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Diplomacy, Alliances and War: Anglo-American Perspectives on History and Strategy in the September 11th Era

A Joint University of Texas-Austin and King's College London Conference

Panel 4: History and the Special Relationship

Panelists:	Kurt Volker, James Ellison
Discussants:	Rob Singh, Tom Mahnken
Moderator:	Jeremi Suri

November 2, 2013 | 8:15 AM – 10:00 AM
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[Note to Reader: When possible, speakers are identified by first name. If not, then Respondent is used for panelists and discusssants, and Audience is used for attendees.]

[Begin File: Panel 4A.mp3]

William: I'll be turning it over to our first panel this morning, chaired by my dear friend and esteemed colleague Jeremi Suri, so he'll introduce our speakers. Just one or two housekeeping items. As many of you know, with the football game this afternoon, when they changed the start time of it, we have to move our sessions forward; hence the early start today. So we will make every effort to keep on a disciplined schedule this morning through Professor Leffler's closing lunch talk. Then for those of us who are going to the game, Cathy will be handing out your tickets during the second session or the lunch time. We will certainly endeavor to meet in the lower lobby at 1:45, so pretty much as soon as the last session ends you can go up to your room, finish checking out and what have you, and then meet in the lower lobby at 1:45. Then we'll walk over to the stadium from there. With that I will turn it over to Professor Suri.

Moderator: So we're just the pregame show here right now. It's my great honor to be able to chair this panel and the part of this wonderful conference. I was thinking last night as I was recounting to my wife what we had done, that we had had really great insights on a number of issues, certainly the issue of the connections between historical knowledge and policymaking. I think Lord Reid, the lecturer at lunch, really brought together many of the ideas. I think we had a wonderful discussion about intelligence. These discussions circled around the U.S./UK relationship, this so-called Special Relationship, and I think it's quite appropriate we now have a panel on exactly that issue. I think our panel is really about the ways in which the Special Relationship is deeply connected to the history of these two societies and the history of policymaking in these two societies. The papers we have today, two very fine papers, really look at how we can use this history to better understand our contemporary relations across the Atlantic, and where we might be going from here.

If you've just seen in today's *New York Times*, there are all sorts of questions about the future of the transatlantic relationship, and I think this is a quite appropriate moment to reflect historically and look forward at the same time. So I know we'll have a wonderful discussion. We have two papers, each of which will be delivered in 15 minutes, and then we'll have 2 sets of comments, 10 minutes apiece. Then we'll open things up for discussion and debate. I will introduce the presenters right now. They are individuals who really don't need any introduction, but I'll give them one anyway.

Our first speaker will be former Ambassador Kurt Volker. He's now the Executive Director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership, where he has already put on his staff one of our wonderful LBJ graduates, and hopefully he'll have many more on his staff soon. We hope to become the McCain Institute for our best students. Kurt is the former Ambassador to NATO, and he is also former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, as well as the Director for European and Eurasian Affairs on the NSC, so he's deeply involved in these issues at both the ambassadorial level and strategic planning level as well.

After Kurt Volker we have my friend James Ellison. We go back many years. James teaches at Queen Mary University of London, and he's the author of a number of important books on this subject, two of which include *Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 1955-1958*, and then another book, *United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-1968*. Our distinguished commentators include Robert Singh to my right. He teaches in the Department of Politics at Birkbeck College at the University of London. I think he's also taught at four or five different Oxford Colleges: Trinity College Dublin and the University of Edinburgh, so he's made the rounds. Then to his right is my friend Tom Mahnken, who is a Senior Research Professor at SAIS at Johns Hopkins, as well as the Jerome Levey Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College. I've never actually asked you, Tom, what economic geography is.

Tom: It's a license to do interesting research and sponsor interesting conferences.

Moderator: Excellent. That's a nice Chair. Very good. Tom is the author of a number of books I know many of you have read: *Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945,* which actually connects to one of the discussions we had yesterday, and also *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918 - 1941*. So without further ado, Ambassador Volker.

Kurt: We're not doing video, right? It's only audio that you're doing?

Moderator: I believe so.

Male: Just audio.

Kurt: So I'm free to get up?

Moderator: Please.

Kurt: Let me do that. I hate standing behind furniture. It's 8:15 in the morning, and if I sit down talking, I will not only put you to sleep; I will put myself to sleep. I think that was a great introduction, so thank you for doing that. I just wanted to emphasize why I might have been invited to speak here. Among the things that were rolled off in the introduction was that I spent the first four years in the Bush Administration in the National Security Council, nominally in charge of U.S./UK relations. Of course I had no sort of authority like that, but what I did do was a lot of the briefing memos, a lot of the note-taking, a lot of the listening in to hear the conversations to find out what was going on and how we support that. As a result of that I can say from my own personal experience that you don't need to hear from me this morning, because you already heard from Mike Gerson last night.

Kurt: Mike put it much more eloquently and with much richer examples than I think I can give you this morning. But the basic point was that the Special Relationship, both as a structural phenomenon but also as a personal phenomenon between President Bush and Prime Minster Blair, was quite real and quite important during the Bush/Blair time period leading up into and after the war in Iraq. I think that is something that is important for us to stress. In fact, as I think about it, I want to congratulate Will and the other organizers here, because I think you succeeded in assembling the 15 policymakers from both sides of the Atlantic who actually believe that. The common narrative is quite the opposite. The common narrative, the public narrative is that the U.S./UK Special Relationship is at best a sentimental relic, if it ever really existed. The U.S. has strong important national interests and will plow ahead of those.

The UK perhaps believed in some kind of lingering Special Relationship and so sacrificed all of its interests, all of its integrity in order to follow blindly this United States to disastrous results. I think that is the narrative that is really out there. Now, as I said, I agree with Mike, and I agree with many of you. I think that narrative is completely wrong, but I think it's probably worth talking a little bit about why does it exist. What are the elements that make up that narrative and make it wrong? Where does that leave us? What do we do today as the U.S. and the UK to figure out how to work together along with the support of our publics in the future? Well, I'd say there are five observations I that would make about what's driving that narrative. The first one is a gross tendency to underestimate George W. Bush. The narrative about Bush is that he was unsophisticated, unintelligent, uncurious, belligerent, that he really was just a cowboy in office plowing ahead, no knowledge and no intellectual input to it.

If that's the narrative that you believe about President Bush, then hitching your wagon to him clearly is an idiotic thing to do. That is where I think the UK narrative starts: by underestimating President Bush. For those of us who worked with him — and I see many in this room who did — he was phenomenally intelligent, very quick, very funny, and very modest as a human being. He was obviously a very strong leader, but as a human being also a lot of self-deprecating human, a very "human" human being as well. It's no coincidence that the phrase "compassionate conservatism" started with his candidacy, because he wanted to be compassionate. I can give you a couple of examples of this that just illustrate the point, but when you prepared a briefing memo for President Bush, which we did on a multiple-times-a-day basis — and he got hundreds of these — you would have to get them in by a certain deadline that evening.

He would read it somehow in the hours between when he finished his official dinner that he was having for somebody that night, and when he showed up in the Oval Office at 6:30 in the morning to start making phone calls. He managed to read and process and digest all of this. You were then sent over early in the morning to go brief him for his phone calls, which immediately he'd cut you off, because he'd already read what you had written, and he started asking questions. The reason for his questions was not that he wanted to know something that you had written down; he was testing your belief. He wanted to see how strongly you knew what you were saying and how strongly you believed it, as a way of calibrating how strongly he should make a point or a pitch that he was just about to do.

Then another example just in the illustration, I remember a time we were flying to Denmark for an official visit to Denmark. I briefed him on the plane about what was the

sequence of meetings and what we were doing. As a policy person you're focused on what is our goal here, and there was an element of climate change, and there was an element of Iraq, and there was an element of Afghanistan. But among the things was a misstatement on my part of where the meeting was going to be, so what was the transportation from where he was staying to where the meeting was. This is something that changed while we were in the air. Sure enough the very first thing the next morning, as we all sit down to do the morning briefing, that's the first thing out of his mouth. He said, "Volker, you said this was going to be here."

Kurt: This was important, because it meant that he wanted people to have the facts right. He wasn't imposing a false paradigm on anything. He wanted the facts. He wanted them to be right, and he wanted that high standard of integrity and a high standard of quality, which is important, because that is contrary to the image that anyone in the public would have of President Bush. So that's the first driver, and the second driver is people have a tendency to underestimate Prime Minister Blair as well. The image of Blair especially in the UK being one of being glib, slippery, the guy who introduced spin to Downing Street, the whole image of Alastair Campbell, all of that attaching to the Prime Minister as being kind of a charlatan who tricked his way through three general elections. Again, anyone who worked with Prime Minister Blair — and there are a number of you here — knows that narrative is equally false. It could not be further from the truth.

I think the defining thing about Prime Minister Blair, and we've heard it now from many speakers, is that he was a person who had convictions, and he acted as a prime minister based on his convictions of what he believed to be right and to be wrong, what was in the interest of the UK and in the interest of wider humanity. That drove his decision making. That again is not the narrative you get in the UK today, but I believe that to fundamentally be true. A third reason, another thing that we tend to underestimate is the influence that the UK had on U.S. thinking and policymaking. I think that there's a tendency in the UK principally, but also to a degree in the U.S. of, "We did this. We did this. We didn't get any credit. The U.S. made all the decisions. We were just run roughshod over. We tried, but." Not so. Not so. First off, it starts again with President Bush. He strongly valued the insights and input of Prime Minister Blair. He wouldn't have done a weekly video conference with him if he didn't value that, and clearly he did. He also admired the degree to which Prime Minister Blair was willing to stand up, make a decision, and stand by it, a very rare trait among the other allies, I have to say.

So the decision to take the Iraq War vote to Parliament, a willingness to do the work to get a positive vote on that, a willingness to be among the first countries to go in on the invasion of Iraq when he didn't have to. As we heard last night, given an opt-out he chose not to do it. All of these things impressed President Bush immensely because of Blair's willingness to stand up and be committed. Blair did that not because he wanted that approval; he did it because he thought this was the right thing to do to get to the best outcome. There are a couple of examples that Mike gave last night, and they were the same ones that I load into my remarks. They are just concrete examples that people should be aware of if they need them, to say how did the UK have influence. One of them was this two-stage vote on the Security Council resolution on going into Iraq. Nobody — nobody — in the National Security Council of the White House thought that this was a good idea. We could see the writing on the wall.

