’s worried about what kind of society we’re in. There are lots of popular misconceptions about what’s actually happening, and I have to say — and here I criticize my own colleagues in the party. I mean, our governments really do have to start defending this and actually explaining this. I don’t think it’s happened much in the U.S.. There’s activity in Congress, but is the administration saying anything? Certainly the government in London is not.

We cannot go on doing things that we are not prepared to defend. It becomes very important actually. That becomes part of the way we move forward in the future. So to come to the fight on terrorism briefly, and the last thing I want to stress. I do believe that for all the travails that I’ve just outlined, our cooperation in intelligence will continue. I don’t actually see that not happening, though I do think quite a lot [unintelligible 0:36:26] probably doesn’t need to happen. What do I think [unintelligible 0:36:32] key, key asset in the whole fight against terrorism? What’s the mighty evolution? Well, here I am. I am

perhaps among the pessimists, but I am pretty worried. This large gathering of fighters in Syria, and it's acted as a tremendous recruiter of present and possibly long-term terrorists — well, not everybody who goes to fight there will turn into a long-term terrorist, but some will, and some people will turn into the professional killers. At the moment as far as I know they don't have any particular command or controlled organization, but I think that Syria will actually end up in some kind of stalemate, probably Balkanized.

Pauline: These people will then probably need to move out, because I would think if that Balkanization does happen, there will have to be international peacekeeping forces in there to keep it not stable, but just simply preventing the outbreak of fighting again. These people, these guys will move off. Where will they go? Well, I reckon they'll go down the Gulf. They'll go into the Horn of Africa. They'll go to Somalia. They'll go to East Africa. They'll go across the Sahara. They'll end up in West Africa and right across North Africa. We have the potential therefore, certainly when you sit in the UK, of feeling this thing as coming closer. Now, distance doesn't matter. It's not the key element, because it can happen from Pakistan as well as we know. Nevertheless it means that the rim of what is meant to be a secure zone of the world, i.e., Europe, is likely going to become much, much more unstable than it is now, and much more dangerous, and much more of a threat with the regimes in that part of the world, some of them who are friends on whom we depend, very directly threatened. I don't quite know.

I mean, this is a problem about being inside government and outside government. I'm in sort of a semi-position, but I don't really know what's happening in terms of policymaking in relation to this, but I am quite clear in my own mind that we need a strategy. We seem to have parts of policy, and we're dealing with Syria there, and we're dealing with Egypt there. There are various other policies, and we have friends in the Gulf. Do we have an overall strategy? I wonder. Is it a strategy that incorporates any kind of long-term dealing with terrorism? We certainly need, I think greatly, to reinforce what is already happening, which is increasing the capability of friendly regimes actually themselves to deal with terrorism on their soil. There's capacity and capability training. It's difficult to combine with the status on values, because some of these regimes are not particularly respectable and tend to use their police and their military in repressive forms. I think that we have to make some choices there, and I would say it's only in our interest to increase capabilities.

However, there is obviously also the issue at home, and I won't go into a great deal about that. This was an issue that caused a certain amount of ideological difference between the incoming Conservative-led government and its preceding Labour-led government on the question of, "Whom did you use to do the conversion work, the prevention work with your own Muslim communities?" We rejected the policy which our predecessors had been employing, which was actually to use Muslim extremists, people who rejected Western values, provided they weren't themselves violent, in a prevention role, a conversion role with young people who were on the verge of going over into violence. We said this is not what we want. We want integration. We want Western values. Multiculturalism is needing to stay on the right path, so you have to be very discriminating about who you get to help.

It's very hard work, very difficult, very mixed results only over a period of time, but what I think I can report is that actually at least the leading voices in the Muslim community in these days in the UK are much more on the side of mainstream thinking than they once were. They used to excuse or indeed even justify some of the things that went on, some of

the atrocities. That no longer happens, but the problem is that they don't have much pulling power inside the Muslim community itself, so there still remains a problem. There's obviously the policing element, where those who are suspected of activities do have to be monitored, and if there is evidence of it, here we enter into the difficulty of how far you go in preventative policies.

Pauline: I think we will continue in the UK to have at our disposal a form of house arrest. It's very controversial. It's very difficult in a democratic society, but the alternative is exposing the population to significant danger. I think that policy will continue. At the moment we're talking about petty numbers of people. I think it's not even in double figures at the moment. My fear is that if we get a new resurgence of organized activity from abroad — some of which will undoubtedly be directed at our societies. We will have some of these issues that we have to deal with at home, again, assuming political profile. So what about the future? Well, I think for all that I've put out, quite a lot of sort of dark elements in the picture, the positives I think are our values.

I think Kori is absolutely right to emphasize the nature of open societies, and she's also right to say that actually governments have less control. This is not just a temporary feature; it's an absolutely permanent feature. Power has passed not between societies — it certainly has passed in the sense that there's more power than there used to be in emerging societies, but power has also changed inside societies, and it has certainly descended. You have to pay attention therefore to what people are saying and thinking. I'll come back to what I was saying of the dangers of going on with policies when you don't have proper consensus behind you. I think governments have to work a lot harder than they have been at actually explaining policy and of being willing to engage in debate. There's a really serious tendency in Britain for ministers to make foreign policy speeches abroad to foreigners and to contemplate on domestic issues at home. I want to see us actually resume the foreign policy debate inside the UK. We now do actually design national security strategy on the basis of risk factors. That seems to me to be right, but we have to be honest also about the negatives and about where we have actually real problems in dealing with the challenges we face.

