



EMERGING POWERS POLICY FORUM

## PROMISING PARTNERSHIPS

Emerging and Established Powers in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

DANIEL M. KLIMAN  
JOSHUA W. WALKER  
WILLIAM INBODEN

**G | M | F** The German Marshall Fund  
of the United States

STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

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The German Marshall Fund of the United States  
1744 R Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20009  
T 1 202 683 2650  
F 1 202 265 1662  
E [info@gmfus.org](mailto:info@gmfus.org)

This publication can be downloaded for free at [www.gmfus.org/publications](http://www.gmfus.org/publications).

#### Emerging Powers Policy Forum

The Emerging Powers Policy Forum was launched in July 2013 with the purpose of bringing together emerging power diplomats in Washington, DC, and relevant U.S. and U.K. officials, to discuss how to approach the key policy questions presented by the changing international landscape. This initiative has received the support of the *U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office's Emerging Powers Programme Fund*.

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Cover photo: Diplomats meet at the UN Security Council on November 16, 2010 to discuss the referendum in Sudan.  
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Daniel M. Kliman,<sup>1</sup> Joshua W. Walker,<sup>2</sup> and William Inboden<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Daniel M. Kliman is a senior advisor for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Joshua W. Walker is a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

<sup>3</sup> William Inboden is a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, executive director of the Clements Center for History, Strategy, and Statecraft, and an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin.

# 1

## PROMISING PARTNERSHIPS

DANIEL M. KLIMAN

**G**rowing challenges to international peace and prosperity place a new premium on cooperation between emerging and established powers. Efforts to forge closer partnerships have accelerated in recent years, but the gap between the level of existing cooperation and the potential of these ties to contribute to international order remains significant. For emerging and established powers, the stakes are high. If they can come together, all are more likely to thrive. If the global order fragments, they — and the broader world — will suffer the consequences.<sup>1</sup>

### New Pressures on International Order

The global order that exists, despite deviations and exceptions, has facilitated peace, prosperity, and freedom for more than six decades. Initially rooted in a set of multilateral organizations — the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — the order has since evolved into an interlocking web of institutions, norms, rules, and relationships. Today, this system encompasses numerous elements, but five specific functions remain at its core:

- A *trade order* strives to advance the principles of commercial reciprocity and nondiscrimination.
- A *financial order* works to preserve monetary stability.
- A *maritime order* attempts to guarantee freedom of navigation while protecting the territorial sovereignty of coastal states.

- A *non-proliferation order* aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce their testing.
- A *human rights order* endeavors to promote respect for fundamental liberties and the democratic process.

Since 2000, new challenges have begun to degrade these core functions. Some challenges largely relate to the rise of China, such as outsized maritime claims and the bypassing of international financial institutions. Other challenges involve diminished multilateral trade talks, a weakened global financial architecture, the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, and a retrenchment of democracy in some parts of the world. At the same time, a combination of fiscal and political constraints limits the role of traditional supporters of the global order.

The international order is subject to growing pressures. Unlike the aftermath of World War II, when the communist bloc constituted a potential alternative to the rules-based system championed by the United States, today no country or grouping has the power and ambition to construct a rival order. Rather than entering a period of eclipse and displacement, the international order currently trends toward fragmentation. In the future, the principles advanced by the order may become less universally binding; different parts of the world may interpret and apply them based on local consensus or the desires of the regionally dominant power. In this future, arrangements at the global level that have successfully regulated key areas of state behavior may become less effective as they are duplicated. Fragmentation of the existing order would be deeply inimical to all countries that depend upon an open and stable world for their security and prosperity.

**For emerging and established powers, the stakes are high.**

<sup>1</sup> The below paragraphs draw on parts of Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine, *Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order* (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Center for a New American Security, November 2012).

**While counter-piracy has become a locus for cooperation, other global security issues have driven a wedge between emerging and established powers.**

### **The State of Cooperation**

Cooperation between emerging and established powers has expanded in recent years. The rise of the Group of 20 (G20) exemplifies this dynamic, and at the same time, reveals its limitations. More inclusive than the Group of 8 (G8) industrialized nations, the G20 played a pivotal role in preventing a severe depression. However, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the G20 has yet to fully realize its potential as a steering committee for the world economy. Collaboration in other longstanding multilateral forums such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the IMF has also moved forward, but the thorny question of how to reform these institutions to reflect a changed balance of power remains an impediment.

Another recent but mixed example of growing cooperation is the Bali meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2013. After more than a decade of deadlock, emerging and established powers came together to forge an agreement that will advance trade liberalization on a global scale. Yet the Bali accord only covers trade facilitation, leaving unresolved tariffs and taxation, politically fraught issues that have bedeviled the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks.<sup>2</sup>

The most successful case of emerging and established power collaboration to uphold the global order is counter-piracy. Altogether, more than 60 countries have joined the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. Under the banner of this voluntary ad hoc initiative grounded in UNSC Resolution 185,<sup>3</sup> new and traditional powers have contributed ships to protect vital sea lines of communication around the Horn of Africa. This effort has succeeded largely because all of

the involved parties share similar perceptions of a threat to their interests, and critically, a number of emerging powers have developed new naval capabilities.