Kurt: This is a slippery slope to losing the critical momentum that we'd been building up as to what to do. But it was important to Prime Minister Blair to make the effort to bring the French on board. It was important in order to demonstrate to the Parliament in the UK that there is a way forward without a conflict, and we are trying to find that before we end up in a conflict. I think it was a tremendous step on President Bush's part to say to the UK, "We will go along. We will do that. We don't agree. We don't like it, but we know that it's important, and we will make our best effort for that." The second was the work on the Israeli/Palestinian issue. As you heard from Mike, the first part of the Bush Administration was reframing the Israeli/Palestinian negotiation, saying you've got to have a Palestinian state, but you've got to have a democratic Palestinian state, and Yasser Arafat is the wrong guy to create that.

The second part though was in the second term of the Bush Administration, where again seeing that we were just stuck. Having come up with a model, we weren't moving. There was a lot of push from Prime Minister Blair and others saying we have to do more. That led to the effort to create a new negotiating process, the Annapolis Conference. Participants in that say it's as close as they feel they've ever been. I think that is also an example of that influence. The fourth thing that we tend to underestimate is the day-to-day. There's an enormous amount of cross embedding of people in intelligence services, in the military. There's an extraordinary amount of direct communication between senior officials at every level in every agency, so the influence of the UK is not only in the prime minister pushing something on the president. A significant part of that influence is shaping the way the Americans actually think day to day in what we're doing every day at every level, and that is equally important.

That gets to the point about where were we in the war in Iraq. It wasn't either that the U.S. disregarded the good advice from the UK, and if we had listened, then everything would've been fine; or that the UK was the one really calling the shots. It was a collaborative collective decision. We made mistakes along the way, but we made the mistakes jointly as we came to the same conclusions together. Then the final thing that I think we tend to underestimate that drives this narrative is the importance of values in political and policy decision-making, especially during the Bush Administration. It wasn't enough to say that we had a national interest in this. We had to look at what the values equation was as well. If you take the narrative of why went into the war in Iraq, you hear all sorts of crazy things. "We did it for the oil. We did to finish the job that Bush 41 had started. We did it to avenge an assassination attempt on Bush the elder that Bush the younger wanted payback for."

This is all crazy. It had nothing to do with that. In fact, the simplest explanation is usually the right one, and in this case the simplest explanation is what the leaders actually said they were doing at the time, which was an inordinate — a tremendous worry about the possibility of WMD and terrorists getting together and what that mean for us, and secondly that in stopping that problem we would also be freeing the Iraqi people from a horrible dictatorship and trying to create — and this is more Prime Minister Blair than President Bush initially, although he also adopted this point of view — an alternative in the Middle East between the crazy terrorists and the crazy dictators. That is something that is still plaguing us today. We got started on it; we got it wrong; we then walked away; it has metastasized; and we haven't come back to that to say, "How do we get a Middle East that is not dominated by these two extreme elements?"

Kurt: So that I think explains why the misperceptions about the role of the Special Relationship and now. The question now is what do you do. There is this public perception, vastly different from the reality. I don't think now, as we have both changed, we can just go back to where we started and pick up. I don't think that's possible. I think in this country in particular we have a degree of emerging isolationism, war fatigue, and a sense that we need to pull back and focus domestically. Both political parties are looking more at those issues than trying to figure out how we should engage to solve problems in the world, a kind of "pox on all their houses" approach to the Middle East. I don't think we can just pick up there, so what I would advocate — and this is actually what we are doing, so it's not a shock either — keep in place all of the coordination, all of the relationships, all the mechanisms, all the cross-embedding of personnel, all the day-to-day mundane stuff that has already been developed.

Keep that there. Make the effort to cross the Atlantic and meet people and get inside their thinking loops. We're not going to do anything with that right now. We can't. We're just not mentally there, and frankly neither is the UK, as we saw in the vote in the British Parliament on the suggestion that we should bomb Syria. But keep those things in place, because there will come, probably not too long a time from now — remember it was only 30 months between Kosovo and 9/11. It won't be that long when there will be a crisis that we do feel a need to respond to, and it's going to be those relationships and those patterns of shared thinking that will help us work together, get us straight, and make the best possible outcome out of that, rather than a disparate one. Thank you.

Moderator: Excellent. Now James Ellison.

James: I'd like to start by thanking Will Inboden, John Bew, and Michael Rainsborough for the invitation to speak at a conference so rich with people who were involved in the period in which we're all studying. It really has been an excellent conference, and it humbles a pure academic to listen to the practitioners and to realize that it produces for us as academics a great understanding of the stuff that we're writing about.

Moderator: Don't be too humble, James.

James: I'll do my best. I've learned a lot of the complexity of the Bush era from listening to the people who have been speaking from the last couple of days. It ranges widely from Douglas Feith to Sir David Omand and Sir Nigel Sheinwald. We heard a lot about that, and I think the overwhelming thing that I've remembered so far is Lord Reid's reference to how he tried to match the relationship between Condoleezza Rice and Jack Straw by asking Rumsfeld to go and watch *Brokeback Mountain* with him. It made me think what a contrast it is with the original attempt to create an Anglo-American relation in wartime origins. In 1941 in August when Churchill chose the hymns that would be sung with Franklin Delano Roosevelt up on board HMS Prince of Wales off Newfoundland, which of course was *Onward, Christian Soldiers*. I did remember that. You're no different than Churchill in many ways, Lord Reid, because he said on the moment that the Americans decided to enter the Second World War, that he was much relieved, because no lover had wooed a mistress as much as he had wooed Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It says a lot about the origins of the Anglo-American relationship.

Now, my qualification for standing here today is not that I've held public office like many of my U.S. academic colleagues, but that I've read a lot about Anglo-American relations, so

I hope you'll be interested in what I've got to say. I'm going to start in the Oval Office on the 16th of July, 2001, when President Bush sent a bust on loan from the Art Collection of the British Government. It was given him to by Sir Nigel's predecessor, Sir Christopher Meyer, who at that very moment evoked the history and the blood ties between the United Kingdom and the United States in the speech he gave. He reminded the people in the room that Churchill was of course half American, the son of Jennie Jerome, a Brooklyn, New Yorker, who was a descendant of a lieutenant named George Washington in the Revolutionary Army. He also quoted a statement that Churchill made as the first foreign citizen to receive honorary citizenship of the United States of America in 1963. "In this century of storm and tragedy I contemplate with high satisfaction the constant factor of the interwoven and upward progress of our peoples. Our comradeship and our brotherhood in war were unexampled. We stood together, and because of that fact the free world now stands."

James: That was a remarkable statement that's often been used in the history of the Anglo-American relationship, again in 2010 in the House of Representatives resolution. It's a remark on friendship and its strength between the United Kingdom and the States. On accepting the bust George Bush paid Churchill perhaps the greatest compliment he could've paid anyone. Quoting George Bush, he said, "He knew," Churchill, "what he believed, and he really went after in a way that seemed like a Texan to me. He charged ahead, and the world is better for it." Now, of course there was another Texan in the White House when Churchill died in 1965, and that was Lyndon Baines Johnson, who made a very fulsome comment on hearing of the death. "As long as men tell of that time of terrible danger," Johnson said, "and of the men who won the victory, the name of Churchill will live." Yet despite this obvious warmth that Johnson felt for Churchill, and he remarked on it many times, it's also true that in Johnson's view of the world, as one commentator who worked with him at the time said, "England figured about as large as North Dakota." I apologize to anybody here who is from North Dakota.

In at least two depictions, the passing of the bust to Bush and his acceptance of it, and in possibly Johnson's view of the world, we have the essence of the history of the Anglo-American Special Relationship. Wartime creation, familial bonds, blood ties, closeness at the top, personalities, but also the reality of power imbalance and increasing asymmetry from the mid-1960s onwards. Now, it's easy, as Ambassador Volker said, to describe the passing of the bust as just some kind of diplomatic performance which Bush had to carry out, and also easy to see Tony Blair's attachment to the Anglo-American relationship in the Bush/Blair era as anachronistic. I think these things are really entirely wrong. The one thing I've learned by listening to all of you over the last day or so is that it's a much more complex picture than has been described in the caricatures of the blood sport of anti-Americanism and anti-Special Relationship generally in the UK and also a kind of distant interest at best in the United States.

I had the opportunity to talk about Obama's visit to the United Kingdom in late 2011 and wrote a bit about it. It struck me that the British press went wild in talking about a reformed Anglo-American relationship and the call for an essential relationship, meaning that the Special Relationship had been reborn. When I looked at the United States press, it hardly featured, and that says something about the different approaches across the Atlantic, despite the fact that we hear obviously the health of the Anglo-American relationship in the period was very strong amongst the elites who dealt with it. Now, the relatively few academic commentators who have written about the Special Relationship

also, as you said, Ambassador Volker, are skeptical about his closeness in the Bush/Blair era.

James: If you read the articles in the *Journal of International Affairs* through the '90s and the 2000s, you'll see increasing comment about the Special Relationship being a barrier to Britain accepting the thing that it couldn't accept, because it was tough on its stomach, and that's the future role in the European Union, much stronger than it's been up until now. That matched with the criticism of Blair as a throwback to a previous prime minister, be it Winston Churchill or Harold Macmillan, has dominated the literature that we all can read on the Bush/Blair period. Now, there are some features in those rather less than positive descriptions of the Bush/Blair era. I think we have to accept as historians that things weren't as close. There wasn't a kind of parity that might've been described in previous eras, but it's essentially a caricature. The influence of the Bush/Blair era was certainly the history of the Anglo-American relationship. The closeness at the top — in fact that personalities drove the relationship from the top down through the officials, who worked in the practicalities of meshing the two countries together. We can't question the evidence that we've seen here over the last day or so.

Now, assuming the existence of a Special Relationship which has a protean ability to survive over time, regardless of imbalance in power and asymmetry in strength, there are essential questions which I think the Bush/Blair era exposed and which Tony Blair tried to answer. Those are how can there be a meaningful and purposeful relationship between two states who have a shared history, but who are obviously different in terms of every measure of international power. What should the relationship between Americans and Europeans as a whole, including the British, be in the 21st century, when the world is changing so dramatically, when the threats were entirely different to the ones that were in the 1940s, '50s, '60s, '70s, and onwards? What I try to say in my paper is that I think that despite the differences in power and the differences in threats, there are longevities in the Anglo-American relationship drawn from the 1950s right through the 2000s, and we can see those as histories, not least in people who have been talking to us when you look at the documentation of the era.