I think the two governments actually do need to talk to each other rather seriously about the Snowden challenge and everything that's falling out of the Snowden challenge. I think it would be a really good thing to see not acting overtly in cohort, cohorts with each other — not cahoots with each other. That would probably be a bad idea, but actually developing some kind of strategy which helps both deal with the negative effects. Because if we don't, we are going to have an increasing difficulty in getting populations to believe that the truth is being told, that the agencies that governments employ in the name of security are properly accountable, and that therefore this is something that they should continue, which up to this point they have continued to support and accept. So the national security state I think is something that we have to deal with in the process of actually retaining support for wider causes and dealing also with the main security threat to us. My conclusion is don't resign from the task. Don't give up, but do reengage and do reestablish a connection with the population.

Gary: Well, I want to begin by telling our visitors from the UK and elsewhere that, when you go to the University of Texas football game today, you will need to practice giving the "hook em horns" sign with your hands. This is not to be confused with its reverse, an obscene

European gesture that might just get you tossed out. And you will also need sunglasses, because you've never seen so much burnt orange in your life.

With those words of advice to our guests out of the way, I do want to congratulate Will and John and the Clements Center and Kings for putting on such a remarkable conference. However, the conference's success has been somewhat of a pain in that with this late panel 99 percent of what I wanted to say has already been said. But that just shows you how well the successful the conference has been in covering the topics. Really, again I can't say it too much, this is one of the best conferences I've ever attended; so, congratulations to the Center and Kings.

Gary:

Since I'm getting paid to sing for my supper, let me throw out a few points. I apologize for echoing what others might've already said, but I hope I can add a bit of either depth and/or dissent from what has been said. Let me begin with a remark that Ted put on the table yesterday. He suggested that the gap between the U.S. and the UK approaches to terrorism might not be as wide as some were suggesting. The point is that when you think through what the requirements of a true COIN strategy are, it's not all that different from what the ultimate British strategy in Northern Ireland, as described by Sir David, was. I think there is congruence there that shouldn't be overlooked when we're talking about counterterrorism. Moreover, while we shouldn't ignore the harder edge to the U.S. and allied COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan—such as the targeted killings by special forces—it's equally important not to shove under the rug, as John and Martyn have written about and discussed, the harder edge to the British security services' efforts in Northern Ireland. There were no shortages of targeted takedowns in Northern Ireland by special operators there, as well. Indeed, it wasn't until the PRA's leadership was operationally decapitated that talks could and did move forward.

Frankly this is one side of the Northern Ireland story that, for some reason, British officials rarely ever want to talk about when giving the U.S. advice, for example, about possible talks with the Taliban. I also think the congruence extends as well to the home front. For all the talk about the sea change in American domestic security arrangements—the rise of the so-called security state since 9/11—the reality is, as Doug also noted yesterday, American laws and investigative guidelines have changed far more modestly than in previous times when the U.S. was at war. Taking the fight to al-Qaeda is a luxury that the U.S. policymakers have had, and I would argue that in turn has kept the balance between safety and liberty within reasonable bounds at home. As for Europe, well, it's certainly true that most countries address the problem of terrorism principally through law enforcement, it's also important to point out that the laws that they rely on to combat terrorism are more hard-hitting than those related to your typical criminal matter. It would be a mistake to conclude that because, to quote one analyst, "Europe approaches the problem of terrorism in the context of crime, not war," that most European states treat terrorism as just another crime. The French, among others, have made much of the fact of that unlike the United States they reacted to the attacks on 9/11 with more equanimity.

However, this ignores the real revolution in laws and practices that France adopted in the late '80s and early '90s when they faced repeated terrorist attacks on the streets of Paris. Although the UK and France are not in a position to make preemptive military action a central element in their countries' counterterrorism policy, for each government the preferred policy is still preemption, and the domestic laws and security practice reflect that goal. The laws dealing with domestic terrorism do not look like other criminal laws.

Now, before I move on to the panel topic, I just to very briefly note that, when we were talking yesterday about the possible historical “overhang” on the reaction to the attacks on 9/11 by events such as, Kosovo, Vietnam, Somalia and Munich, I wanted also to bring up another point of history. In the case of 9/11, and resulting momentum for the policy of preemption, arguably, some of that momentum was generated by Don Rumsfeld’s chairmanship of the Commission on Ballistic Missile Threats in the late 1990s. If you look at that report, which was bipartisan and unanimously agreed to by the commission members, there are findings that focus on the inevitable gaps in intelligence, the likelihood of surprise, and the nexus among the countries cooperating in developing missiles that, I think, clearly underpin the logic of the preemption policy that developed in the wake of 9/11 and when Rumsfeld was defense secretary. So just as a historical matter, there’s big history, such as the legacy of the Munich Agreement on much of American strategic thinking in the wake of World War II, but there’s also small history, such as the Rumsfeld Commission, that I think we need to keep in mind as well.