While counter-piracy has become a locus for cooperation, other global security issues have driven a wedge between emerging and established powers. Traditional actors such as the United States and its European allies have enthusiastically embraced pressure as a tool of diplomacy. By contrast, many emerging powers remain wary of this approach. As the evolution of technology enables the application of increasingly fine-grained economic sanctions, the role of non-military coercion will likely become a growing source of tension.

Another area of lingering friction is how to approach the human rights record of other governments. Vigorous debates on this question exist within emerging and established powers, but the overall picture is that of division between the West and the rest: leaders in established powers remain more comfortable with humanitarian intervention and aggressive naming and shaming than their emerging power counterparts.

A new area of tension relates to the collection of information. Although Edward Snowden's disclosure of the U.S. National Security Agency's covert activities has triggered angry reactions in capitals ranging from Berlin to Brasilia, the most sustained pushback has emanated from the governments of emerging powers. Policies toward intelligence collection will remain a point of contention for these governments as the United States and other traditional powers continue to enhance their technical ability to gather information.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew Walker, "WTO agrees global trade deal worth \$1tn," *BBC*, December 7, 2013.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. State Department, "Contact Group on Piracy of the Coast of Somalia: Quarterly Update," December 24, 2013.

## Toward 21<sup>st</sup> Century Partnerships

To chart a vision for 21<sup>st</sup> century partnerships between emerging and established power, in July 2013 the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) launched the Emerging Powers Policy Forum. This initiative has brought together emerging power diplomats in Washington, DC, along with relevant U.S. and U.K. officials, to discuss how to approach the key policy questions presented by the changing international landscape. Over the course of three meetings in the fall of 2013, participants addressed the following themes: economic diplomacy, global security challenges, and scientific, cultural, and other people-to-people exchanges. Prior to each session, the contributors to this volume authored read-aheads that were distributed to participants. The sections of this volume build on the read-aheads by integrating the best ideas generated during the course of the discussion.

In the first section, “Rethinking Economic Diplomacy: Blurring the Lines between Public and Private,” Joshua Walker argues that global prosperity in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will require closer cooperation between governments and companies in both emerging and established powers. Walker begins by surveying the state of global economic governance, and finds that innovations such as an empowered G20 have strengthened the world’s economic architecture. Yet at the same time, the evolving nature of the global economy and the changing roles of government and the private sector pose a new set of questions. Will new regional institutions and economic groupings enhance prosperity or create closed fortresses? How can development projects more effectively engage the private sector? Can international institutions address inequality within countries? What rules and practices should govern the Internet, and who should determine them? Walker subsequently details how the United States has started to leverage the private sector to enhance diplomacy during

a time of fiscal austerity. He points to the U.S. Department of State’s Global Partnerships Initiative, which coordinates with some of the largest U.S. companies, and the international skill building activities of firms including Hewlett Packard, Cisco, Google, Intel, and Microsoft as key examples for governments in both emerging and established powers. Walker concludes by recommending that policymakers should clearly define the role and scope of the many economic organizations that exist before creating new institutions. Regional organizations should concentrate on building infrastructure rather than setting rules. Governments should reassess the utility of the various economic meetings that exist with the aim of ultimately reducing a now unmanageable number. Development agencies should bring the private sector into discussions at the outset of new initiatives. Last, governments and companies should jointly design metrics to measure the impact of public-private partnerships.

In the second section, “Global Security Challenges Confronting Established and Emerging Powers,” William Inboden cautions against sweeping generalizations about either group of states. He contends that the real fault-lines on global security cut across emerging and established powers and reflect a complex interaction of interests, identities, and issues. Moreover, states may behave as either emerging or established powers depending on the institutional context and the problem at hand. To demonstrate this, Inboden analyzes six leading security challenges. He observes that the coalition vigorously opposing Iran’s nuclear program includes traditional and new powers, as does the group of countries favoring a less confrontational approach. Focusing on terrorism, Inboden finds that regional position and perception of threat best predict whether nations favor tactics such as the use of armed drones. On climate change, he acknowledges that the disagreements over mandatory emission reductions largely cut between

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**Democracies at any level of development may be best suited to address today's global security challenges.**

emerging and established powers. From Inboden's perspective, the recent debate on the Syrian government's mass killings suggests that traditional powers are less supportive of humanitarian intervention than in the past and the issue no longer pits the West against the rest. Looking to norms on information gathering, he argues that beneath the rhetoric, the most significant divide separates governments and publics, with intelligence agencies in emerging and established powers similarly eager to exploit new surveillance technologies. Finally, he notes that China's rise has produced a set of security concerns and economic dilemmas shared by almost all emerging and established powers. Based on these findings, Inboden asserts that democracies at any level of development may be best suited to address today's global security challenges, and that the success of the Contact Group on Piracy of the Coast of Somalia may point the way toward a new model of issue-oriented, informal cooperation that the world's democracies should consider leveraging.