What I would suggest is that Blair's policies have roots in the 1950s and '60s, that the American reaction to those policies have the same roots in the same period. But I'm also going to suggest that the trauma that the British went through over the Iraq War and the War on Terror means that it has now been in some way opposite. When we think about how it might develop in the future, we have to accept that the alteration is a fact of life. I'm going to start by looking briefly at the 1950s, when the British developed a policy which we might call "power by proxy," which attempted to use American power and American influence, which of course was based on shared values, for what the Foreign Office in the United Kingdom called in 1934 "for purposes which we regard as good." There's no difference a lot of the time in the basic fundamental aspects of outlooks on both sides of the Atlantic. Unable to foot the defense bills in the Far East and the Middle East, the British decided to try and engage the Americans in defense institutions, effectively to shoulder the burdens the British would otherwise have to shoulder themselves there. It was in theory a great policy, because of course it had a precursor during the Second World War.

The military forces and the diplomatic forces of both countries were so enmeshed, but it faced early difficulties, because early on in the 1950s the Americans wanted to pursue a

more aggressive policy to the defense of French actions in Indochina than the British wanted to. We also have a different conception of the way in these defense structures ought to work in the British part. Consequently one of the architects of this policy of power by proxy, Anthony Eden, former British Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, wrote in his diary in 1955 that we couldn't allow the Americans to dictate our foreign policy. If they were wrong, we would have to show independence.

James: Well, ironically it was Eden who of course showed independence, as Sir Nigel said, over the Suez Crisis in 1956, the most humiliating event for the British since 1945, which split the Americans and the British significantly, leading the Eisenhower Administration to put a stranglehold on the British economy and bring Eden to his knees to stop the paratroops from running down the Suez Canal. What that led to in Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan, was even greater interest in deepening the ties between the United Kingdom and the United States. That Macmillan wanted to recalibrate this policy of gaining influence by association through the Special Relationship, because he recognized that the ongoing trend in the Eisenhower Administration — and he also saw it in the Kennedy Administration that followed — was that Americans were not conceiving of Britain as a premier ally, but one that had a significant role in leading Europeans across the Atlantic towards the Americans. That was certainly true of the Kennedy Administration. It's been a theme beyond that too.

Here's where I think Blair's policies in the Bush/Blair era have their origins in the previous Anglo-American era, because Blair essentially wanted to do what Harold Macmillan wanted to do, which was to act as a bridge between Western European states and the United States of American to ensure a new kind of burden-sharing in a Western alliance, which dealt with the threats in international defense. What Blair faced however was one big difference with Harold Macmillan, and that was where at the end of the Cold War there were many who said that the Special Relationship was dead. Let me just deal with 1989 and the era after that very briefly. My source of what happened is Raymond Seitz, the former U.S. Ambassador to London, who in his book *Over Here* famously said that the Gulf War of 1991 was the last hurrah of the old regime, and this is indicative of a general trend in the post-Cold War era which saw the end of history bringing the end of the Special Relationship. Now the imbalance of power was such that the Americans were going to be the only hegemon, and the British would have to find their role alongside other European states.

Of course, in the period of the 1990s and 2000s major issues of international affairs were left open, and major questions about the future were also wanting to be asked and answered. In the UK the Special Relationship was seen by many commentators as a myth and a diversion from the now obvious truth that Britain's only future was a member state of the European Union and playing a full role there. In the U.S. these developments were seen similarly, and as a logical extension of the reactions that the Americans had to the United Kingdom's decision in the 1960s to withdraw from Eastern Suez from a world role to a North-Atlantic based one. On the 5th of June, 1968 the National Security Council met to discuss the future of the U.S./UK relationship. At that meeting Clark Clifford, Johnson's Defense Secretary after McNamara made a famous statement that those of us who are interested in Anglo-American relations can never forget. He said that the British did not have the resources, the backup, or the hardware to deal with any big world problem. They are no longer a powerful ally of ours, because they cannot afford the cost of an equipped defense staff.

James: Now, this was a particularly partisan view of the Anglo-American relation. If you look at the record of that National Security Council, there are others, not least from the State Department, who have different views. Blair's answer for that same issue was for Britain to maintain the basis of its international affairs: Atlanticism, Europeanism, and UN internationalism, and to adapt it to play a role somewhere across the Atlantic, to play Britain's ace card. Now, this was not new. As I said it comes from the Macmillan era. There's also the policy of John Major in the preceding Conservative government. He said that the British described the Europe and American connection. Major would be unable to pursue that policy of course because of the conservative space in Europe. It didn't allow him to take Britain closer to the European Union. Blair didn't suffer those splits extensively.

Now, we know the Labour Party does have different view on Europe, but they were quiet with the fervor of the new Labour administration from '97. There were two planks to Blair's policies towards the United States from '97 onwards. The first was to build strong relations with the Clinton Administration based on the third-wave ideology, and the new construction of some kind of Western intervention in the world's dirty and difficult events. That was particularly true in Kosovo, as we heard yesterday. The second plank was his 1999 Chicago speech. This too was rooted in earlier British foreign policy stretching back to the late 19th century, but it was also a strident attempt to answer the questions left open by 1989. I think we can categorize those questions quite simply. What roles should nations adopt in a world where authoritarian regimes use ethnic cleansing as a tool of state? When was preemptive action justified? What in particular should Britain's role be in the international community there called for, given its resources and its obligations?

Blair's answer of course was for Britain to play a very strong role alongside the United States of America to strengthen the Atlantic bond rather than weaken it, and move towards Europe. That was going well until 9/11. In the history of the Anglo-American relationship, as we've heard here more than I think anywhere else in anything that I've read, 9/11 had the effect of strengthening ties immediately because of Blair's reaction, the clarity of which he was able to comprehend the threat the Americans now faced, and the new world in which they were living. It strengthened the bond immediately. Ideological similarities, common interests born of a common enemy, close personal relations between a president and a prime minister, close working relationships between their officials at all levels, military cooperation on the ground — these are the things that we've heard about in the last couple of days, which goes to show that any criticism of the Anglo-American relationship is misplaced in terms of its weakening. That said, there has been condemnatory comments, which has argued that Blair overstated the connections that he had with the Bush Administration for his own purposes.

If you read Robin Cook's memoir of the Iraq decision, that's effectively what he said motivated the prime minster to take the decisions that he did. That's a particular view, but it's one we have to contend with as historians. In my research on this so far — and I admit it's in the early stages, but I've been emboldened by what I've heard over the last day or so. It's clear to me that Blair's support for United States of America was very much rooted in the traditions of the Anglo-American Special Relationship. Moreover, with the ascendency of the new conservatism of the Bush Administration, one of the distinctions that I've learned most about in the last day was how across the two terms that the complete difference. The asymmetry of the power relationship between the UK and the United

States was much more strident than it had been. The really interesting thing is how Blair managed to get over that.

James: The problem that he faced of course was that the United States in its national security strategy in 2002 and in the Bush doctrine, at least in adherence — although we've now learned from yesterday's discussion, not necessarily in reality — was seen as having changed the multilateral basis of international affairs, that this movement towards preemption, even though we now know it's not entirely new, was seen in Western Europe as an altering factor. That weakened Blair's ability to claim to be the proponent of multilateralism in a world which saw some kind of burden-sharing and balance between the United States and European allies. Yet Blair's outlook was obviously close to the Bush Administration's, and that built a tie that we can't question. Those of us who are writing about this era are still longing to see the 12th of September, 2001 memorandum that Bush received from Blair, where Blair instructed — well, instructed, that's not true at all — where Blair said that the Americans and the British and the Western alliance, the international community should now concentrate on al-Qaeda and the Taliban and leave Iraq for a future era. Talking to some of the people who were involved in that has been fascinating for me, particularly to see how that fitted across the Atlantic.

Here was Blair's moment in terms of the development of British policy towards the Special Relationship, to implement liberal interventionist ideals that he outlined in 1999, which had roots much further back in British attitudes, and to deal on a global scale with the issues that had been laid open since 1989. This was an attempt in a way by Blair to achieve the kind of power by proxy that had not been achieved in the 1950s and '60s. Now, his ability to pursue this kind of traditional diplomacy and work alongside the Americans was troubled by the swift adoption of elements of new conservative ideology in American foreign policy. Certainly that's how it was seen back in Western Europe. Since the Second World War, the Western lines had rested on presumptions, unspoken presumptions as such, a kind of rules-based multilateral regime, when the Americans would agree that they negotiate with Western Europeans through the institutions of the West and take on their attitudes and ideas as part of their discussions and policymaking process before doing anything about it.

There was a presumption, pedaled a lot by French and German leaders at the time, that this had fallen away. It was this that undermined that attempt to create the kind of transatlantic link renewed by the new threats of the Atlantic world as a result of 9/11. It was right at this time of course that Robert Kagan wrote his famous small book, when he said we should stop pretending that the Europeans and the Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. He makes the case in that book that effectively the Europeans and Americans share a kind of common intellectual heritage, and if they accepted that and looked beyond their national differences, then the transatlantic relationship could work. I think to understand what Blair was attempting to do you have to see the similarity in that concept and what he'd spoken about in 1999. Now, there were of course differences in importance and subtlety, but essentially Blair's aim was to respond to the open questions left by 1989 by calling for an international community based on Western institutions, which had at its heart Anglo-American relations, and there was nothing very new about that.

That's the legacy for me at least of the history of the Anglo-American relationship. So the points that I'd like to put to you are that essentially Bush and Blair worked very strongly

within the traditions of the Anglo-American relationship in the era that we've been discussing. Blair believed that Britain's best interests were served by attachment to an American foreign policy, even at the cost of Britain's ties with the European Union member states because of the ideological significance of Blair's outlook on the world. The Bush Administration similarly sought support from all its premier allies, in a world which temporarily was led by a prime minister who was unusually willing to pay a national blood price in the United Kingdom in support of the ideals he believed in, which were also shared across the Atlantic. In this sense the Anglo-American relationship was clearly revived, and the two nations came more closely together in this period. We learned a lot about that here, and Ambassador Volker's paper this morning fleshes it out further. I think the difference in the post-2003 era is that the relationship had changed fundamentally over time. That becomes starkly clear as a result of the Iraq War. The Atlantic seemed to have widened, and yet the British prime minister had failed in his attempt to bridge it.

