Notes: This transcription is smooth format, meaning that we do not transcribe filler words like um, er, ah, or uh huh. Nothing is rewritten or reworded. Transcriber notes such as [*multiple voices/cross talk*] or [*laughs*] etc. are italicized and contained within brackets. A word that the transcriber could not understand is indicated with a six-space line and a time code like this _____ [0:22:16]. A word that the transcriber was not sure of is **bolded**. Punctuation is to the best of our ability, given that this transcript results from a conversation.

Key:

Chesney	Professor Bobby Chesney, Director of the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law
Brennan	John Brennan, CIA Director
Ramos	Elisa Ramos, Assistant Director of UT Student Activities
Inboden	Professor William Inboden, Executive Director of the Clements Center for National Security
McRaven	William McRaven, Chancellor of the University of Texas System
Goss	Porter Goss, Former Director of the CIA
Slick	Steve Slick, Director of the Intelligence Studies Project
AQ	Audience Question

Chesney: Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Bobby Chesney and I am the Director of the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law. On behalf of myself and my dear friend and colleague, Will Inboden, the Executive Director of the Clements Center for National Security, let me say welcome to the University of Texas at Austin. Now nearly two years ago, the Strauss and Clements Centers joined forces to create something we call the Intelligence Studies Project. We did this out of a conviction that the activities of the U.S. intelligence community are profoundly significant, yet poorly understood and quite under-studied. We believe that universities as citadels of free inquiry and rigorous thought should play a key role in closing these gaps and that is why the Intelligence Studies Project exists. Fortunately, we've been blessed with a tremendous support and I want to take the opportunity to thank President Gregg Fenves, former President Bill Powers, Chancellor William McRaven, Admiral Bobby Inman, Jim Langdon, George C.--the list could go on, we've been very blessed as you can see and time just doesn't permit me to thank all whom I should. But while I'm in the mode of extending thanks, I do think that we should thank our host for this facility, the Texas Exes, the Alumni Center, and especially Leslie Cedar, for whom we are very grateful for the opportunity to be here today. I'd also like to thank our co-host for this remarkable event; there are several--The Alexander Hamilton Society, the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the Center for Politics and

Governance, the International Affairs Society, the International Relations and Global Studies Program, the LBJ School of Public Affairs, and last but never least, the Student Veteran Association. Now in a moment, Director Brennan will give remarks and then Dr. Inboden will introduce the rest of our distinguished roundtable participants. But for now, I want to briefly distract you and turn your attention away from this moment and towards the past. Specifically, I want to take you back to the year 1979. Apocalypse Now was in the movie theaters, J.R. Ewing and Archie Bunker were in our homes and our living rooms and for that matter so was Jack Tripper. On the radio, alas, disco was dying but not yet dead and the Village People were singing about YMCA. And here in Austin, a much smaller city then, a young man from New Jersey, lately of Fordham University, was getting to know our fine city. And I can't tell you, because I haven't asked him, whether he hung out at the Armadillo World Headquarters. I like to imagine that maybe he did but when I think about it, he was probably too busy with his graduate studies here at UT's Government Department with his concentration in Middle East Studies, because it was a heck of a time to be in that field. 1979 was the year of tectonic change in global affairs and throughout the Middle East in particular. In Iran, the Shaw was out, the Ayatollah was in, and the Embassy in Tehran was soon occupied. Egypt and Israel were signing their peace agreement. A little further afield in Islamabad, the U.S. Embassy was burned to the ground and next door in Afghanistan, the Red Army was on the march. In Mecca, the Grand Mosque, in a portent of things to come, had been seized by religious extremists. I can only imagine what his final exams that year looked like but that was the world into which John Brennan graduate the following spring and he then went to work for the Central Intelligence Agency, embarking on what became a storied career by any measure, rising through the ranks over time, acquiring more experience, more responsibility, eventually becoming the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism before finally, in 2013, returning to his beloved Agency to become the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Again, it has been by any measure a storied career, a time of extended public service dealing with the greatest challenges the country has to face. We're very lucky to have the chance to spend time with here today and again tomorrow at the LBJ Library for the declassification event and we're especially lucky to call him a Longhorn. Mr. Director, welcome home. [*applause*]