In the third section, "Reimagining People-to-People Diplomacy," Joshua Walker explores the rising importance of international exchange programs. To achieve influence abroad and online, national leaders in emerging and established powers can no longer focus solely on other governments, he argues. Changes in technology have empowered new diplomatic actors — particularly the youth. At the same time, effective foreign policy increasingly requires forging consensus on a common set of values, which places a premium on diplomatic efforts to build global networks of future leaders. One area of high potential that Walker identifies is science and technology exchanges. Leaders in both emerging and established powers view innovation

as critical to economic growth, and well-designed science and technology exchanges can benefit all parties. Cities present another promising area for people-to-people diplomacy. With major urban centers in advanced and emerging economies increasingly linked by commerce and a shared cosmopolitan outlook, there is an unparalleled opportunity to build on existing exchanges of civic leaders. Yet Walker acknowledges that creating a world of citizen diplomats is no easy task. Governments generally lack the funds to expand exchanges significantly; meanwhile, the private sector, though possessing the needed resources, has its own agenda. Without adequate funds, governments confront a tradeoff: engage fewer people more intensely or touch more people briefly. Another challenge is that international exchanges tend to involve elites and top-tier institutions. This results in overwhelming demand for a handful of experts and organizations while leaving large segments of society untouched. Walker offers several recommendations to improve people-to-people diplomacy. Governments should structure exchange programs to focus more on domestically oriented leaders. Emerging and established powers should work together to diversify the groups involved in exchanges. Last, governments should leverage corporate funding for people-to-people diplomacy where public and private objectives overlap.

Together, these sections set forth an innovative agenda for advancing cooperation between emerging and established powers. In a world of growing risk and uncertainty, these promising partnerships hold the key to adapting and renewing the global order.

# 2 RETHINKING ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

JOSHUA W. WALKER

Policymakers today almost universally acknowledge that global security and thriving markets go together along with the central role that open economies and global governance structures play in both arenas. Yet the diplomacy and foreign policy institutions of most nations do not reflect this reality. Put bluntly, the channels of influence that nation-states could once rely upon — large, multinational consortia of advanced industrial economies — are waning in power. One thing is clear to governments around the world: economic diplomacy needs a jumpstart into the 21<sup>st</sup> century led not only by the developed but also the emerging economies of the world so that all have a stake in future prosperity.<sup>4</sup>

Effective, pragmatic partnerships based on shared objectives — economic growth, financial stability and more — are the future of economic diplomacy. Such partnerships will be the engine for increased security and prosperity, not just for advanced but also for emerging economies around the world. Creating spaces at international summits for public and private sector leaders to collaborate is critical. Existing public-private pairings such as the United Nations General Assembly and the Clinton Global Initiative or the G20 and Business 20 have a proven record of success. They and future collaborations will orchestrate long-term opportunities for cross-sector cooperation, and in turn, promote long-term economic growth that taps into public-private partnerships that are still nascent in diplomacy.

## The Shifting Landscape of Global Economic Governance

The state of global economic governance in many ways is stronger today than at any time in modern history. Yet how emerging powers engage with existing global economic governance structures is as varied as the reform agendas pursued in the IMF, the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD), UN, and World Bank, to list just a few key institutions. The perception of these international economic institutions ranges from that of a Western “rich man’s club” to global standard-setters serving as a hub for technical expertise. However, the limitations of the postwar economic order and its inability to prevent the last global financial crisis must be addressed if new players are to become part of the solution rather than a problem for global economic governance.

The consolidation of the G20 as *the* leading economic council of wealthy nations at the 2008 Washington summit ensured a more inclusive and representative governance structure than the G8, the UNSC, or any other international leadership body. Representing over 85 percent of global GDP, 80 percent of world trade, and 70 percent of the planet’s population, the G20 includes both established and emerging powers and is an innovation in global economic governance. The G20 studies, reviews, and promotes high-level discussions on policy issues pertaining to the promotion of international financial stability, and seeks to address issues that go beyond the responsibilities of any one nation or organization. Yet as the global landscape shifts, the world’s ability to gain traction on key long-term challenges remains unclear despite the short-term gains enabled by the G20 as a new tool of international economic governance.

Although achieving agreement on a single strategy or set of priorities for the international community is almost impossible, various global institutions including the G20 and World Bank are attempting just that. New strategies such as the UN’s Millennium Development Goals include the eradication of extreme poverty and shared global prosperity as lofty and universal ideals, for which sustainability is a cross-cutting theme. Yet there are real questions — and divisions — over spending international aid on energy or the environment,

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<sup>4</sup> An earlier version of this section was published as Joshua W. Walker, “The Future of American Diplomacy,” *The Diplomat*, August 25, 2013.



**Issues of fairness have set the agenda in civil society discussions around the globe, often led by emerging powers.**

and how to grapple with ownership by individual member countries. The IMF and the World Bank are becoming increasingly involved in the G20 and G8, playing a larger role in long-term financial mechanisms. However, as countries graduate from low income to medium income status, they still must deal with pockets of poverty. In the years ahead, the extreme poverty challenge will be most acute in fragile conflict states and parts of Africa. How governments manage rising populations at the same time as they try to reduce poverty brings security directly into the development space. These multifaceted and complex challenges defy resolution by any individual country or government.