Now, as a separation took place towards the end of the Bush/Blair era and beyond, the extent of that failure and the failure to answer the questions left open by the end of the Cold War meant that the new strategic environment had to be reshaped, and those questions would have to be put once again. The issue of Iraq would have to somehow be put in its context. That I think is what's changed, and that's part of the reason the Anglo-American relation was going through this phase of introspection, as it's done many times before, not least when American leaders took their country into effectively unilateral war in Vietnam. There a similar period of introspection right after that and a revival. The difference I think in the era that we're now studying is that the realities of power and differences of intent and capabilities between the United Kingdom and the United States are more clear than ever. Thank you.

Moderator: So now we will turn to our commentators. We have two rich presentations that we can use as a jumping-off point for our discussion. Rob Singh?

Rob: Thanks. I'd like to echo James in thanking Will, John, and Mike for inviting me here and for your great generosity, which arguably reflects and reinforces the special nature of our two nations' relationships. I'm mindful of Anthony Trollope's mother Fanny Trollope in her 1832 book *Domestic Manners of the Americans,* in which she stated, "One of the most remarkable traits in the national character of the Americans is their exquisite sensitiveness and soreness respecting everything said or written concerning them." However, we are in Texas, and I'm a professor of politics, not history, so you're going to have to take it on the chin. Let me say I'm enjoying these two papers very much, but I want to say something about the concept of the Special Relationship. Though I agree with both Kurt's and James' analysis of the shared sources underpinning what happened under Blair and Bush, I tend to agree more with Kurt that the prospects for this relationship being resilient are positive and that in fact, contrary to James' conclusion that it changed fundamentally after 2003, I don't think it has.

I want to set out three contingencies as to why that might be and the case may be open to discussion. If you remember when Obama's state visit to the UK he made in 2011, shortly before it happened the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee recommended that we ditch the use of the term "Special Relationship" entirely as being more problematic than useful. One has to conceive that it is a concept that is problematic insofar as it's typically the weaker power that needs it; the stronger gets what it wants

without supplication, and the stronger generally refers to it only in cases of either real need or the need to flatter the other nation's leadership. The Anglo-American one is especially complex, because it's not just about shared language, shared history, shared military alliance, shared cultures; but all of those woven together. Individually only one might make for a Special Relationship, but not be sufficient. Therefore I think it's important, as we learned yesterday, to avoid romanticizing our relations, to recognize the conflicts that have occurred, to recognize the relationship has ebbed and flowed, and that it is really the minority of our history — albeit a long one for the last 70 years, but over those 70 years it's been tested frequently and severely.

Rob: Indeed, a post-9/11 challenge, that both Kurt and James have illustrated, to the Anglosphere in terms of shared threat receptions, the optimal responses to them, and an extraordinary level of anti-Americanism that's always been latent, was tempered by the Cold War, but was made manifest after 9/11, really pose a challenge here. I think there's a central conundrum that both papers have kind of dealt with to a certain extent, which is the paradox of suddenly Britons after 9/11 hating Bush, and yet London supporting Washington. How do we resolve that? I think it's important. We've touched on it over the last day or so, but it's important to remember just how exceptional this period has been, and indeed how the last 12 years beyond Bush have been. Namely that Tony Blair took the United Kingdom to war in 2003 against an extraordinary background of both elite and mass opposition to that war. Lord Reid was correct that at the start of the war there was a majority in favor, but that was exceptional, and it dissipated quickly. This was the greatest transatlantic rupture since and arguably including Suez, and it took place against a level of exceptional vitriol against the United States' president that was unprecedented.

Yes, there was something similar under Reagan, but with Bush there was something qualitatively different, the kind of parent/child trope that has existed between the UK and the U.S. since Macmillan, but one which alternatively sees Bush as either naïve and stupid for believing in what he said he believed in, or in terms of being a hypocrite and a Machiavellian who did not believe in a security justification for the Iraq invasion, but that it was all instead about oil. Even at the end of Bush's term when he visited London in June 2008, Gordon Brown described, quote, "Partnership is not just of governments but of peoples driven forward not simply by mutual interest, but by our shared values." Yet in May 2008 a YouGov poll reported no less than 35 percent of Brits viewing the United States, quote, "as a force for evil in the world." If you went back to Alastair Campbell's diaries — a wonderful read, the best of times — he describes the 23rd of September, 2002 cabinet meeting as focused, quote, "on the idea that we were having to deal with a mad America, and Tony Blair keeping them on the straight and narrow."

Now, it seems to me there are three fundamental issues in terms of why the relationship took the form it did post 9/11, and why it potentially will still remain resilient. The first is there is, as Kurt referred to it, the embedded nature of the relationship. Or if you like, the structures and uniqueness of the institutionalized relationship have proven especially resilient, at its center being defense and intelligence cooperation, and to a certain lesser extent diplomatic cooperation. That has transcended partisan and ideological differences on either side of the pond. Which is to say with the exception of Edward Heath, every British prime minister since 1945 has recognized the primacy of the American tide. With the possible exceptions of Bill Clinton in his first two years and possibly the current incumbent in the White House, every American president has been eager for a dependable ally with at least some power projection capacity. That didn't make it impossible for the

UK to oppose invading Iraq as Wilson had opposed lending military support to Johnson over Vietnam, but it inclined London by default culturally to support Washington and defy widespread elite and mass public dislike of Bush.

Rob: Secondly though, in terms of the relationship that's been set between, if you like, structures of power and agency, it seems to me that it's impossible to deny the importance of individual leadership. Yes, our relations have transcended partisan and ideological differences, but that was especially important and especially strong between George Bush and Tony Blair. One historian of the relationship, Kathleen Burk, put it like this, "The most important element is to walk the line between playing hard-to-get and throwing oneself at a lover. It's as dangerous for a leader as for a country to be taken too much for granted." While there were some who would say that perhaps Blair did go further than what Clinton advised him when Bush came into office — namely "hug him close" — it was essential to maintain a deepening of our ties post 9/11. Now, I would argue that, as we saw yesterday, as Mike Gerson illustrated, yes, the motives may have been different; yes, Blair's motives were in part that the cause of multilateral global governments would suffer more if the U.S. acted alone, then if could be prevailed upon to lead a coalition which would necessitate some concessions, but nonetheless a basic sense of shared threat perceptions, the need to work in alliance, and the real threat from jihadist Islam, were real.

I would add to that in terms of the importance of domestic politics to statecraft, the Blair government, like the Thatcher government in the ''80s, recognized that however limited the UK influence on the U.S., when the U.S. administration is internally divided — and as we've learned, god knows the Bush Administration was internally divided — that provides some opportunity at the margins to influence. The final note to bear also in terms of politics is it seems to me there's been an assumption that events — 9/11, Iraq — simply drive public opinion and how politicians cater to it. But instead there's a rich political science literature now which argues that the way that elites respond to events set cues for the public. In that sense on the U.S. side post 9/11 and even down to the start of the Iraq War, most Americans saw unity, bipartisan between the Republicans and the Democrats — not complete, but broad unity. By contrast, in the UK what we saw was 139 Labour MPs. Yes, a minority, but 139 voting against authorizing war, which itself fed into the public perceptions that this was not just illegal, but also illegitimate.

Let me add on one third point, which I think is going to be extremely important on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly the UK going forward. That's what I would argue is what you might term, or what's been termed over here pithily "Bush derangement syndrome" — or perhaps more worrying in the UK's case, a more broader American derangement syndrome. One scholar of U.S. foreign policy in the UK put it like this: far often embodying a healthy spirit of national independence, Bush hatred partook of a strange sense that the American president is somehow also the president of the UK, a figure whose behavior should somehow always be acceptable to and cognizant of prevailing British cultural preferences. Indeed you can see this at one level in terms of how that translated into irrational exuberance over Obama. For example, populist polls of the *Times*, one in 2006 that asks, "Is it important for Britain's long-term security that we have a close and Special Relationship with the U.S.?" 58 percent in June of 2006 said yes. In November of 2008 80 percent said yes. Again, the same poll in June 2006, 62 percent of Brits wanted the next prime minister to be, quote, "less close to George Bush than Tony Blair."

In November of 2008, 61 percent of Brits wanted Gordon Brown to be, quote, "as close to Barack Obama as Tony Blair was to George Bush," which is to say the U.S. president is viewed in a very peculiar, confused way in the UK as not just the national leader of America, but also as a kind of alternative or additional British one to be judged by his ability to respond positively to British expectations and British preferences. In that sense, which British anti-Americanism, be it across the left, the Tory right, nationalist and cultural activities towards America, is broad. It seems to me it's also shallow compared to continental anti-Americanism. In that sense in terms of the parent/child trope, Kurt referred to this notion that most Americans don't even think of the UK, whereas in the UK that aggravates us even further. It seems to confirm something prescient that that great American anglophile Ralph Waldo Emerson put in English traits in 1856. Quote, "England, an old and exhausted island, must one day be contented, like other parents, to be strong only in her children, but this a proposition which no Englishman of whatever condition can easily entertain."

Moderator: Thank you. Tom Mahnken?

Tom: So it's left to me to have cleanup on this topic. I was looking forward to this panel, and I was looking forward to the opportunity not only to read and comment upon the papers, but to be able to think about the topic with some historical perspective. But I must admit that I'm having difficulty doing that, and I think that the papers actually have some difficulty doing that, because the issue of Iraq appears to loom so large, particularly on the British side. I think we've heard both in the papers and in the broader literature that, ten years on from Iraq, there still is all too often kind of the quick resort to sort of very neat characterizations of what is in fact a very complex history and a very complex relationship. So just to take a step back — others have done it, but I want to do it as well — to talk just a minute about what exactly do we mean when we talk about the Special Relationship. It is about leaders to be sure, and certainly the way that this conference is framed promotes that focus on leaders, but it's more than that. It is about shared history and culture.

Any visitor to Jamestown, Virginia — and I would urge you to visit Jamestown, Virginia — will see a memorial dedicated by Queen Elizabeth II declaring Virginia to be, quote, "where the Commonwealth began." As David Hackett Fischer reminds us in *Albion's Seed*, American history and American culture owes a deep debt, deeper than many Americans will admit, to Britain. There's also the issue of shared interests and shared values. I think to the extent that we can ask questions about the Special Relationship in the future, it really does come down to questions about how shared those interests are likely to be in the future, how shared those values are likely to be in the future. But we should also remember that from the very beginning the bedrock of that relationship was and has been cooperation and specifically military and intelligence cooperation, and most specifically in some of the most sensitive areas. I think we lose focus on that element of the Special Relationship at our peril. I'll come back to that in just a minute.