Brennan: I don't think I've blushed in years, but you just made me blush. Thank you so much Bobby for those very, very kind words and good afternoon University of Texas. It is wonderful, wonderful to be back here in Austin, a place where, as Bobby mentioned, I spent many memorable times here at the campus coming down first in 1977 after getting my undergraduate degree at Fordham and then coming here to the Department of Government in the Doctoral Program. I was

mentioning this morning, I came down here first in '77, got mono after two or three months down here, must have been the fast pace of the Texas lifestyle, and I went back up to New Jersey, got married and brought my then bride and still wife back here and we spent two glorious years in Texas. I was in the Doctoral Program but got out in 1980 when the CIA offered me a job and was able to complete my Masters' thesis. And the Armadillo World Headquarters? Yes, I was there. I remember being there and the Ramones were playing at the time and I was a teaching assistant here in the Department of Government and I remember walking through there with my wife and I was all of what, 24, 3 years old or so and one of my undergraduate students said, "Mr. Brennan, you like the Ramones?" And I said, "Yeah, I'm not much older than you." But it's just walking through some of the campus here this morning and **going on Guadalupe** not having been back here honestly for the last 30 years. Last time I came here was in '86, just to see the growth of this campus and the vitality walking around lunchtime and seeing that this institution of higher learning is still as energetic, vivacious, and as integral to this state and to our society. It's just really quite heart rendering and it's a great privilege to be back here today. I never dreamed in my wildest imagination that when I was a government student here at Texas that I would come here as the Director of the CIA. I didn't know when I applied to the agency what my career would involve, having had a rich career for the first 25 years at CIA working both at CIA Headquarters.

Students: On trial not on campus! On trial not on campus! On trial not on campus! On trial not on campus! On trial not on campus! On trial not on campus! On trial not on campus! [*shouting continues in the background*]

Ramos: Good evening, my name is Alisa Ramos. I'm with the office of the Dean of Students. Disruptive activities that prevent the speaker's message from being heard are in violation of the University's institutional rules and are not permitted. The University will issue up to three warnings to the audience asking the disruptive activities to stop. This is the first warning of this event. Please allow the speaker to finish his comments.

Brennan: **I said that** working in the CIA for 25 years in my first stint, I must say I am exceptionally proud to be part of an organization that has allowed free speech to live in this country. [*applause*] And it's times like this that I think of the 114 stars on CIA's Memorial Wall in our lobby, representing the 114 women and men of CIA, through the course of our 68 years, that paid the ultimate sacrifice so that we can live in a country that truly does respect individual rights and liberties and freedom. That's why working at CIA for 25 years and then having the opportunity to go out and retire and go into the private sector for a few years to learn what it's like to actually earn a living without getting appropriations of

Congress was quite enlightening for me as well. But then I had the opportunity to go and work at the White House with President Obama as the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism. And I was talking to some students early this morning, that experience gave me great insight into how intelligence is viewed and used by policy makers. And although I was planning to retire after the President's first term, the President asked me to return to the Agency that I started my professional career in and an agency that I love. And so for the past 2½ years, I've had the great honor and privilege to be part of an organization that is doing its utmost to keep this country safe at a time of a great challenge around the world. And I must say that in my 35 years of experience in national security, the types of threats and challenges we face today is both unprecedented, as well as dizzying in terms of the number of the complexity of these challenges that are not just the ones that we faced back when I was a graduate student and we would talk about and discuss the Cold War and the super power relationship, but also as I was talking several times today about the new environment, the digital domain that is an area and an environment that is used for good as we well know, educational purposes, and opportunities, but also is used for ill by those who would do us harm. And that's why in CIA right now, we are undertaking a renewal or renovation of CIA to make sure that we as CIA are able to do all we can to understand all of the opportunities and challenges in that digital domain. So I like to report back to here to the University of Texas after being away many years, your government is in good hands in terms of the intelligence professionals that are working closely with their military, law enforcement, Homeland Security, and diplomatic colleagues, and it really is a great privilege for me to be still a part of this effort to protect our country. When I was talking to student earlier today, I gave them a warning that as they are planning now possibly to go into the government and intelligence and national security, that they have to be ready for an addiction and that addiction is doing national security work, doing intelligence work. It is something that gets into your blood stream and it becomes a driving factor and force in your life. It is something that at the end of long hard days, you feel that you have been enriched and that you have contributed to this great nation, this great society, and I can't think of another profession that I would substitute for my experience and the opportunity to work with such great patriots that I am joining with today. And that's why, having someone like Bill McRaven and Porter Goss join me here today, two great Patriots, colleagues, friends, and icons in the intelligence and military and national security environment. You really are quite blessed to have somebody like Bill McRaven be Chancellor of the University of Texas system. [*applause*] Now although the CIA does a lot of things clandestinely, covertly, and in the shadows, we also recognize that we need to do a better job of explaining ourselves to the American people, indeed to the world in terms of the types of things we do and the value that we contribute to this nation and its