Gary:

Let me now make a few comments about Kori’s paper. There were three points in the paper that struck me as being particularly insightful about the Special Relationship but about which I have some small — small — caveats. She notes for example that London, like no other government in the world, understands how Washington works. I think that’s true and important for sustaining the Special Relationship but I would also add that, precisely because it is a morass, it makes it very difficult for London to translate that understanding into policy effectiveness. Indeed I would say that a feature of that morass is the fact that the British efforts are mostly focused on the executive branch, which is understandable given the day-to-day requirements on the military and intelligence fronts. But what it also has meant is a declining influence on Capitol Hill, which is part of our morass, if you haven’t noticed. Ties between members of Congress and London are simply not what they once were, and I think that’s an important element in the current problems we have in the Special Relationship.

Kori also has at the center of her paper the brief but insightful case study of how the United States and President Lincoln were able to effectively constrain Prime Minister Palmerston and the UK—then the world’s hegemon—from intervening on the side of the South during the American Civil War. It’s definitely an interesting early example or test case of the democratic peace theory; but, I would just add, that it was a very close run. If the Union forces had lost at Antietam in 1862, which it could have easily done in the absence of some fortuitous intelligence about Gen. Lee’s plans falling into their laps, it seems likely that Palmerston would’ve probably decided to intervene on the side of the South. My only point here is that ultimately Palmerston’s decision, while affected by the character of the American regime, was one of simple cost and benefits. If the cost of intervening had gone appreciably down because the North had lost this battle, “Perfidious Albion” would have been hard pressed to stay out of the war. As precursor to this Special Relationship, it’s also a reminder that core interests can and do override even the closest of ties.

Finally, Kori ends her paper by noting that for the UK and the U.S. the challenge is harnessing the advantages of our respective open societies that reach into and affect the societies from which the jihadist threats are emerging. I don’t disagree at all, but I would just add this side of our power, which is sometimes called soft power, is largely outside of our governments’ control. 90 percent of our interaction with the world, or even more, is

not governmental, and as such it's very difficult for the sea of policymakers to actually use this ability to reach into societies strategically. Jody Williams, the American activist working to ban anti-personnel mines, is a very good example of just how little control, for good or ill, we have over that soft power. So, as strategists and policy planners, we don't really have much of a handle on that particular joystick.

Now, what we do have a handle on of course is hard power. And if Churchill's Iron Curtain speech is to be taken seriously—and even though Churchill was always a romantic about the United States—what makes the tie between the United States and the UK special and not just fraternal is, as Tom Mahnken just noted, our security connections. On those fronts I think the Special Relationship is something akin to an old tree. It was planted decades ago and its roots are well established. It's certainly true that no other country than the UK works at the working levels so closely with U.S. counterparts. In that sense the Special Relationship is alive and well. However, my concern is what's going "above ground." In the broader environment it's just a fact that the American and British elites are not as close as they once were. Here I disagree somewhat with Phil Zelikow. I don't see, outside this room, that once high level of closeness among elites; and it certainly isn't seen within the broad publics either.

Gary: On the military front the U.S. military is with some exceptions highly respectful of their British counterparts. As we've talked about, there on-going and important relationships through shared command structures and overlapping strategic programs. And they are important, and they'll remain important; but there's another side of this story. Because of Kosovo, Libya, Basra, and Helmand, there are also a lot of senior officials in the U.S. military that believe there's less and less to the partnership. They don't always appreciate the resource constraints the British have been operating under, but it's precisely those constraints that will continue to exist or perhaps get worse. On the intelligence front, it's been a number of years since I've been involved in these matters. All I can say is that, based on what's been said here and elsewhere, it appears that after 9/11 there was a quantum jump in deepening those ties. So, that's on the plus side. However, I would note that because of the global character of the terrorist problem, and as recent press stories have made clear, the U.S. now has more partners in this field than just the UK and Australia.

Of course, when you have more partners that means the one partner that you relied on for so long and so deeply with can't help but be somewhat less important. It doesn't mean it's not very important; it just means that these things are relative. Of course the Snowden leaks have created considerable uncertainty about this whole area of cooperation going forward. I must say that, before I came down here this week, for my sins of doing transatlantic at the American Enterprise Institute, I had to host a number of EU parliamentarians.

Female: Gary had fun this week.

Gary: Yeah. What I took away from that discussion was that I actually think it won't be that hard to put back in place the intelligence ties between Washington and Berlin, Washington and London, Washington and Paris, precisely because those governments have a requirement to take care of their own country's security. What's going to be more difficult, what's going to be more problematic, is the fact that Brussels actually has a lot less direct responsibility for domestic security. The concern about privacy by politicians in Brussels

is going to override the balance that we've tried to strike between liberty and safety with our allies. In that sense I do worry that things could get further out of control.

On the nuclear end of things, my British friends tell me that the hurdle of sustaining the nuclear deterrent has been met. With the updating of the Weapons Cooperation Agreement of 2006 it certainly appears that matters are on the right track. However, I would say with the bill for the UK's strategic modernization potentially eating up something like 25 percent of future defense expenditures, one does have to wonder whether some future governments might change course and argue that the 25 percent could be better spent on other things. Moreover, the strategic environment is increasingly problematic for the Special Relationship. Both the president and a large number of Republicans seem bound and determined to get out of the Middle East and rebalance to Asia. The U.S. administration had to be dragged into Libya. It wants nothing to do with Syria, and the government was embarrassingly slow to offer even logistic support for the French effort in Mali.