So if the Special Relationship is about more than relationship between leaders, the Special Relationship during the Bush/Blair era was about more than just Iraq. Certainly we talked about it yesterday. It had to do with broader global issues. It had to do with dealing with 9/11, dealing with al-Qaeda. It had to do with a whole bunch of things. Third, I'd say the Special Relationship perhaps looks differently at different levels. Kurt highlights this. This is the fourth point in Kurt's paper. I want to spend a little bit more time talking about that.

How does the Special Relationship look below the surface, if you will, on a day-to-day level? You know, the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to an agreement between President Bush, Prime Minister Blair, at very broad information sharing, quite apart from our traditional information sharing with the UK. It also led to a similar agreement with Prime Minister Howard of Australia.

Tom: What that led to was British government gaining access to a lot of American information; U.S. government similarly getting access to information. What did that mean tangibly? What that meant tangibly was the deep embedding of Americans and British government employees down to a very low level. Speaking in my own — when I was serving in the Pentagon, I had a British MOD exchange officer in my office. I said I treated him as well or as poorly as anybody else in my office. That individual had access to virtually the same information that everybody else in my office had. The barriers to that cooperation were not policy barriers; they were technical and bureaucratic. To get onto an unclassified DOD network I need one of these, a common access card. To get onto those same networks a British exchange officer needed a common access card. However, the brilliant architects of the software that issues these had never envisioned actually having a foreign national issued a common access card, so we had to get through that, and we did get through that.

In the Pentagon you have British MOD employees working side-by-side with the U.S. DOD employees, and at MOD UK you have the same arrangement. In a historical perspective this is something quite extraordinary. When I was in the Pentagon, one of our exchange officers played a leading role in MOD's Asia shop, Asia policy. Similarly in my office, a British national played a very important role in U.S. policy. Again, in historical terms that is quite extraordinary. We heard from Mike Gerson last night similarly, Tony Blair providing edits to President Bush's speech. I would say also in terms of acquisition of hardware the UK has had a very important voice. One of the main issues facing Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was tactical aircraft modernization. At the time the United States had three tactical aircraft modernization programs: the F/A-18, the F-22, and the then Joint Strike Fighter, now the F-35. The question was which of those three should be cancelled to save money. I would say in many ways the strongest case for actually saving money was for the cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter. F/A-18 was already largely rolled out. The navy really needed them. F-22 was in production. Most of the money had been spent. The real savings were with F-35.

I would say one of the main reasons why F-35 survived was because the UK was a partner, and if the F-35 had been canceled, I think there was a justifiable concern on the American side that the Blair government would've followed. This would've been the reincarnation of the decision to cancel Blue Streak back in the '60s. If we look at the U.S. modernization of our ballistic missile submarine fleet, the timescale for ballistic missile submarine modernization really is paced by the timeline for modernization of the British fleet. In other words, the United States is spending money, and the United States is making decisions on a timeframe agreed to by Great Britain to help Great Britain with her ballistic missile submarine modernization. So the United States again at the deckplate level is making decisions that are not optimized to its own timeline and its own resources, but rather to alliance timelines and alliance resources. Certainly one sees this now that particularly on the British side more and more documents are being declassified and released on the early stages, the early history of the British nuclear program.

Tom: One also sees various manifestations of the alliance cooperation there as well. So below the surface, below the head of state relations, I think you see this day-to-day cooperation proceeding in some very extraordinary and historically significant ways. Another point that I think is worthy of some additional discussion is — frankly, look, there is a third party in this relationship, and that is — and I'll construct this carefully — Continental Europe, constructed carefully not to offend anybody. We're talking about Continental Europe. James in his paper talks about Tony Blair seeking to serve as a bridge between Europe and the United States and at the end talks about that bridge being broken. Well, I think arguable at that point the bridge was broken from both ends, except we haven't talked as much about the Continental European part of the relationship in 2003. Certainly if we go back and look at the history of the Special Relationship, that third party and how that third party played matters a lot, whether it's Suez; whether it's the INF deployment decision in the '80s; whether it's the first Gulf War in 1990 and '91, or whether it's 2003.

I think similarly as we try to look forward, one of the things that we need to think about as we think about the Special Relationship is the relationship of both parties to Continental Europe. I will kind of wrap up by saying that here we are in 2013, and things look a certain way. I think we still are in the shadow, particularly on the British side, of the Iraq decision. One can only wonder how different things will look ten years hence. I think part of that has to do with the relationship of leaders; part of it has to do with the relationship between Britain and Continental Europe, the United States and Continental Europe. Part of it also does have to do however with that fundamental bedrock of the Special Relationship, which is the military and the intelligence cooperation. There I think there is reason to be optimistic, but also reason to be concerned. I think the Snowden information is still playing out, and I worry — I actually worry a great deal — about how that will play out, not so much at the government-to-government level, but more broadly. The United States is drawing down its military capability; so is Britain. I think we need to definitely, as we both move forward, retain that cooperation, not because of any sentimentality, but because of the instrumental benefits that it has provided both parties, and particularly if we're smart about it, can continue to provide both parties as we move forward. Thank you.

Moderator: Great. So we have a lot on the table here. Just in structuring the discussion, I want to put out a couple of questions that I think arise from all of these wonderful presentations, and then all of you can ask questions, respond, comment, what have you. It seems to me, especially when teaching about the Special Relationship, it's there, but it's still very hard to pinpoint for students and for the American public what drives it. We have a lot on the table. We have from the papers a mix of personality and historical structure, past dependence. From the comments we have questions about the degree to which personalities matter and the role that structure plays. What are the driving elements? Obviously all of these things matter, but it seems to me everything can't matter equally. So what do we think are the driving factors? How can you have a Special Relationship that survives torturous relations between John Foster Dulles and Anthony Eden, and Lyndon Johnson and Harold Wilson, but then also include Clinton and Bush and Blair.

Second, what's the meaning of this? What does it really produce? This is the question my undergraduates ask all the time. We can point to specific examples, again, such as the Blair/Bush relationship, but we can also point to moments when the Special Relationship didn't seem to produce what actors on both sides of the Atlantic thought it would produce. Lyndon Johnson expected to get more support from the British in Vietnam than he

received. The British it seems to me expected more help from the United States when they withdrew east of Suez. So what does this Special Relationship mean? What is the payoff from it? I think these are not only historical questions. I think these are very real questions as we go forward in terms of policymaking. I'm not going to give my answers, though I have my thoughts. I'm not going to give my answers now. I think we should open this to discussion. Brandon Archuleta, please.

Brandon: Brandon Archuleta, UT grad student. Ambassador Volker and Professor Mahnken, I'd like to direct my question to both of you. You speak of the importance of maintaining the day-to-day routines in the Special Relationship, and I wonder how can institutions like State and DOD and others institutionalize these day-to-day interactions in a time of budget contraction, where investment matters, relationships matter. If we are worried about parochial bureaucratic interests and not investing in the overseas relationship, what can leaders do to make the investment and maintain the institutional interactions?

Moderator: Just because I see so many hands — in fact, I see everyone's hand —

Male: I've got a question, Jeremi.

Moderator: Well, I don't count you. So can we take three at a time?

Male: That's fine.

Moderator: I've already got 12 on the table here, so Admiral Inman, you're next.

Bobby: Mine are more comments than questions.

Moderator: I expected that.

Bobby: But they really are triggered by the talks and all that. I've had the privilege of observing this relationship for over 60 years at this point.

Moderator: The Admiral first met the Brits when he was two, so you know [inaudible 1:09:17].

Bobby: It goes all the way back to Bletchley Park, and Churchill's decision to open up totally to the U.S. the cryptographic packs played a huge effort on the war efforts [inaudible 1:09:35]. That was codified at the end of the war. Canadians, Australians, New Zealand were brought into it. It is as complete a sharing as I've observed anywhere, far closer than between the NSA and the other intelligence agencies in the U.S.. It's just a fact. With that, it's survived tough times. I was a young naval officer in civilian clothes standing in a line to go into the Haymarket Theatre, and this vituperative anti-U.S. dialog going on behind me. I turned around and recognized Sir Anthony Eden. Yet through Suez there was no interruption in the day-to-day collaboration and collection, and that has been true for each of the crises that have gone on. I believe it's been a fundamental issue in holding together much of this relationship and dialog.

What really worries me is there are a lot of disclosures from Snowden that are not out yet. There's likely to be a large one in the next couple of days in *The New York Times* focused on GCHQ. I think it's going to bring GCHQ under pretty intense pressures for this to be a collaboration, so my worry — and this is particularly to my colleagues in the UK but also

elsewhere here. I can tell you from close examination that both agencies have operated within the law and the agreements across the board, but it's going to be very necessary to defend, because there are going to be pressures to pull apart those relationships that are going to come out of it in the process. So I can't think of all the worries that I have right now, but going forward that was at the top.

Moderator: Sir David, you have a two-finger on this I saw.

Sir David: Yeah. First to write a historical footnote, that you can actually trace that relationship back to the First World War. When General Pershing arrived in Flanders, he had with him a young cryptanalyst, William Friedman. Friedman had instructions to cozy up to the DZM [phonetic] bureau, because they were thought to be the great experts on signals intelligence. [Unintelligible 1:12:07], Genera Haig's chief of staff spotted him, took him his under his wing, and it was the same Friedman who turned up later in Parliament to build the relationship. It's been going for a long time. What I wanted to ask really follows on very directly. For political elites in Continental Europe, the GCHQ is seen as a Trojan horse of the United States. This morning's *Guardian* has a story that GCHQ with National Security Agency's calling has been helping the French, the Germans, the Swedes, and other European nations tap into continental cable traffic and sharing the profit. So we have this disjunction between European political elites' view of the relationship, and the reality post 9/11 of what is necessary to deal with terrorism. How is this going to play out?

Moderator: Gentlemen, we have three questions.