national security so that the individuals who were expressing themselves earlier would have a better appreciation of what it is that we're all about and not just pivot off of some of the mischaracterizations and misrepresentations that exist in the media. Now CIA is not a perfect organization. Lord knows we've made mistakes. We've tried to learn from them and pick ourselves up and move forward but I can say that CIA plays such an integral role in national security that I find it my obligation to make sure that we give the men and women of CIA all of the tools, all of the capabilities, and all the support they need in order to carry out their work. But one of the reasons why I'm down here in Texas is that tomorrow, as I think many of you know, we're going to be releasing for the first time in a systematic fashion, the agency products that were delivered to two Presidents--President Kennedy and President Johnson. During President Kennedy's time in office, we delivered something called the President's Intelligence Checklist and for short it was called PICL. So the PICLs that were delivered to the President on a daily basis and then as it transitioned to President Johnson, it was called the President's Daily Brief and it remains that today. And so there are going to be thousands of pages of documents that are going to be released, most of it unredacted that will give you keen insight into world events between 1961 and 1969 but also give you some insight into what the CIA was seeing, what it was reporting, and there is quite a bit of color in a number of those documents. And I mentioned before that we're facing today this unprecedented array of challenges, but I spent about 2½ half hours the other night going through the disk of all of these PDBs and I must say, looking back at that time, that was a dizzying array of challenges, whether it be the Cuban Missile Crisis; Vietnam; coups in Europe and Africa, Latin America; things that were going on with the Chinese and the Russians; the six-day war between the Arab States and Israel; and I'm sure policy makers at that time were lurching from issue to issue as well. So things have changed in many respects as far as the global landscape, but that requirement for the President and our senior most policy makers to have the best insight as possible into the challenges that too often, when we are here in the wonderful, wonderful environment of Austin, seem so far away but they really do have a real potential impact and ongoing impact on a national security interest as well as on our homeland. So again, it is a wonderful, wonderful opportunity to come back here to be a party to the release of the PDBs and also to be able to talk with you today and I look forward to having an open and honest discussion because as I said, one of the things that CIA has to do is be able to talk about its work, protect our source and methods when appropriate, but also acknowledge the important role that we play in this country's security. So thank you very much for the very warm welcome. [*applause*]

Inboden: Thank you very much Director Brennan for those very thoughtful remarks and let me echo Bobby Chesney's welcome. Welcome home to the 40 acres. My name's