Regional formations and groupings have allowed countries to punch above their weight and ideally create momentum that they can carry over into the broader global community. The African Development Bank and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) grouping offer possible directions along with the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). At the same time, these initiatives, to varying degrees, pose a challenge to the global economy by encouraging regionalism and regional institutions. The possibility of creating regional fortresses within a global system that facilitate development and trade only for those on the inside understandably concerns countries excluded from these groupings. Therefore broadening and facilitating public-private structures through the private sector for global economic governance will be essential.

Global and regional institutions have a role in helping to level the playing field in both expertise and providing a macro view for the private sector on international development and economic issues. Recognition of the relevance of the private sector in setting some of the norms and standards that governments and international institutions are

building is critical. All governments struggle with how to support job creation and spur growth; therefore, it is vital to involve the private sector early on in traditional development projects using appropriate incentives. For example, the private sector can build low cost hospitals and schools better than governments in many cases — how can institutions facilitate these efficiencies systematically rather than through one-off philanthropic endeavors? The private sector often struggles to find ways to obtain relevance in the eyes of government, while diplomats often underestimate the utility of including businesses and multinational companies in their discussions. There is a real need to support and develop the private sector within countries to capture and promote private sector capital flows internationally, which necessitates greater cross-sector collaboration.

Economic success and technological innovations can generate new challenges to further development, as demonstrated recently in the street protests of Brazil and Turkey. Amplified by social media, protests focused on economic inequality. Issues of fairness have set the agenda in civil society discussions around the globe, often led by emerging powers. Socio-economic inclusion and other indicators of equity matter more than ever, yet they are rarely addressed at the highest levels of global governance. International institutions need to own inequality as a global economic issue or they risk losing credibility.

Internet governance is often mentioned in global communiqués, but beyond the rhetoric, governance of the greatest driver of economic innovation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century remains in flux. Unlike established pillars of international order such as trade and finance, the Internet lacks well-defined rules and practices. Internet governance poses both an international and domestic challenge and is a new area of international order that established and

emerging powers will have to jointly construct. The Internet that exists today reflects norms promulgated by the United States and Europe that enshrine freedom of online expression and a multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance involving companies and civil society groups. However, most Internet users now live outside the United States and Europe, a trend that will only accelerate, and emerging powers across the globe are pushing for a stronger voice over the Internet's future. With a significant number of countries imposing restrictions on the flow of online content and a growing push for a more statist model of Internet governance, the future of the Internet increasingly hangs in the balance. A free Internet will only endure if a critical number of emerging powers come to regard open governance structures as key drivers of domestic innovation and economic growth.

Ultimately, domestic developments in both established and emerging powers pose a challenge to governments internationally while simultaneously creating shared opportunities for cooperation.

### **Public-Private Partnerships: The U.S. Response**

While terms such as “Economic Statecraft,” “Global Engagement,” and “Strategic Partnerships” have grown fashionable in Washington, the tangible impact of these buzzwords is difficult to measure. The intersection of public and private sectors has now blurred the lines in diplomacy. Today in Washington, U.S. diplomats are beginning to understand that public-private partnerships are an ideal mechanism for getting the most out of available resources, technology, knowledge, and networks. Faced with constricting budgets, U.S. officials are trying to find smarter ways to make government capital more catalytic. And perhaps more importantly, these partnerships might be the most effective foreign policy tool that the United States has at its disposal today.

Expanding this U.S. model globally, with the help of multinational companies, includes seeking advice and collaboration, rather than trying to simply direct the private sector from the public. The best way to capitalize on the overlapping interests between various sectors is to designate senior-level responsibility for that task, completely tied to core business and focused on unlocking new markets in partnership with governments. Efforts such as the UN's Global Education First Initiative and the State Department's Global Partnership Initiative coordinate with some of the largest private sector companies and offer potential examples for the future.

For the private sector, investing in diplomacy is not merely charity — it is an opportunity. Technology giant Hewlett-Packard has provided business skills training to young entrepreneurs in 49 countries through its HP LIFE program. Similarly, Cisco, Google, Intel, and Microsoft, to name just a few companies, are using a combination of low-technology (face-to-face training from local experts) and high-technology (web-based learning) solutions to build human capital.

Partnerships leverage resources by blending public grants and guarantees with private investment, effectively making the sum greater than the individual parts. Co-creating solutions with civil society and the private sector — as opposed to dictating solutions from above — is the wave of the future in Washington given the new global dynamics. The more opportunity that established and emerging powers can provide globally and locally for a very talented next generation through their private sectors, the more successful the global economy will become. Rather than reactively bemoaning the effects of shrinking government budgets and the rise of non-state actors, proactively adjusting international diplomacy to include the private sector is the best path forward.