Male: Okay. I'll take the first one in a very functional way, and the other two kind of go together. How to do more institutionalization and keeping things alive? First off we have a lot on the books and just need to value it and do it. I think that is a challenge, because a lot of people moving into leadership positions, say in the State Department or the Defense Department, don't necessarily carry with them the personal experience of having served in the other's country or having had these strange relationships pay off for them. So there may be a tendency not to value them as much as, for instance, I would. So I think there's a little bit of a personal leadership element to this. There's a little bit of the taking advantage of what's there. Then the third one would be to try to create some new ones, because I could think of areas where we don't do a lot of cross-collaboration and perhaps could do a better job — for example, in our Middle East bureau.

What I would suggest, if we're looking for a practical step, those of us — and I think on both sides of the Atlantic in the U.S. and the UK, whether in government now or recently out of, maybe should be making the effort to go see some of our counterparts and encourage them. Why don't you make a trip? Why don't you go see your counterpart in the UK and talk about what you can do to put something in place? It shouldn't cost very much at all in the sense that you lose a person, but you get a person, and then you're also getting additional value from that person that you would from your own employee. For the other issues I want to come back — somebody mentioned Ray Seitz, and I wrote it down, because I worked for Ray Seitz in London, and then I worked for him again in the European Bureau of State. He wasn't the end of the old guard in these of people who believe in the Special Relationship and people who didn't, but what I think he does represent is the end of an old guard, which is the people who conducted diplomacy before the Internet, and the people who conduct diplomacy after the Internet.

That's a big distinction, and it gets to the issues that Admiral Inman and David Omand raised about intelligence in an age when everything is electronic. I have a couple thoughts on this that I didn't know if we would get to or not, but since we did, I will say them.

Moderator: Briefly.

Male: Yeah, very briefly. I apologize. First off, we need to recognize that there's more to Snowden now than Edward Snowden. He is living in Russia. He's gotten his residency there. He can't go anywhere else. He's in a situation at a minimum of decency upon Russian intelligence. Moreover, if you look at the effects of all the leaks taking place, the prime beneficiary seems to be Russia, China, Iran, and Syria. So I have to think there's got to be some connection going on here that we should be paying attention to. We should stop pointing the finger at each other and tearing up a transatlantic relationship, and instead focus on what the real problems of the world are.

Snowden has gotten us off of that, and it takes a concerted effort to get back onto it. Then the related point is that allied governments — I'm thinking especially about Continental Europe, but also the U.S. administration and the UK — need to be much more aggressive is explaining and defending the role of intelligence collection. It is not an illegitimate activity. It's not a new and shocking activity. It's a necessary activity, and it's one that is done in democratic societies with a great deal of responsibility. It may be that the Internet generation and the publics haven't thought about it and don't like to hear it, but it's something that governments need to be very proactive and aggressive about.

Moderator: James?

James: Sure. In terms of institutionalization and cooperation, of course being a practitioner and studying, that kind of institutionalization has occurred throughout the whole postwar period, and there are plenty of examples of it, not least the meeting after the Suez Crisis. One thing that students will be surprised to hear is that the Americans and British established working groups which were secret to the Western allies for a period of time when political defense officials on both sides of the Atlantic met and recalibrated their policies together on international affairs in light of changes in Middle East. I think it happens. It happens when the British Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend traveled across regularly the Atlantic in the 1960s to have meetings with [unintelligible 1:18:15] to work on all aspects of international affairs, at that time principally financial. I'm sure the practitioners here would be able to tell us, if we've got them to one side, the occasions when this occurred, so it probably will continue.

It always comes back to the point that you read, in one of the great skeptics of postwar American diplomacy of the Anglo-American relationship, George Paul [sic], a Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, who in book, published in the late '60s, had a chapter entitled "The Special Relationship" in which he says that the British and the Americans mentally looked through the same refractive spectacles on all issues. In that same chapter he also called for an end to the Special Relationship, however. But the thing that changed in the 1960s was the obvious power imbalance by any measure of power, but the institutionalization continues. [Unintelligible 1:19:04].

I think that's a really crucial question, and we've seen some of them here, and they are unquantifiable in terms of shared interests, commonalities of view, and so on. But there

are quantifiable occasions which we can see as much more concrete. 1957 — students often think when they study the Suez Crisis that this is a break point of significant proportion, but in the year that followed the Suez Crisis of course you saw the greatest cooperation between the Americans and the British in light of the missile gap as a result of the launch of Sputnik. That motivates a new kind of cooperation, which exists through the Kennedy administration and perhaps beyond.

The Americans turn to the British at that stage. It's ironic that, given the schism of the Suez and what the Eisenhower Administration had to do and the difficulties between John Foster Dulles and Anthony Eden, that it was the Americans who came to the British against expectations and against the ambassador at the time, Sir Harold Caccia's view, which was we should not follow this up. If we were going to split over Suez, it was time actually to think in a much more realistic way of the Anglo-American relationship based on a business relationship rather than sentiment. The Americans were full of sentiment. They were shaken to their core by the effect of the launch of Sputnik and the idea that the Americans weren't as advanced militarily and technologically, and they needed to cooperate with allies. That was one of the hard and fast reasons. On the British side of course the Falklands War, about which we're only still learning more and more information. But there are all sorts of ways that the British couldn't have done what they did without American military and diplomatic assistance.

Moderator: Right, despite the storm between Thatcher and Haig, right? Okay, so I have nine more people on the list. No time to —

Male: Actually, let me just — I think all these comments come back to the topic of public education. I guess as an educator I believe in education. On the issue of institutionalization, the exchanges that are going on now are cheap. Now, I say that. At the same time I'll say that for the U.S. Defense Department, never underestimate its ability to cut training and cut travel while avoiding cutting other things, so I think those exchanges shouldn't be taken for granted. I think it's actually a point of leverage for the British government. It's a type of thing where British leaders should be talking to their American counterparts, reinforcing the value as they see it of these exchanges. But broader than that I think there is a need for public education and really for bringing together young scholars, young practitioners from both countries to build those ties that hopefully will pay off across careers.

On the issue of intelligence, I totally agree with Admiral Inman and Sir David Omand that there needs to be an effort to help defend NSA and GCHQ, because for political reasons, for reasons of secrecy, and frankly for reasons having to do with the personalities of the individuals that inhabit those organizations, those organizations are incapable of defending themselves. And yet on both sides of the Atlantic it represents a tremendous investment of national treasure over decades to keep both countries and others safe. That I think is very much in jeopardy. So public education I think is key.

Moderator: Great. We have about eighteen minutes left, and I have nine people on the list, so I want to take that in three groups of three. I'm going to ask you just to be brief and concise, but I'm going to try to make sure we get everyone in, because I know everyone has brilliant points to make. The next three I have are Sir Nigel, Phillip Zelikow, and Doug Feith. Sir Nigel?

Sir Nigel: Thank you very much. I agree with the analysis [unintelligible 1:22:53] broadly there is the resilience, and this relationship is not one that's going to go away completely, disappear completely. But I think I'm a bit less optimistic than I appear to be about the future. I think there are some really quite problematic things going on. In the UK if you haven't noticed, we're going through a bit of an identity crisis ourselves. We're having a referendum over Scotland. Not we, but the Scots are having a referendum next year over their future. Maybe more importantly for our discussions today, we're having a fundamental debate about Britain's role in Europe, which could mean that Britain leaves the European Union in 2017 — could mean. That's the first time that's been a possibility for 40 years. I think that even with the present government and their Atlanticism, they're talking about a relationship which is — this is the quote — solid but not slavish. That doesn't sound like a very warm or unqualified commitment to the UK/U.S. relationship. It's a deliberate distancing from the sort of thing we were talking about earlier, in the post-9/11 period.

So I think some of the sort of political assumptions are changing. There's a big debate about UK capabilities in the military, intelligence, and other areas, whether we're able to sustain even what we have now in the next parliamentary period, from 2015 onwards. I think over here it's difficult. The asymmetry, which has always been there, and Kurt talked about it earlier, remains problematic. If Americans in the 21st century world do not continue to validate alliances, and this alliance in its top category of world alliances, then there's a problem, and it is a problem that the U.S. media never talks about, not just us, but other American allies. It's a problem whenever you read a biography or you read Woodward, or you read Peter Baker's book. I haven't done so. My guess is that the role of others in these things is absolutely minimal, so I think if it's not in the mindset of Americans to value the role of alliances in handling 21st century problems, whether these are Asia Pacific alliances or European alliances, then there's a problem. It's a problem, because you don't see this as part of your projection of power. So I think there are some problems around there. Maybe they'll be resolved. I'm not so sure.

Moderator: Well said. Phillip?

Philip: I can't quote back as far in this relationship as Bobby Inman, but I do recall when I worked in the White House for the elder President Bush, for Bush 41, one of my portfolios on the NSC staff was the UK relationship, so I was involved in all of the elder Bush's discussions of any kind with Margaret Thatcher, for example, and then John Major for a time after that. So with kind of a long view of this relationship, I have a comment about the Americans and a comment about the British. The comment about the Americans is in a way to reassure my British friends that you are still very much the Greeks to our Romans. That's the shortest way to encapsulate it.

By the way, the panel was excellent. The comments were very good, but there is a tendency in the literature to keep looking for geopolitical explanations and then to measure formal objective attributes of power and seek in this clues to the answer of the question that Jeremi posed about why the Special Relationship. How about just look at what's right in front of you, which is the Americans believe the British are their friends, and they value their advice. They need friends. Frankly on a personal and individual level leaders need friends; officials need friends. They need foreign friends. They need people they can talk to. In the case of the British they value their advice. They don't always agree. Goodness knows the elder Bush and Margaret Thatcher did not always agree, but man, did

we talk to them all the time, and at an astonishing level of intimacy, and it never changed. The advice is valued in part because of the sheer lucidity and quality of thought. That's really important. The British in all of my experience and even today continue to punch well above their weight in the lucidity and quality of their thought. I think this is true in their government documents, and it is true to a large degree in the culture.

Philip: I would venture the presumption that across all cultural realms American elites are more influenced by British elite opinion today than the other way around. Whether it's historians, public intellectuals, the impact of their views here and their writings here is really hugely disproportionate and still very powerful. This takes so many forms. I urge folks, especially the historians here: it is worth going back and reading an old essay by Ernest May, published in *Diplomatic History* in 1990 — not about Britain at all — called *The American Commitment to Germany* in which he makes actually in a very subtle way a rather astonishing and I think really true argument that during the 1950s a kind of confederation developed, almost a sort of super-national entity. The comment from the panel earlier about the way peculiarly Europeans seem to regard the American president almost as one of their politicians; May's essay captures the essence of a lot of that. American leaders pay more attention to German provincial elections in the 1980s than to many state elections in the United States, and knew the German politicians often better than they knew governors in their own country. There is a super-national entity that has come into existence here that Tom Mahnken was marveling at in his comments that really requires notice, and now it as at a level that transcends calculations of geopolitical alignment power.