Will Inboden. I am the Executive Director of the Clements Center and a distinguished scholar with the Strauss Center, today's host organizations, and it's an honor to be with all of you here today. I'm now going to introduce our three panelists who are joining Director Brennan here on stage. First over here on my right, your left, is Chancellor Bill McRaven. Of course, he's known to all of us as the Head of the UT System but he's here today in his capacity as an intellectual pioneer in special operations, especially the integration of intelligence with irregular warfare and counter terrorism. As a Navy Seal and four-star Admiral in his almost four decade military career culminated in service as the Commander of Special Operations Command. Among his many accomplishments in this field, he literally wrote the book on special operations. You can still find it on Amazon and he designed the special operations low intensity conflict curriculum at the Naval Post Graduate School, in some ways anticipating his career now as a civilian educator and he helped author our national Counter Terrorism Strategy in the months following September 11th at the National Security Council. Next, Director Porter Goss who, among many achievements in his distinguished career, is the only person in American history to have ever served as a CIA Operations Officer, the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Director of the CIA. So taken together these experiences really give him a singular perspective on the role of intelligence in a free society and as you can see he lived to tell about it. Finally, closest to me here is Steve Slick, he's the **inaugural** Director of UT's Intelligence Studies Project, as Bobby mentioned, a joint collaboration between Clements and Strauss. Steve came to UT just in January, following almost three decades with the CIA's clandestine service, where his many leadership roles included Senior Director for Intelligence on the National Security Council Staff--that's where I was honored to work with him and he and I first become friends--and then Chief of Station in a Middle Eastern capital. When he joined UT in January, Steve traded in his former life of hunting terrorists and recruiting spies for his new life here of teaching classes and grading papers. During the Q&A, you might ask him to discuss the relative challenges of hunting terrorists and sitting through long faculty meetings. No more comment on that. Anyway, taken together, it's no exaggeration to say that these four gentlemen here represent perhaps the greatest collection of experience and insight on intelligence and national security that you'll find in any single place outside of the White House Situation Room. So we're honored to host them here at the University of Texas. Please join me in a round of applause for our panel. [*applause*]

Slick: Well, thank you very much Will. This microphone working okay? Terrific, thanks. Let me add my welcome to Director Brennan, Director Goss, to the University of Texas. It's really a privilege and an honor for me to share the stage with the two of you and also with Chancellor McRaven. It's been my pleasure

today to be allowed to moderate this discussion, its question and answer format. I'd like to go around quickly with a few questions, tee up some issues and then we're going to open it up to the audience. But before I do that, I should also say thank you to all the people who came out today to join us in this event, particularly the students in the crowd now. I know many of you are familiar faces and Dr. Inboden and I probably strong armed you to be here. But for the rest of you, it's great to see you come out. This is a unique event and I want you to get the full impact of it. In that regard, I should offer two quick program announcements, one of which is redundant, one of which less. Director Brennan's been very generous with his time. In fact, he's away from Washington for two days here in Austin, not maybe an act of complete generosity or selflessness. In any event, we have the benefit of his presence for two full days almost. And so he's joining us here today and that's terrific. We're going to have a wonderful discussion, but for students that want to engage further with the Director, he's going to be meeting with some students tomorrow morning at 9:00 a.m. I know that's not a particularly hospitable time on the University campus, but up at the Avaya Auditorium, he's going to discuss their diversity issues and I just wanted to mention this and he may pick up on it a little bit later but diversity's a particularly important topic to this Director and to the CIA and indeed to our entire national security community. And the Director commissioned a study at the CIA to consider the diversity of its leadership ranks. That distinguished group reported back to the Director and he's now in the process of implementing some changes at CIA that will create a better prospect that in the hiring and in the elevation through promotion that he have a more diverse workforce at CIA. So it's very important and if you want to engage with the Director on that, I'd encourage you to go to the Avaya Auditorium tomorrow at 9:00. Now you do need to register for that even, so feel free to go to the Intelligence Studies Project website and you'll find information for how to register and then I'll also second what two other speakers have mentioned and that's the **PDBD** classification event that's taking place tomorrow up the hill at the library and as was mentioned, Director Brennan, Director Goss, Admiral McRaven, will be joined by the Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, who's coming down to Austin for the day and he along with the former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and UT Professor, Admiral Bobby Inman along with a raft of other distinguished figures from Washington will be joining us. It's a terrific event for students to learn more, not just about how the intelligence community supported the President, the first customer but also to learn more about the momentous events that took place during those seven years while Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were in office. And then the last thing I'll say before I turn it over to our guests whom you came to hear, was just a comment on the title of today's event, it's "Intelligence in American Society." If that sounds to you like the title of a graduate seminar, it's because it is. Students at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, who are competing to