**The intersection of public and private sectors has now blurred the lines in diplomacy.**

**There is a growing need to ensure that rules apply globally while leveraging regional institutions for local solutions.**

### Recommendations

The following ideas will help policymakers — and their private-sector counterparts — to navigate the future of economic diplomacy:

- **Closely coordinate regional and multilateral institutions.** Given the proliferation and overlap of various institutions, it is imperative to clearly define the role and scope of the many organizations that currently exist before creating future organizations. Identifying institutions to lead on specific issues, whether globally or regionally, will empower participating states to play a larger role in addressing particular challenges and overcome some of the buck-passing that currently exists within the international system.
- **Regional institutions should concentrate on building infrastructure rather than setting rules.** There is a growing need to ensure that rules apply globally while leveraging regional institutions for local solutions. Rule-setting at the regional level risks fragmenting the global economic order.
- **Reduce the number of international economic meetings.** Policymakers are hard-pressed to attend an ever-expanding constellation of regional and global meetings. Governments devote too much time to formulating the next set of talking points rather than ensuring that economic policy initiatives agreed upon at earlier forums move forward. Policymakers in established and emerging powers should reassess the utility of the various meetings that exist with the aim of ultimately reducing the number by at least one-quarter.
- **Focus on action-oriented results rather than process.** When countries and diplomats get together, they often focus on process rather than on affecting real-world change. This is particularly a problem for governments looking to establish new institutions or meetings — setting up new development banks, conferences, institutions, or groupings requires substantial time and money. Established and emerging powers should prioritize functionality over format and whenever possible use pre-existing organizations or partnerships to accomplish new goals.
- **Bring the private sector into the room at the outset of new development initiatives rather than simply as a funder after the fact.** The private sector can play an essential role in infrastructure projects — whether related to energy, the Internet, or transportation. Development projects initiated by global or regional institutions or individual governments will, in many cases, be more effective if the private sector can help with conceptualization and planning early on.
- **Effectively measure the impact of public-private partnerships.** To clearly assess performance, governments and corporations should develop metrics that capture outcomes rather than inputs and minimize rhetoric and symbolism.

# 3

## GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES CONFRONTING ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING POWERS

WILLIAM INBODEN

How do established and emerging powers differ in their approach to global security challenges? Often along the same lines that established powers differ among themselves. A similar point could be made as to when and how established and emerging powers converge in their perspectives on such challenges. The fault lines are rarely so mono-dimensional as to spark cleavages between existing and emerging powers, but rather alliances and divisions form among these nations across a shifting kaleidoscope of interests, identities, and issues. *Who* a nation thinks it is often shapes *how* it decides *what* it will do. Such is the case as established and emerging powers confront an array of global security challenges. There are many ways a nation can define itself and its core interests. These include its relative power levels, the nature of its power, its region, its political system, its religious and cultural identity, its alliances and participation in international institutions, and its perceived threats and adversaries.

Moreover, sometimes a nation may be an established power in one context but an emerging power in another context. For example, Japan has for decades been an established power in economic terms. Yet when it comes to military force projection or participation in international institutions, Japan is better seen as an emerging power, as it considers expanding its military and revising its constitution to permit broader uses of force, while continuing its (thus far unsuccessful) bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Conversely, China is often classified as an emerging power due to its “BRIC” status and remarkable economic transformation, yet it has long held a permanent UNSC seat alongside other established powers. Or take India, which while in many ways is a prototypical emerging power, is also one of the world’s more mature and established democracies. Its democratic traditions provide it resilience even as it struggles with tensions between political reform and bureaucratic sclerosis, economic stagnation,

and residual Non-Aligned Movement affinities within some elements of its national security establishment. India’s burgeoning ties with other emerging power democracies such as Brazil and South Africa show the potential for greater cooperation with mature democracies among established powers as well, such as the United States and United Kingdom.

Religion further complicates efforts to categorize emerging and established powers. Despite earlier predictions of the inevitable decline of religion in the face of the twin advances of modernity and globalization, if anything, religion has experienced a global resurgence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As one of the most potent forces known to the human condition, it can inspire acts of the greatest magnanimity and sacrifice, and the basest malevolence and destruction. Religion also accounts for many of the most fraught fault-lines that transcend nation-state borders, such as the Sunni-Shia sectarian divide across the broader Middle East, or the Christian-Muslim belt across sub-Saharan Africa. Some resurgent nationalisms have a pronounced religious dimension too, such as the Russian Orthodox nationalism mobilized by Vladimir Putin, and the Hindu nationalism of Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India. Finally, some religious leaders can mobilize global attention and influence how we think about policy challenges. Perhaps the reinvigorated Vatican under Pope Francis might even qualify as an emerging power in its own right? At the very least, the large numbers of Catholics resident in both established and emerging powers shows the possibility of religion being a unifying force across national frontiers as much as it is on occasion a source of division within borders.

Considering the global security challenges themselves, even as discrete issues are identified, they are often linked. For example, considerations of humanitarian intervention in Syria are inextricable from the issues of terrorism, and

**Who a nation thinks it is often shapes how it decides what it will do.**

**The coalition of nations most vigorously opposed to the Iranian nuclear program includes both established and emerging powers.**

how to address Iran's nuclear program, given the proliferation of jihadists in Syria and the Iran-Syria alliance. Or questions of information privacy and intelligence gathering, which touch on the rise of China given Hong Kong's role in Edward Snowden's flight.