Gary: So the two countries' strategic priorities — especially when it comes to Europe's rim — are not in line these days, and indeed seem to be growing apart. Because of the changing priorities, it can't help but make both countries seem less relevant to each other. This matters because whenever the Special Relationship has hit a bumpy road in the past, there was always the backdrop of the Soviet threat that kept things on track. Now, I think the irony is, returning to the jihadist question put before the panel, 9/11 might've provided that galvanizing strategic vision for the Special Relationship but, the fact is that neither country was prepared for the wars they took on.

The British SDR in 1998 pointed to a British military capability that would be designed to gain rapid success in expeditionary operations. With modern equipment and an analogous but smaller force structure than the Americans, it would allow Britain to punch "above its weight." But London found itself in two wars where success would not be rapid, and many more boots on the ground would be needed. Similarly, while the U.S. had more boots to put on the ground, it still didn't have enough to handle the insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan, with the result that the lack of success in both countries that has created a public backlash which has both politicians and publics saying "never again."

As Kurt noted, however, it would be historically naïve to think that we won't be in some serious crisis and calling upon each other as we have in the past. But the issue here is what capabilities will we be calling on? I want to conclude by suggesting that I don't think the Special Relationship will suddenly disappear. The long history of cooperation runs too deep for that to happen. However, the changing strategic landscape can't help but affect how that relationship unfolds in the years ahead. Ties will undoubtedly remain close, but how truly special they remain I think is still an open question.

Moderator: Thank you, Gary. Martyn?

Martyn: I'd like to add my own note of thanks to the organizers for putting on this wonderful conference and for inviting me here. I have the dubious privilege of being the last act on the bill. I know that I'm the only thing standing between us now and hearing from Professor Leffler and from the football, so I'll try to keep it brief. There were two parts to what Dame Pauline Neville-Jones called our essay question: the Special Relationship and conflict and jihadism. Given the esteemed audience in front of me and the very valuable

contributions we've had already, I'm going to do what the worst undergraduates do and basically ignore half of that essay question, because I'm not sure there's much I can really add to the overview of the Special Relationship. I'll instead focus more on the question of the conflict and jihadism and how the British and American governments approach that conflict, and do so ending up back where we started, with Professor Bobbitt's comments on the uses of history and the way in which history can be a dangerous to try and apply to the foreign policymaking world, but the reality is it's a tool that is used in almost every case.

Martyn: There are of course different histories we could look to in thinking about this question of the conflict of jihadism. We could look to the history of the Anglo-U.S. relationship in the broader Middle East region, which there's no question constitutes the crucial critical strategic environment for this conflict. Alternatively we could look at the past histories of the way in which Britain and the United States dealt with the challenge of political violence from non-state actors, i.e., the history of terrorism and responses to it. If I can be permitted a very brief digression, I have to say it's striking, having spent the first ten years of my research career studying Northern Ireland and the next three to four years trying to get away from it, I've come to the other side of the world and find out there's no escape from it in Austin, Texas in terms of discussions of Northern Ireland in the last two days. But in many ways this shouldn't have been a surprise to me given, as we've heard particularly from Sir David Omand, how formative an experience this was for the British political [unintelligible 1:03:44] and intellectual classes and elites.

If I can be permitted just to reinforce what I think Gary mentioned — and there's no question this is not the time to delve into it in any detail, but just to respond to some of the things we've heard over the last two days. I think it is encouraging that understandings of what happened in Northern Ireland have progressed. I think it was very heartening to hear today what everyone was saying yesterday. The key to the peace process in Northern Ireland was the waging of a high-grade intelligence war against the IRA, which led to the degradation of that organization's capacity. And yet I think there is still a tendency, as Gary was saying, to sanitize aspects of that war, to downplay its murky and inconvenient aspects. So if we ask how did the British Security Services come to obtain high-grade intelligence on the IRA, it was by doing things like running informers and agents in that organization, men who had blood on their hands, who were involved in many murders, and were prepared to do pretty unpleasant things in order to stay where they were. Then if we think about how the security services did degrade the IRA's capacity, again as Gary mentioned, it was by being prepared to eliminate literally the perceived irreformable elements.

The SAS was used repeatedly in the late '80s and early '90s to kill IRA volunteers, some 30 IRA volunteers killed in a 5-year period, and let's be clear: extrajudicial killings of British citizens on British soil. So hard power no question played an indelible role in bringing the IRA to the point where they were prepared to settle on essentially British terms. So whilst it is true that the British learned to avoid using the blunt fist in the early years of the conflict as Sir David Omand said, let's be clear that the rapier remained just that, and it retained a lethal edge. So with that cathartic intervention behind me, I can go back to what I was originally going to talk about. I mentioned two places where we can think of historical lessons from our past experience in terms of interventions in the Middle East, experiences of dealing with terrorism. A third approach would be to look into the broader history obviously of the Cold War and the way in which the West waged a conflict in which

the key terrain was ideological. It raised questions about values and identity, and I was struck by Douglas Feith's brief remarks on this yesterday, but we didn't really sort of explore it any further. It's something I might like to do more, perhaps in the questions; I don't know.

Of course these sorts of different approaches I've outlined are not mutually exclusive. Reflections of one kind unquestionably flow into another, and so it was for me when I read Kori's very stimulating paper, which seemed to me to draw on some of the insights of the third approach in emphasizing the cultural aspects that our societies possess in tackling this liberal totalitarian-inspired violence from the various jihadist phenomenon, particularly in an ever more connected and globalizing world. Kori's assertion in the paper that she produced that we shouldn't shy away from reaching into other societies, or as she said earlier today, reaching past governments. In terms of how we do that, how do we reach past governments? How do reach into other societies? Yes, as Gary has just said, there are clearly limits to what governments can do in terms of this soft power. But actually again if we look at the history of Anglo-American foreign policymaking, one of the things that governments have quite often done, dating back to the British Imperial era, is look to find allies at the local level and look to find moderates. We reach what I call, if you like, the dilemma of the moderates.