My second comment is about the British, and it is this: I believe the British opinion about the Americans are cycling back to becoming more like old American opinions about the British. The phenomenon I've just described in American opinion, which I think is a consensus of interest and attention to British opinion and views, is relatively new. For most of American history a large number of Americans really did not like the British. They did not like them. They did not trust them. They did not want to work with them. They regarded them as rivals and indeed as potential military enemies and planned against them. This did not end in World War II; it persisted throughout World War II among a significant fraction of the American elite, even inside of the Roosevelt Administration and the American military. It persisted through the 1940s and in my view persisted actually through perhaps at least most of the 1950s, diminishing perhaps — I tend to see some significant turning points towards consensus in the Kennedy period and the Reagan period perhaps.

But meanwhile the British, who of course have always been ambivalent about the Americans throughout their history, that ambivalence is becoming more marked in interesting ways. In the old America, American foreign policy opinion really could almost be marked and divided by who were the Anglophiles and who were the Anglophobes. Who were the people who were with John Hay and his allies, and the people who would vote against anything John Hay did, and people who sought their opinions across the Atlantic and people who detested those who did? Meanwhile in Britain you're increasingly seeing a political definition that comes to resemble that: of the people who are America-philes and the people who are America-phobes. As anti-Americanism in Britain is now a really pronounced and powerful intellectual tendency in the way that Nigel alluded to, this is becoming more and more interesting, and you see this in many parts of Europe.

My only comment on that is as it was in the case of Americans, and as it is today in Britain, most attitudes towards the United States in Europe are really what people see in the mirror. Then their attitudes towards the Americans flow from what they think they have seen in the mirror. In my view most Russian attitudes and dislike for America has to do with the way they think about themselves, and I believe this is to a significant idea also true in Britain. As British leaders are more secure and confident in their own convictions, views, and country's future, they tend to be much more comfortable working in partnership with the Americans than the other way around.

Moderator: Yeah. It makes sense. That's very helpful. Doug Feith?

Doug: I think that in answer to the question that, Jeremi, you raised that you said your students raised about what does the Special Relationship produce, I thought I would just offer a few thoughts that are in the nature again of testimony. It might also help as a way of concretizing the idea of specialness in a relationship. When I was Under Secretary, my calendar was I think similar to the calendars of people throughout the government, especially after 9/11. My day began at 4:00 AM, and I tended to get home between 8:00 and 9:00 PM from the office. My secretary would schedule meetings when I had to go from my office and get into a car, the two or three minutes that it took me to get down — she would schedule meetings with my staff for two or three minutes.

Basically one thing I would emphasize that all the historians can look at as a measure of the Special Relationship is time. How much time can — now, there are certain things that Tom Mahnken emphasized, Admiral Inman emphasized that are enormously important, which is the continuous relationship of people who are in an office together. That's enormously important, but when you look at who gets time on the calendar of people like the under secretary or assistant secretaries, that's a very important measure of the relationship. When I analyze why did I do this, I had a sense whenever I got a request for a meeting with British embassy people or visiting British officials, the answer was always yes. That was not true with everybody. But the reason that the answer was always yes in my office — I thought about it. What was motivating me? I would say it was two things.

Number one, I had my own sense that the British really wanted to invest in this relationship. They were paying heavily, and they were participating. They wanted to be with us. They were contributing in Afghanistan, contributing in Iraq, and that meant that we owed them the courtesy of spending time with them. We were interested in hearing what they had to say in large part because they were participating. Then in addition to the decisions where you say, "This is within my discretion," we also knew the president had this relationship with the prime minister, and therefore for our own reasons it was enormously important to do at our level what the president was doing at his level. We respected the president. The president was making policy, and when he was spending that kind of time every week with Tony Blair, then the only way you could be a loyal official working for President Bush was to do at our level what he was doing at his level. I think that helps, and I would urge whoever is trying to measure what a Special Relationship is, at my level that's the way I implemented the specialness of the relationship.

It had to do with leadership from the president. It had to do with our own sense of what is in the national interest based on the idea that if the British are investing in the

relationship, they deserve that time. And it had to do with the point that Phil Zelikow was just making, which is when you met with various officials and you came away, did you feel that you benefitted, that you got any enlightenment from the meetings? With the British the answer was yes. You actually learned something, so it was beneficial to us, and it was a courtesy to them, and I think that helps perhaps explain in somewhat concrete form what it meant to think of somebody as special.

The last point I'll make is this. We used to have routine quad meetings as they were called at the under secretary level: the British, the Americans, the Germans, and the French. I attended one such meeting, and this was a legacy. These meetings existed for years before I became under secretary. After attending one I basically cancelled them. The reason was we had such limited time. Why were we going to take that time and spend it with the French and the Germans instead of the Poles, the Italians? Now, it didn't affect the amount of time we gave the British, but if you have really limited time on your calendar, and the French are spending all of their time opposing us, why in the world do you want to give that time to the French when you could give it to the Poles and the Italians and people who are really helping you?

Male: When you could be eating freedom fries instead.

Doug: So we actually made that decision and canceled the quads. I don't know if the quads are back. But that is a way of measuring the specialness of a relationship.

Moderator: These are fantastic comments. I want us to get more in, because we are approaching —

[Multiple speakers]

Lord John: — the British investing in it. This is an anecdote, and I know — I can tell in here that it will never go any further.

Moderator: Turn off the recording device.

Lord John: As you know, at the NATO meetings there's a huge sort of circular table, and everyone sits in alphabetical order around the table. For many years, because the NATO headquarters was in France, the name tags were in French, was perfectly acceptable to everybody, except it had one terrible consequence. That is *États-Unis* came just before France, so the French and the United States had to sit together. Of course somebody came up [unintelligible 1:39:34]. "Why don't we just name them all in English? Then the United Kingdom will sit next to the United States." So arrived at one of these NATO meetings and Donald is sitting next to me. In the course of it he's writing some papers, but the French defense minister makes a very curt statement. Donald leans across and says to me, "What did she say?" I said, "She said no, Donald." He said, "She said no?" I said, "Yes, she said no." He said, "But at the last meeting she said yes." I said, "Yes, Donald, but since then you've said yes." He said, "You mean she's saying no because we're saying yes?" I said, "Yes, Donald. What you've got to understand is there is not one vote in France for agreeing with President Bush and Donald Rumsfeld. In fact, Donald, if I'm being blunt, there isn't one vote in Britain for voting with President Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, but we just kind of like you, and we want to invest in you."

So the comment that you made there — I think one very brief comment, which I think goes to Rob, because political scientists — although it's a historical point. It's fascinating, if you've been sitting on the inside, to listen to perceptions of political scientists and historians on the outside, and it's generally more accurate than the commentaries of the press, who write with great authority on things in which they patently know nothing and present caricature. But I'll make a suggestion to you, and that is while it is understandable that you look at the relationship and the traffic between a president and a prime minister, which is not only incidentally Churchill and Roosevelt, and Kennedy and Macmillan, and Blair and Bush, but also living large is Thatcher and Reagan — Thatcher and Bush certainly, but Thatcher and Reagan.

The perceptions are formed about the American president. Roosevelt was respected. Kennedy was loved. These are just my impressions. Ronald Reagan for some reason was regarded as a bit of a joke, and Bush was demonized. You tend to think that must be because of the intrinsic factors at the American side or in their character of the president, or to do with this relationship. My suggestion is would you also look at the possibility that in fact the character perceived of the American president is also affected by domestic British politics, and particularly during the period of 2003 – '07. You had Tony Blair in his last [unintelligible 1:42:39] with the growing opposition because of the unity of the far right and the far left in the United Kingdom against him. Generally speaking it's not a bad position for a prime minister to be in, if he's getting attacked both by the right and the left, but you had *The Guardian* and *The Independent* on that side; you had he *Daily Mail* on this side. Secondly, he was under intense pressure from opposition within his own party, part of it by people who had views on the Iraq War, part of it from people who had been demoted in their positions within the cabinet and so on, because as your period of office goes on you get more enemies from demotion than you can get friends from promotion, because you also have the expected promotions that don't arrive.

Thirdly, because you had what we now know effectively a coup d'éta being attempted inside the Labour Party itself. So what I'm saying is there may have been at least an element of the demonization of Bush, which derived from a perfect storm domestically of antagonism in certain quarters towards the British prime minister, which latched on to the relationship with Bush. I'm not saying this explains the whole thing, but I think it's worth the British historian and the raw political scientists at least considering to what extent that helped to demonize Bush. Because I've never quite understood the extent of that demonization. I understand Iraq. I understand the opposition to war, but I've never understood why that should be so visited upon this particular president, despite his closeness to the United Kingdom.

Moderator: It's a very good, a very valuable point. So I've got five more people. I want to get those comments in, and then the panelists can choose what they want to respond to and what they don't want to respond to. A two-finger from Celeste?

Celeste: Yeah, just really quickly. I know we're talking a lot about the high politics here, but in thinking about the future of the Special Relationship — and this builds a little bit on Rom Mahnken's point. If you went to Iraq in the mid —

[End File. Recorded Time = 1:44:59 = 105 minutes] [Begin File: Panel 4B.mp3]

Celeste: — we have a generation of military officers from the tactical level all the way to the strategic level that work together utterly seamlessly and see almost no difference between themselves and their British counterparts. I think that there's a "good news" story there in terms of it boding well for the relationship.

Moderator: Great. Josh Emprenson [phonetic], you've been waiting.

Josh: Oh, thank you. Perhaps this is a question about how special the relationship is. I want to return to the question of the influence of Britain upon American foreign policy in particular. We've heard a lot about the modalities of Anglo-American cooperation. We've heard about purchasing decisions, UN Security Council decisions, but many of these struck me as very operational [inaudible 0:00:39] nature. I would argue that the influence British or any countries of influence on American foreign policy or any dyadic relationship actually comes in a country not making a major [inaudible 0:00:50] decision. "Go to war or not go to war. Invade a country or not invade a country," or, "Form an alliance or not form an alliance," rather than these more tactical issues. So I guess the question is, is there any evidence, are there any cases you could point to of deeper British influence on American policy. If we're thinking of the '03 period, if Britain had said, "Do not invade Iraq," would the U.S. still have gone? If the answer is yes, [inaudible 0:01:14].