**Assessing Specific Security Challenges**

*Nuclear proliferation:* The nuclear non-proliferation regime faces its most significant test over Iran. The disposition of the Iran issue will have significant second and third-order effects on whether other emerging powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey go nuclear, on the potential availability of nuclear devices to non-state actors, and on future cooperation among various powers. The fault lines on this issue also mark some cleavages across both established and emerging powers. The coalition of nations most vigorously opposed to the Iranian nuclear program includes both established and emerging powers (e.g. United States, United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates), as does the group of nations that have either supported Iran or tried to develop a less confrontational approach (e.g. Russia, China, at times India, Turkey, and Brazil).

*Terrorism:* Again the alignments here resist simple categorization. Perhaps the best predictors of a nation's posture on terrorism and the tactics used against it (such as drones) depend on its regional position and its own perceived threat assessment. Thus the United States, United Kingdom, India, China, and Russia generally find their interests aligned in robust counterterrorism measures, even if specific cooperation is sometimes anemic (such as between the United States and Russia, or the United States and China). Sharper divides emerge over questions of long-term counter-radicalization, where nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France point out that Russia's support for the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war has also contributed to the radicalization of many

rebel fighters. Further divisions come from Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who share this assessment but criticize the Western powers for not doing more to support the moderate opposition and thus perhaps indirectly contribute to the strengthening of extremist elements.

*Climate and energy:* The divisions on these issues were on sharp display at the UN climate change conference in Warsaw in November 2013, and cut between developed powers such as the United States and the European Union (who generally favor stronger mitigation measures such as reducing carbon emissions) and rising powers such as China, India, and Saudi Arabia whose economies are reliant either on hydrocarbon imports or exports. It is possible that an alternative way forward will emerge in time from a combination of adaptation strategies and the shale revolution, which makes cleaner-burning natural gas more affordable and available, and which has already made the United States a net energy exporter.

*Humanitarian intervention:* The Right to Protect (R2P) doctrine's zenith may have been Libya in 2011, in which a coalition of established and emerging powers secured UNSC support for the intervention that decapitated the Gaddafi regime. Conversely, R2P's demise may have been marked by Syria in 2012-2013, in which even the killing of over 100,000 Syrians and the use of chemical weapons by the regime of President Bashar al Assad did not prompt an international intervention. Here international divisions were on stark display and cut across established and emerging power lines. It may be that the near-term future of humanitarian intervention will look more like smaller-scale, ad hoc interventions of informal coalitions led by one interested power facing little international resistance, such as France's intervention in Mali.

*Information:* Drilling down beneath the headlines, it seems that international divisions on information

gathering are actually not across borders but between governments and their publics. Most governments of established and emerging powers quietly see a continued need for robust signals and communications intelligence gathering, including sometimes in friendly countries, whereas most publics find such practices disquieting at best, abhorrent at worst. The challenge for democratic governments will be bringing more transparency and privacy protections to their intelligence practices while reassuring their publics that appropriate balances are being respected.

*Rise of China:* This challenge actually elicits fewer divisions and more agreement. Almost all established and emerging powers (with the partial exception of Russia) find the manner of China's rise to be at least in part worrisome. Yet almost all of those same countries find themselves facing variations on the same dilemma: growing economic integration with China amidst growing security tensions and resentments. The degree of shared assessments by nations as diverse as the United States, Japan, India, Australia, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom shows the potential for jointly developing a strategic policy framework. But China's own growing power and ambitions, coupled with the particularities of each country's own "China dilemma," complicate such efforts.

### Reflections on the Way Forward

Considering these aforementioned security challenges in the aggregate, are democratic nations overall better equipped to respond? There are some reasons to think so. To begin, democracies are much less frequently the main causes, drivers, or sources of global malignancies such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and the mass killing of civilians. Democracies have also proven more adept at responding to public opinion to address emerging issues such as climate change and disease pandemics. When it comes to international cooperation, democracies more often show

leadership in supporting existing multilateral organizations and in forming new multilateral initiatives and partnerships. This may be in part because democratic values and institutions such as accountability, rule of law, and minority rights more readily translate from the domestic sphere into responsible behavior in the international sphere. It also suggests the possibility that the support and promotion of democracy could have a salutary effect over time in helping mitigate security challenges and crafting effective multilateral responses.

What of the role of multilateral institutions and regimes? Are prevailing multilateral institutions suitably equipped to respond to these multifarious security challenges? The very fact that almost 70 years after its founding the UN remains the preeminent global multilateral institution and often the global venue of first resort testifies to its continuing relevance and perceived legitimacy. Yet the additional facts that the UN is often the locus of ineffective or even non-existent responses, and that UNSC resolutions on nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and mass killing are not infrequently stymied or disregarded, testify to the UN's considerable limitations. Alternative, complementary multilateral institutions and initiatives can be based around shared values (such as the Community of Democracies), common regions (such as the African Union, or the Organization of American States), or specific issues.