Martyn: Again, this follows on from what Dame Pauline Neville-Jones said about debates within the British domestic context about prevention and who you work with in order to align your domestic prevention policy, but it does have a clear foreign policy component. Again I think this is where the ties come together. When we think about who are the moderates, who are our allies, who are they, what does it mean when we label someone or something, a group, moderate? Perhaps above all in the context of this struggle with jihadism, how do we stimulate a process in moderation? How do we make moderates? This last issue is one that there's a huge political science literature out there around things like the inclusion/moderation debate. As the name suggests this would hold that a readiness to include of the two rightful actors won't necessarily lead into moderating their actions, and equally an exclusion of them won't push them towards radicalization. At first glance I think one of the reasons why the inclusion/moderation paradigm has been so alluring is that there is superficial plausibility to it, but there are several problems with it. First it tends to privilege an analysis of the environment in which radical terrorist groups operate, and it downplays questions of ideology.

The structure, instead beliefs and behaviors are assumed to be a function solely of the environment and the context in which a group or individual operates. What this in turn neglects is the extent to which changes in the external context, changes in the external environment for a group can product divergent responses, both radicalizing and moderating at the same time. Again, just to illustrate this, if I draw an example from what I know best, which is what happened in Northern Ireland, you take an example like the 1981 hunger strikes, in which the British government was held by many Catholic Nationalists in Northern Ireland to have allowed ten IRA members to starve themselves to death. It was accused of having done that, and this episode was seen by many to sort of have polarized society in Northern Ireland, to have given fuel to the IRA, and there's no question that to some extent it did. And yet the same accounts also pointed to the fact that it was in this period that members of the IRA such as Gerard Adams began to properly consider charting a path away from violence. He could see how this one key episode can produce both radicalizing and moderating reactions.

What determines the predominant response again links to questions of organizational structure, organizational dynamics, and the role of individuals within it. I know that the work of various people such as Carrie Wickham points to and makes similar sorts of arguments in regards to the Muslim Brotherhood. I think this leads on to the second major problem — this regards the inclusion/moderation thesis —the desperate attempt often to identify and recruit moderates to the cause. As I said this has been a feature of British and American foreign policymaking for the last 200 years and probably beyond. Again, this is maybe not the time to discuss why it is. There are various reasons as to why it is, and it's one of the things I'm thinking about a lot in my research, but it's clear that the ideas of working with moderates is a staple of diplomatic practice, but there are a number of problems arising from it.

Martyn: Again, what do we mean by the term moderate? Is this an absolute or relative label? Does it reflect behavior? Does it reflect values? Does it simply equate to nonviolence, or do we mean it to go beyond that? To throw such matters into stark relief, we might consider a *London Times* editorial from the 2nd of July, 1934, which reflected optimistically on the recent Night of the Long Knives in Germany and suggested that now the comparatively moderate Adolf Hitler might now tame the more revolutionary forces within the Nazi Party. Now, with hindsight clearly we can see this is in a way darkly comic, but the point is that on its own terms, the *Times* writer had correctly identified the forces in play. Hitler was more moderate than Ernest Röhm in terms of his belief in a more controlled application of violence at that point in time. Of course, given subsequent events few would use the word "moderate" to describe Adolf Hitler. Another question flowing from that same example of course is the relationship between engagement in democratic politics and moderations. Are those who participate democratically to be seen as moderate or not? Again, other issues arising from this example are questions about causes and consequence of moderation in any given context.

So just to finish my remarks by tying these issues back to the issue at hand: the debates over Islamism, which have gone back to the 1990s, the democratization debate and whether the broader Islamist phenomenon could be brought into sort of fourth-wave democratization in the Middle East and debates of whether or not they could be or were moderate partners. These debates were clearly given added impetus in the post-9/11 world, and new questions about the relationships between jihadists and the broader Islamist firmament. Should the broader groups like the Muslim Brotherhood be seen as a bulwark against jihadists? Or is it a conveyor belt to them? As I said, I think against this background a key question has been how to view the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, given this is perhaps the foremost Islamist group in the world and plays a key role, as we've seen in the last two years in Egypt. This indeed is the subject that I'm working on, so it's quite in the front of my mind in terms of my recent, current, and future research of how Western powers see the Muslim Brotherhood both historically and in the future.

Really the most recent thing I've done is to go through the cables that were leaked and produced by WikiLeaks to see what you could see there about Western views of the Brotherhood. On the one hand there we can chart a context and relationship that goes back to the 1980s, varying levels of contact but one which was ultimately subordinated to the relationship with the Egyptian State. To anyone who follows sort of contemporary Egyptian political discourse, it's therefore a useful corrective to the wilder conspiracy theories of the last two years about the relationship between the United States and the

Brotherhood. More significant I think were, from looking at those cables, the repeated U.S. efforts to categorize the Brotherhood, to read its internal runes to try to decipher its organization, because what emerges is a very mixed picture.