Moderator: Good point. Josh, go ahead. You're next. Oh, I'm sorry, Phil. I didn't see you. Just briefly, please.

Phil: Iraq is an example. I don't think it's — the literature does not really quite comprehend the significance. Tony Blair was more influential perhaps than any other single individual in determining how Bush chose to think about war with Iraq in 2002. The famous British story for instance is that Dearlove comes back, and he says the facts are being fixed around the policy. In all the press stories that's where it ends. There's actually a sequel to that. The sequel is that Blair sends David Manning to Washington, and David Manning has a private meeting with Condi Rice that is effectively joined by President Bush, and Manning has testified about all of this to Chilton, in which Manning says — and Manning has recounted this to me as well. Manning says, "If you don't go to the UN, we are not with you."

By the way, I think coincidentally Bush gets an analogous message from Colin Powell literally within about the same week. Then the answer is, "Well, what should we do? What do you think we should do?" "You have to go to the UN. Here's what you have to do if you want us with you." I believe by the way at that stage Blair had something very close to a veto power. Such was the extent of Britain's influence on this. Others can disagree with me, but I really do think that it was nearly at that level, and no one had more influence. I think between Powell and Blair they shaped the basic way the decisions made in August and September on how to construct the whole diplomatic approach to the Iraq confrontation.

Moderator: This is something you should write up, Phil. I think you should write this up. It's my charge to you. Josh?

Josh: Very quickly. Following Celeste's comment, which I thought was very interesting, the Iraq experience put in diplomatic terms sort of drives the U.S. and Great Britain potentially apart, but in terms of military relationship might drive them together, this shared crucible.

I don't know if this is also going to be the case in terms of both intelligence communities. There's an open question from me. The history of intelligence cooperation on the working level has been very important all the way back to World War II, and it helped the relationship sustain some pretty serious diplomatic crises, especially during the late '40s and early '50s. There was a lot of entrepreneurship on both sides, but I'm thinking about this generation of new intelligence officers on both sides who have been grown up without the background of World War II or the Cold War, and who have grown up in a very different information environment with Edward Snowden lurking in the background. Will they be driven, will they see the necessity of the kind of very close integration that existed in the past?

Moderator: Very good question. Alexander Evans and John Bellinger?

Alexander: A very quick sort of 30-second — I just want to introduce two other policy issues on which I think cooperation was incredibly close. One was the 2001/2002 India and Pakistan crisis, where I think actually the U.S. and the UK effectively had a huge policymaking framework towards it, and where I think the UK was a strong influence in terms of the U.S. policy decisions on how to deal with that. I think a very successful outcome in terms of diffusing what could've been a major between those two states. The other one I'll just point is the Afghanistan reconciliation debate. I don't push as strong a pitch as we heard from Phil Zelikow about the Iraq policy debate, but I think the fact that you had Brits closely involved — and I was one of those in Holbrooke's office — on the reconciliation agenda with the Taliban is again an interesting ingredient about the proximity and the intimacy of involvement in the U.S. policymaking process.

Moderator: Great example. John Bellinger? Then we have George, and we'll be done.

John: I just want to give a quick vignette of the actual influence of Tony Blair on George Bush that fits into these Iraq examples. After the cessation of hostilities in Iraq, the first thing we had to do was to decide on Iraq reconstruction. You all recall that Bush and Blair met at Hillsborough Castle in Northern Ireland in April of 2003. I had done all the preparatory work. I think Kurt was involved. I had been working on the UN legal issues. We knew that the British wanted the UN to be involved. The defense department, Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney adamantly opposed. "No UN involvement. Do not mention the word UN." Condi had been briefing the president on the way over and the way in. "State wants UN involvement. Tony Blair wants UN involvement. OVP and DOD do not want UN involvement." The president took this on board. Then in the little meeting, first there's a [unintelligible 0:06:31] meeting, and then they decide what they're going to say. Blair makes his pitch to the president.

"At this point, George, we've really got to get the UN involved. It's really critical for me back home." The president nods, and then they talk about what they're going to say. Blair says, "The first question is going to be about UN involvement. What are you going to say?" The president says, "You know, we're going to think about it," so we really don't know what they're going to say when they go out. The first question sure enough is to George Bush. "So is there going to be a role for the UN?" Right out of his mouth he says, "There's going to be a vital role for the United Nations." I see Condi just totally blanch. So does the president. The press conference is over. He walks right out, walks over and says, "What's the problem? You're really frowning," and she says, "I'm going to have a terrible time explaining this to Don Rumsfeld."

Moderator: That's wonderful. George, you've got the last question.

George: Great. I'll keep this brief, because so much rich pageantry of commentary has already come down the pike this morning. It's a great panel. Thank you all very much. Probably most of the people in the room are aware of where the American military was in 1941, but maybe not everybody. We had slightly over 100,000 men under arms, and they were trained with broomsticks. You think about the end of World War II, that we had over 16 million men and women under arms, and had risen so far so quick. If you think we're isolationist today, or we have isolationist elements in the Libertarian area of the Republican Party and in the far left of the Democratic Party, that was true isolationism back then. If you think about the volatility of the Special Relationship over that — I want to go further back in history, obviously — that 70, 75-year period.

It can survive just about anything — not anything, but close to anything. I think about, coming quickly up to the more modern era, how seamless and magnificent that Thatcher, Bush, Reagan elements were in the Persian Gulf War and that coalition, and how beautifully that skirmish I would say was executed, and then how the Iraq War I think was handled much less magnificently and with a much smaller coalition, and with the isolationist tendencies of our country cropping up more and more and more now, I think we're at kind of a pivotal point in the way the UK and the U.S. do business together going forward, and I think it's fraught with a lot more peril than has been evident in the last 20 or 30 years. So it'll be interesting to watch that play out.

Moderator: I think that's a great comment about how historical perspective helps, and it goes back to Admiral Inman's comment as well, I think. So panelists, you all have a few seconds. Choose what you wish to comment on, please. Tom, why don't you start?

Tom: Just really two comments. The first is to follow on to Lord Reid's comment. I think about sort of public visceral responses to individual American presidents, as opposed to the relationship overall. I really think it's a topic that deserves greater exploration, because in the case of any president this is the elected leader of the U.S., elected directly by — well, okay, the electors — elected by the American people. So any president connects very deeply with values that Americans hold. Yeah, you do get a variety of responses. To think about Ronald Reagan, many of the things that the British public didn't like about Ronald Reagan were actually things that a lot of Americans really like about Ronald Reagan. I think teasing that out is very important.

Second, a number of the other comments I think really spoke to the question of the persistence or the stickiness of the Special Relationship and the individual relationships that helped make that up. I mean, Celeste's point I think is spot on. During my time in the Pentagon one of my jobs included supervision of our contingency plans, which are very sensitive, which we don't share with our own Congress for all sorts of reasons. And yet because of exchanges between the U.S. and the UK on a number of occasions when we were having a video teleconference to discuss a future contingency plan, the face on the other end of the teleconference was a British one, and the uniform was a British uniform. The U.S. Central Command Deputy, J5 for plans was a British general officer. So again, here you're having a discussion of American contingency plans with a British officer posted to U.S. Central Command.

Again, that's extraordinary in a historical perspective. This is not the Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II, where it's an ongoing war. You're talking about a hypothetical future contingency. Then Josh's question, applying that stickiness if you will to the intelligence relationship I think also is a really good one. I think it is a question, although I tend to think the degree of institutionalization is such that when it comes to the intelligence cooperation, this isn't a theoretical thing. This is an enterprise that very many individuals are involved in on a day-to-day basis in the United States and elsewhere working side by side. Now, where the domestic politics in various countries takes it — but I'd say among the analysts that's sort of the least of my concerns. I have lots of concerns, but that's probably the least of the concerns.

Moderator: Rob?

Rob: Yeah, briefly, can I remind Doug Feith that Secretary Kerry reminded us a couple of months ago that the French are your oldest ally, so I don't understand why you don't want to sit them with them really.

Lord John: That's with the Scots.

Rob: That's why you're not going to go independent. It seems to me — your point about Bush is well taken, but you could not have devised, if you had to invent one, a president more likely to animate antipathy amongst Brits and Europeans than George W. Bush. It predated Blair's troubles. It predated 2003. It was there from when he was in office, partly because of the contested election. He was the toxic Texan then. It deepened through Iraq, but it lasted when Brown took over. In fact, if you teach at British universities, you'll know it lasts for Obama too. So there is something distinctive, and I think it's separate and above the domestic elements, however important they are.

The final point, in relation to Phil Zelikow's thing and to Sir Nigel, it seems to me the States needs allies, and the States recognizes that. It's unlikely, I would submit, that you're going to get an isolationist president, Rand Paul or somebody equivalent on the left, who is simply going to dispense with allies. That's a brute fact of international reality, but I would caution you as well: please don't call us Greeks at the moment.

Moderator: Touché. What did you say about lucidity? James?

James: The question of influence is a really good one, and it always comes down to that. I suppose the greatest influence that a British prime minister had over an American president was in Nassau in December of 1962, which everybody will remember, when a president was leading a policy which essentially wanted to reduce Britain's nuclear capability, merge it with the European format, and encourage the British to take a role in the European community. The prime minister left that meeting with a nuclear submarine policy in his pocket. But at the same time Sir Nigel is actually wrong, of course, because the current debates about the future of Britain's nuclear deterrent clashes with Tom's point about the fact that the timeline for modernization, and I think also the technology about the nuclear reactor core is shared in the alliance. I think this is true for the Anglo-American alliance at all times. There's going to be a very active core in intelligence and nuclear affairs and defense broadly, but there will be major changes in international affairs, which will put strains on the alliance [unintelligible 0:15:14] over time, despite the fact that it will probably exist in some way.

Moderator: That's great. Kurt?

Kurt: One thought in response to Nigel, which is the asymmetry that exists between the U.S. and the UK is less than the asymmetry that exists between the U.S. and everybody else.

Moderator: It strikes me, with the quality of this panel, that we need to discuss this more. We should have another conference sometime on the history of the U.S./British Special Relationship. I want to thank all the members of the audience, especially the members of the panel.

[Multiple speakers]

[End File. Recorded Time = 15:56 = 16 minutes] [Total Time Transcribed = 121 minutes]