A compelling example of the latter is the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). Its early successes are perhaps instructive. Formed initially in 2009 to address the then-burgeoning problem of piracy in the maritime region off the Horn of Africa, the CGPCS drew its initial mandate from UNSC resolution 1851 — thus indicating a certain continuing role for the UN itself in helping catalyze and legitimate new multilateral initiatives. That over 60 nations participate in the CGPCS and

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that it has in the past 18 months helped prevent any successful acts of piracy demonstrates its effectiveness. But its narrow scope — focused on a single issue, in a single region, and a single band of ill-equipped adversaries — should at the least chasten any hopes that its model can be easily replicated and expanded. Nevertheless, the CGPCS does suggest the possibility that other new multilateral initiatives can be created to address other specific security challenges.

Going forward, one approach to consider, which draws on several of the themes discussed above, is for an informal coalition of democratic established and emerging powers from multiple continents to

begin cooperating together on a specific democratic governance project: helping encourage a continuing democratic transition in Burma, for example, or helping Tunisia consolidate its democracy, or more ambitiously, helping promote democracy in an authoritarian regime like Eritrea. The formal mechanisms and informal habits of cooperation in such a venture could then organically lay the groundwork for developing a more formal multilateral mechanism from this new coalition to address other security challenges.

# 4

## REIMAGINING PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY

JOSHUA W. WALKER

The world today is more interconnected than at any point in history. Yet the very tools that can be used to bring nations and people together can just as easily be used to divide and polarize. In a world of 24-hour media coverage and instant gratification, people from across the globe seem to only agree on just how dysfunctional governments and politics have become rather than on ways to mobilize civil society and utilize person-to-person connections. In an era in which anti-government protests and shutdowns reflect the worst instincts of nations, the next generation of leaders is rapidly becoming disillusioned. As a result, while acknowledging the challenges that exist, there has never been a greater opportunity to bring people closer together through bridge building, citizen diplomacy, and international exchange programs.

### The Opportunity

In a more interconnected world, all countries desire greater influence, both abroad and online. But to achieve this, national leaders can no longer simply focus on governments. They must bring their citizens into international exchanges in fields as varied as entrepreneurship, science, and technology, to name but a few. The international has become local, while the domestic has become global. Rather than reinventing diplomacy for each generation, emerging and traditional powers can learn from each other by building on the best qualities that each brings to the table.

Hierarchy, which was once a defining element of the public and private sector, is increasingly an obstacle to the innovations necessary to make companies and governments truly inclusive and responsive. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the world of diplomacy, which used to be the exclusive domain of career professionals and appointed or elected leaders. Today, however, hoodie-wearing and cell-phone toting millennials can be united by text messages in Brazil, Egypt,

Sweden, or Turkey, with an impact that lives on beyond street protests in the form of hash tags, posts, and tweets.

Changes in technology not only empower citizens but also create new economic dislocations and a demand for ever-greater education. Given the acceleration of the global scientific revolution, it is difficult to imagine, much less predict, what new transformative possibilities will emerge within a decade. As a result, exchange programs in science and technology that share best practices have become a key focus for both established and emerging powers.

Countries and governments now realize that with global problems comes the need for greater exchanges and interconnectedness. All countries want to attract and engage with top scientists, university research laboratories, and multinational technology companies. Identifying who can help with any given problem goes beyond national boundaries, so exchange programs have become a preferred tool of diplomacy. Because the task of foreign policy is increasingly to bring countries together around a common set of values, building a network of future leaders whose influence can help bridge past divides has never been more important. Recognizing that the world is changing, there is a new impetus within emerging powers to use science and cultural diplomacy to cement their global status. As a result, established powers need to renegotiate their relationships with emerging powers to build genuine two-way partnerships that are mutually valuable rather than one-way exchanges. The value of innovation and science diplomacy starts with personal exchange programs that enrich individuals but also links technology communities and transfers skills and values to where they are most needed. Particularly in times of austerity, governments need to find ways to lower entry costs for science and technology across the globe.

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Increasingly countries and diplomats recognize that almost every issue they confront at the national, regional, and global level has an important scientific and technological component. This is true whether the issue concerns health, the environment, national security, homeland security, energy, communications, food, water, climate change, disaster preparedness, or education, as highlighted at various high-level summits on these issues. Governments recognize that given the right investments and policies, their citizens possess the creativity and entrepreneurial potential to compete globally. Creating networks and connecting individuals in the right ways requires more people-to-people exchanges and collaboration among world leaders in science and technology. This need for connectivity is true even for countries where diplomatic and governmental relations are strained or non-existent.

Exchanges, homestays, memorandums of understanding, and travel will continue to be the tools of citizen diplomats, but empowering and inspiring the next generation by creating space for inclusion in both informal and formal settings will be critical. Organizations like Sister Cities International, which was established in 1960 by President Dwight Eisenhower, exist to fill just such a need. Today urban centers like New York, London, Istanbul, or Tokyo in some respects share more in common with each other than with their fellow compatriots in rural Kansas, Scotland, Konya, or Kyushu. Connecting to one of the more than 500 communities with partnerships in over 1,900 cities and 140 countries around the globe is only a click away as a result of innovations in technology. However, the heart of citizen diplomacy continues to rest with human connections. Whether these people-to-people programs take the form of boot-camps for entrepreneur start-ups, cultural festivals, interfaith dialogues, or science and technology summer exchanges, the idea remains simple: empower private citizens and

sectors to go global. Co-creating solutions with civil society and the private sector — not dictating solutions from national capitals — is the wave of the future given today's new dynamics.