In the light of the late 1980s the picture of the talk within the cables is one that sees the Muslim Brotherhood as defanged, rehabilitated. There's a model of moderation at one point. But in the 1990s there's a shift in diplomatic consensus to focusing more on the Brotherhood's anti-American and anti-Israeli positions. At the same time efforts to determine hawks and doves within this organization and this effort to decide that the factions within the Brotherhood are again very instructive. The terms used, such as "alleged divide between religiously oriented conservatives and politically oriented moderates" attempt to identify where individuals stood in terms of these categories. The reality is you actually find individuals within the Brotherhood being variously assigned to different categories at different points, none of which is to lampoon or ridicule the diplomats involved, nor to impugn their ability; merely to draw attention to the very difficult and in some ways artificial nature of this attempt to find and identify moderates.

Martyn: In this regard perhaps the most telling remark I found comes from former Ambassador Margaret Scobey, who stated boldly, quote, "Labels like 'conservative' and 'reformer' are shorthand terms used by outside observers to describe Muslim Brotherhood members in Arabic, but not necessarily used by the actors to describe themselves." In other words, they've involved the projection onto an organization of a framework that exists in the eye of the beholder more than in the context of the group that's being examined. These difficulties in deciding how to categorize the Brotherhood I think reflect on the difficulties of this whole process of trying to identify moderates. Often it can obscure as much as it reveals. The reality is that these groups and indeed individuals can exhibit, as I've said, both moderate and radical tendencies at different points but also at the same time. There is no standard endpoint when we think about how we might define these groups.

Certainly there's been no shared understanding of what moderation looks like, and these groups have involved in different ways. So when we're reaching out into other societies and taking on this challenge that Kori in her paper I think rightly suggested we must, to return to where I began, I think history suggests we must proceed with a great degree of caution and always be asking — various references yesterday from Ernest May and others. His big insight for me is to always to be asking self-critical assumptions, searching questions, challenging our own conventional wisdoms as we proceed. With that I'll finish.

Moderator: Thank you, Martyn. [Unintelligible 1:18:03] not a lot of time. Just let me very briefly offer another observation, because we heard in the last panel for ideas for future conferences. One thing that occurred to me in this discussion with phrases like moderation, the rim, the periphery, preemption we've heard at various times, [unintelligible 1:18:22], another P of critical importance. There's a big point in there about 19th century British strategic culture, which is perhaps much more pertinent to the world in which we live in the 21st century. It's an aspect of shared political culture. You have Protestantism as a big linkage between U.S. and UK perceptions of itself in the world, the idea that a nation as an instrument of good as well as an individual. The 19th century British strategic culture, if I were to give the tabloid version, is not about imperial growth or large standing armies. It's actually a preference for nonintervention by and large, but a willingness to use compulsion, period bombardments and acts of preemption — that's the reality of 19th century British foreign policy — through the navy.

The attempt to construct an international architecture of treaties that keeps you out of wars but essentially is constructed in your own self-image. So perhaps there's something in Britain's 19th century desire for a light footprint, desire to avoid wars, but willingness to use compulsion, all of which I think is perhaps the subject of further discussions. But we have about 15 minutes very strictly for questions. I saw some hands shoot up, so I'm going to give it to David first, and we'll take these two questions up here.

David: I think I ought to intervene, just to correct the impression that Martyn and Gary gave about what was actually happening in Northern Ireland. The use of preemptive intelligence enabled Special Forces to set up ambushes for armed gangs in the course of their attacks. On a few occasions the terrorists gave themselves up, were arrested, put on trial, convicted. Mostly, since they were armed themselves, they fought back and were then overwhelmed by superior firepower from the Special Forces. That is entirely consistent with international human rights law. It's a world away from targeted killing by drones outside a battle space. Now, Pauline is right, and I believe she is profoundly right, that we must respect the spread of violent jihadism across areas such as into West Africa.

It seems to me imperative that a transatlantic effort is made to redefine the use of force in the latest sorts of circumstances to get some new legal norms, which enable those who clearly are taking up arms against us to be tackled within some international humanitarian law framework, and to get that internationally laid down. Because without that I think we will have considerable tension. Finally, a very quick historical footnote on Snowden and friends spying on friends. In 1942 Winston Churchill wrote President Roosevelt to say that British cryptanalysts had discovered flaws in American diplomatic cypher systems which enabled them to be read. Since we were now shoulder-to-shoulder at war, Mr. Churchill thought it was worth the Americans knowing that their cyphers were insecure — a wonderful example of trust. He ended his letter by saying, "Mr. President, please tell as few people as possible of this, and burn this letter after you've read it."

Moderator: Thank you, David. I'll give the panel a chance to respond, but we'll just take two questions here, and then I'll [unintelligible 1:22:10] response. Yes?

Rob: My first point, which I'll just make as an assertion, is that the institutions for coalition policymaking between the U.S. and UK are actually quite underdeveloped. There is a lot of coalition interaction and consultation. That's not the same thing as coalition policymaking. Actually the quad in the old days — and not the kind of quad Doug was talking about. There was an earlier quad that was an outgrowth of the Berlin group that actually used to play a rather valuable surrogate role. Despite all the institutions we've talked about, that's underdeveloped.

The only other point I'd make, and this is a comment about the conference more generally, is in many ways it's very backward-looking. The emphasis and all the topics we've discussed are heavy political, military, intelligence, and security oriented. It's very oriented of course naturally towards the post-9/11 era. I do not think actually the future is going to look a lot like the past. I think the agenda is shifting fairly rapidly. I think the distinctions between what we thought was foreign policy and domestic policy are increasingly blurred. The institutions we're talking about, our comparative domestic policies are way underdeveloped, including within our governments. In this light therefore it's worth noting that the Special Relationship is going to be tested very much in

things like the TTIP negotiations going on right now that may be extremely important for both our societies — and I don't think have been touched on yet in the conference — or on issues like international finance, where the cause of the city and the significance of the Bank of England and the relationship to it of one of the three prime reserve currencies of the world, and the whole way in which international finance has been managed since the early 1980s.

The Washington/London relationship is core and has also not been mentioned. A third dimension I could single out for instance as a new agenda topic is, oh, say, energy, where the UK is actually going through an extremely interesting and informative period now in trying to look beyond its traditional North Sea orientation. It's casting about and thinking very creatively about energy issues. At the same time the United States is reconceiving its global energy role with all kinds of policy fallout. By saying all these things, this is simply designed to be indicative of some of the ways in which the agenda is changing, and not necessarily in ways that I think make me pessimistic about the value of U.S./UK discussions.

Moderator: Thank you. I'm going to take another two questions and then ask the panel to respond. I think that's the best way to do it. So the gentleman there and then —

Hal: So a couple of questions —

Moderator: This is Hal Brands for the transcript.

Hal: Hal Brands. Picking up on a couple of points that Gary made, I'm curious to get the panel's assessments — perhaps not now for lack of time, but I think there were questions on a couple of issues. One is the issue of the power disparity between the two countries. The disparity has been there forever, and it was pointed out in the last panel the disparity is less between the U.S. and the UK than between the U.S. and basically everybody else. But it does seem that the disparity is growing in the sense that for all the problems that the U.S. is having with its defense budget, my sense is that in proportional terms there is a greater trend towards retrenchment in the UK than there is in the U.S.. So my question is does there come a point at which the disparity because so great, or rather the retrenchments in the UK become so great that the partnership becomes less special in terms of our ability to do things together overseas.

That touches on a second issue. It's a little bit surprising we haven't talked more about the politics of Syria with respect to the Special Relationship. At the end of September you really had two extraordinary things happening. One was the UK voting down the idea of using force against Syria. Then the American resolution was headed for the same fate before it was pulled. It's because of a number of things, but it seems to indicate at least in part the Iraq hangover is lasting longer than a lot of people had expected. I'm curious as to your impressions of how long this hangover is going to last, because since the end of the Cold War and even before, one of the key pillars of the Special Relationship has been the willingness and ability basically to project power, to use power in an expeditionary capability. It doesn't seem as though that willingness is there. It hasn't rebounded essentially from the effects of the Iraq war, so that seems to be a very key question in thinking about the future of the relationship as well.

Moderator: Great questions. I'm going to take one more question here and then ask the panel to respond to everything.

Josh: Hi. I'm Josh [inaudible 1:27:26]. Following naturally on how [inaudible 1:27:31] other panels. I'm wondering how does the U.S. go about reassuring Britain, and how is the U.S. reassured by Britain in turn, especially when we talk about these grand strategic issues: intervention in Libya, intervention in Syria? It just seems to me that we've not really come to grips with what it means to reassure allies. We're certain [inaudible 1:27:54], particularly in an era where intervention is in some sense not obligatory. It's not like the Cold War, where the complexity of the conflict in Europe was such that structure compelled the U.S. to go in. These are in some sense wars of choice. The way in which you go about pursuing wars is wars of choice. So how does one go about reassuring an ally through those conditions when the environment doesn't enforce a decision like that?

Moderator: Pauline, will you go first?

Pauline: Right. [Unintelligible 1:28:26] just said a few things that I failed to say when I was talking earlier on, pushing the argument through a bit. Just one thing briefly about what Martyn was saying about terrorism. He's actually right to focus on the issue of whom you talk to. Who is legitimate to be talked to? That is something in the strategy that I believe we actually need to formulate. We need to formulate it, I think, between us and get others to buy into it. You really do need to have a fix on that, and it's a really hard issue, but it is one that's very, very important to any kind of political or military success in the Middle East. Second issue, which is somebody mentioned will the UK have any real capabilities in the future. What are the relevant capabilities? Because I think it's a question of what forces do you need for the future. I am less and less convinced that actually we have populations prepared to support boots on the ground for endless periods of time and big interventions, and whether in fact that gets you the results that you actually want. We must refrain, it seems to me, from trying to modernize Afghanistan and doing that around the world. It isn't something that works, I don't think.

So then the question is what are your relevant capabilities. I do believe that special forces are. I do believe, despite all the problems that drones are, that we are going to be doing something which is much more distant, which is certainly intervention and use of force, but of a different kind. There I think the disparities are certainly still there, but not nearly as huge. Something the capabilities underpin that, both good armed forces, good armies, but also intelligence are actually shared. So I'm not so convinced that actually this disparity issue, certainly for the foreseeable future, is actually key to the relationship. I might say that I want to see the UK swing back to something which is much more of a traditional posture of small standing army — you don't need a big standing army — and better navy and more service ships, relevant to the whole question of the pivot. That's the other thing I really wanted to say. By the way, I don't actually think that Syria signals the end of intervention, but I do think it signals the end of boots on the ground. I do think it does.