The amount of micro-investments made in programs such as these is negligible when balanced against the international aid and development budgets that the United States and traditional partners annually expend. Yet the impact of empowering young entrepreneurs or scientists — and the jobs they create — will extend well beyond the tenure of the national leaders who today dictate the terms of engagement. These innovative initiatives and organizations also need to retool to attract the next generation of leaders. Some of the older generation has grown frustrated by rising millennials, whom they regard as apathetic, impatient, self-absorbed, and disinclined to invest in traditional organizations. Yet it is worth exploring the paradox between these millennial stereotypes and the level of energy, innovation, and passion that millennial leaders bring to entrepreneurial and scientific endeavors that are responsive to their needs. The more opportunity that established and emerging power leaders can provide for a talented next generation, the more successful their foreign policies will be.

**The Challenge**

Despite the opportunities and vast potential inherent in people-to-people exchanges, it would be a mistake to overlook a series of challenges. First, countries, governments, and companies do not always share the same objectives. Companies remain wary of becoming seen as tools of foreign policy rather than independent commercial entities. On the flipside, there is a danger that private sources of funding will influence the style and types of exchanges in ways inimical to public objectives — an issue that is often only tacitly acknowledged. This is particularly true in an environment where funds for exchange initiatives have suffered and

both governments and non-profit organizations are trying to leverage the private sector as a provider of resources.

Another fundamental challenge for both established and emerging powers is to structure people-to-people exchanges in a way that goes beyond political elites. Most governments support next-generation leadership development programs, but how do these develop the right types of networks that will be sustainable over the long-term, and what is the focus, purpose, and outcome for sustaining this group until they lead their respective countries? Often identifying internationally oriented leaders is easier than identifying domestically oriented leaders, even though the latter may have a greater impact on their societies over time. Governments can actively promote more inclusive people-to-people exchanges by engaging traditionally disenfranchised groups in other countries. Such engagement, particularly by major powers, can increase the domestic profile of these groups. This in turn can lead to diplomatic challenges that sometimes complicate the start-up phase of people-to-people exchanges between countries.

Measuring the success of exchange programs can be problematic. Other than public opinion polling, it is often difficult to demonstrate clear results from people-to-people diplomacy beyond the number of exchanges. With many governments financially constrained, this poses a domestic political challenge to public diplomacy efforts. To sustain existing people-to-people exchanges — and justify new initiatives — it is critical to develop better metrics to assess the economic and societal impact.

Effective people-to-people diplomacy requires a long-term focus. Governments must not simply bring together people once but repeatedly in order to construct an enduring network. This demands significant resources. Most established

and emerging power governments face a trade-off: engage fewer people more intensely or touch more people briefly. In an age of austerity and technology, the broader approach seems to be the norm. And favoring quantity over quality of contacts has some advantages — not the least because smaller yet enduring networks will register less in the impact metrics that many governments collect.

A final challenge is the disparity between the demand for people-to-people exchanges and the supply capacity of both established and emerging powers. To give a concrete example, foreign governments often look to partner with the same top-tier university or research center. Although world-class, that university or research center will lack the time and resources to cooperate with all would-be partners. This phenomenon afflicts both established and emerging powers and ultimately reinforces existing social inequities: elites engage with elites. Helping governments to ensure that people-to-people diplomacy extends beyond top-tier institutions to impact broader segments of society is a key challenge for any successful initiatives in the future.

### Recommendations

The following ideas will help governments and the private sector to reimagine the future of people-to-people diplomacy:

- **Give exchanges a greater focus on domestically oriented leaders.** Although internationally oriented leaders are easier to identify, foreign governments should promote bridge building between domestically oriented leaders in government, the private sector, and civil society. Growing engagement among world mayors and governors is a step in the right direction, but more can be done. Established and emerging powers should make greater use of their consulates, which are well

**Most established and emerging power governments face a trade-off: engage fewer people more intensely or touch more people briefly.**

positioned to identify local leaders and bring them into the international space.

- **Diversify groups involved in exchanges.**

Governments in both established and emerging powers should work together to ensure that such initiatives encompass broader segments of society. Cooperation between U.S. community colleges and their international peers may serve as an example of how to “democratize” such exchanges.

- **Leverage private sector funding to enhance exchange programs.** Identifying appropriate sponsors for various types of cultural, educational, or scientific initiatives can augment already thin public sector resources. Given the challenges that come

with different types of funding, including corporate and private financing, diversification of sponsorships, and the incorporation of new partners is essential. Collaboration and transparency in the construction of high-impact communities and ecosystems will benefit all stakeholders while creating sustainable partnerships for the future.

- **Develop a shared set of metrics to assess the impact of exchange programs.** Without a commonly agreed upon set of measurements, it will be difficult for governments to sustain people-to-people exchanges over the long term. At the same time, potential private sector donors are more likely to fund such initiatives when clear performance metrics exist.

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