Five Eyes. One thing I didn't say is I think increasingly one of the things that will happen, partly because of all our issues that we face over cyber, is that the Anglo-U.S. relationship in intelligence is going to morph into something which is Five Eyes based. It's relevant obviously to the shift in power across the world and the emergence obviously of China and the South China Sea as a potential area for all sorts of kinds of conflict. Actually there the

UK/Australia relationship is generally relevant to the extent to which the UK will actually continue to be interested in that part of the world. So don't count us out, but it's one of the reasons why I want to see us have a bigger navy. So I think that in looking forward some of the issues that we're going to be facing do include terrorism, no doubt.

I mean, we need to have force capability, but a lot of them have to do with long-term resilience. Rob's absolutely right to focus on things like energy security. I'd say commodity security, given the way the Chinese consume large chunks of natural resources. The agenda is genuinely changing. I don't think it's one however that challenges the principle of the Special Relationship. I think it's one that actually is capable of being poked with by both sides, provided that we actually also however deal with some of our self-created problems, if I can put it that way, and actually get our populations behind us. That's why I keep on coming back — I'm sorry if I sound like a cracked record on this, but we do need to get the confidence of our populations that we are actually reasonable governments that actually obey the law. The problem with telling them it's lawful doesn't mean to say they necessarily agree with the law. It's actually governance of that lawfulness, and that's the area of clarity that we need to get in getting the popular assent behind future policy.

Moderator: Gary, Kori, I told you I'd be harsh: one minute each. Gary?

Gary: Okay, really quick. On the 19th century, I think that's a great idea, as long as you include the end of the 19th century, whose relevance has to do with the rise of Germany and how the UK deals with that. On the European rim, I think it's a mistake for the United States to be moving away from trying to help Europe with the rim.

Pauline: Hooray.

Gary: Now, precisely for a hardheaded reason, which is that if you want an alliance to work, there has to be some quid pro quo, which is that even if something isn't in our direct interest, it's in our ally's interest. And if you want them to help elsewhere, just as we discovered in Kosovo and then Afghanistan, you have to have these kinds of ties in relations, even though the strategic priorities might not be exactly the same among allies. On the disparity question, I think the lesson from Afghanistan and Iraq can be the opposite, which is that if we'd had more boots on the ground, we wouldn't have been there as long, and we might've been more successful. That's debatable of course, but that's what I would argue.

On the second part of the disparity thing, though, putting aside for the moment the issue of whether the army should be larger or smaller. The problem in the UK is that the navy's and the air force's capabilities are shrinking so badly that, regardless of whether there are boots on the ground, there's a shrinking capability that makes the Special Relationship less special. Finally on the point about governments speaking about the capabilities we have when it comes to intelligence, I just would say it's incredibly embarrassing that the Obama Administration — and I'm going to be partisan here — has thrown the U.S. intelligence community under the bus. There is absolutely no way in the world that a president doesn't know his intelligence agencies are listening in the conversations of other nations' leaders. It's just impossible. I've been there. It's just ridiculous to pretend otherwise.

Moderator: Okay, a partisan grenade on the bus. As brief as you can.

- Kori: So I think we are going to have an Iraq hangover for 20 years. I mean, this is Vietnam redux. I also think we're going to have an Afghanistan hangover. The Iraq hangover is, "We're supposed to be good at this, and we bungled it this badly, and not just at the start but all the way through." The Afghanistan hangover I think Pauline exemplified in her comments, which is, "We found a very elegant, very successful strategy that is so costly and time-consuming, my mom wants nothing to do with it. In fact, our strategy for managing terror is going to be more standoff, more kinetic, and more intelligence-dependent, none of which may make it more successful." But we are choosing to have a set of problems, because we don't want to have the set of problems associated with our prior answer, and I think that's at least a 20-year timeline.
- Pauline: Plus building up little capabilities, Kori. I mean, that is a key part of it.
- Kori: Yeah, but again, we have some experience with that in the School of Americas and other places, and the problem is your military training outruns your judicial training, your democratization training. So on the Britain being less special, I had it persuasively argued to me yesterday, as did you, that President Obama went to Congress because Prime Minister Blair lost the vote in Parliament.
- Male: Cameron.
- Kori: Cameron, excuse me. That strikes me as a pretty demanding standard of "special," because I can't think of another country whose domestic debate would have such enormous repercussions in the United States context.
- Moderator: Martyn, finally I'll pass it around.
- Martyn: Very finally and very shortly, just on the shifting agenda for the future. I think there's a great point from Philip Zelikow about this decreasing distinction between the foreign and domestic, faced with this global jihadist threat, which really short of shines a light on it. Again, the British experience has been the real challenges of constructing policy to respond to that and the question of even which agency operates in sort of dealing with this challenge. There have been problems in terms of the foreign office getting involved domestically, not always particularly successfully, but I think partly because they're operating in this in world in which it's very unclear who does manage the response. Secondly, finally just the changing strategic environment in terms of the broader impact of the Arab Spring, which in some ways I'm surprised hasn't come up more in the last two days — no real mention of Egypt, for example, and what's happened there, and the striking absence of, it seems to me, a strategic understanding on the part of the current administration on how to deal with that sort of rapidly changing situation.
- Moderator: Brilliant answers. Thank you for keeping it so short. Lunch is the same place as yesterday. Make your way there as quickly as possible. Go Longhorns.

**[End File. Recorded Time = 1:38:28 = 99 minutes]**