earn Master's Degrees, are required to take a policy research project course. This is a year-long exercise where students work in small teams to conduct research and analysis and ultimately write a report on a current public policy topic. And in this case, the Intelligence Studies Project is sponsoring a year-long course on intelligence in American society. And what we hope is that the students will have the opportunity to study, research, and learn about the tension that exists in our intelligence community, between the need for secrecy, the need for clandestine, covert activities to be successful at the mission they've given, and to evaluate that against the relationship they need to have with the rest of the government, which draws its authority from the informed consent of the citizens. This is a tension that's existed in our country since before the Revolution. So there's nothing new but it's a particularly interesting time to study that. So this is also a research opportunity for our students and I expect to call on them when we get to the questions and answers. So with that, Porter Goss, if I may get you involved, we'll give John a rest. Will Inboden mentioned that you're the only person to ever serve as a CIA Case Officer, as the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee, and then as the leader of the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelligence. My question for you is since most people when they hear about oversight and supervision of the intelligence community, think immediately of the Congress, that that's a function of the Congress. I'd like you to share with us if you would, your experience moving your base of operations across the Potomac River and going in one fell swoop, from being one of the principal overseers of our intelligence community, to being the overseeing leader of the intelligence community.

Goss: Well, thank you very much Steve. It happened one night at midnight, in the dark of the night in Washington. I took one foot out of Congress and moved it over across the river up to Langley and it was a fascinating experience. For me it was seamless because at that point we had so much cooperation and coordination going on in 2004 after what had happened in 9/11 in 2001, that it was absolutely critical that all the players were on the same page, understanding our capabilities, our policies, and trying to keep us safe because we weren't entirely out of the woods in those days about being sure we weren't going to get hit again, hard, somewhere. We had gravitated to the idea, "We have to find out who these people are, a little more about them and do something about them, contain them or take them off the field or run operations," or whatever the policies would be. But the process was a very friendly one. The problem with it was, it was limited and it was limited to an inner core of people because of this tension that you have about the need for secrecy in national affairs, in national planning and not triggering what you're going to do to hostiles who would frustrate your efforts or worse, hurt or harm your people if they knew your plans in advance. So you have this question of trying to plan something and find out what you're going to do, get

your actionable intelligence from overseas, all of that aspect of the business, and then get the support of the people, which means you need the politicians. And I'll tell you, one of the hardest jobs you having in Washington is to go to people back in your district and say, "I'm from Washington. I'm here to tell you this. Trust me. Believe me. I'm from Washington." Didn't work very well and it worked even less well with my colleagues and some will remember that there was a term called "The Gang of 8" or "The Gang of 6," depended on the day and what the issue was, but the limited number of people who actually knew what was going on and what the White House wanted that group to know was very small and that meant that we had to use all of our persuasive powers and all of the chits we'd built up over the years with our colleagues in Congress, on the Senate, and the House side to say, "Look, trust me, we're safe, this is what we need, I'm going to ask for money, I want you to vote for this authorization, for these policies, for these monies." That's a very hard thing to do. I am very happy to report that the system in this country and the spirit of the American society worked very well in that process. So for me to go from the process of the overseeing to being the overseer to the guy who was the overseeing was really relatively simple, in terms of knowing what the problem was and knowing what we needed. The real issue is this yin and yang that we have between transparency on the one side and secrecy on the other, and it all boils down to trust. And trust is great in this country when we're under pressure and we all respond as Americans. But when things get a little bit more relaxed and people go back to their other agendas, then there are challenges to those trusts and in some ways, it's much harder to maintain the trusts in peace that in it is when you're under attack. And I think that was the lesson I learned. There is one other thing I'll briefly talk about. There is in the media in this country, an expectation that the public has a right to know everything and that is true. The public does have a right to know the public's business, of course, but I think we all understand there are privileged matters say, between a lawyer and a client or a doctor and a patient and so forth. Equally, many years ago, our government figured out that there's some things that were important to keep secret for the national security purpose. Now that's a hard test on maintaining your compass at true north to figure out what those things are exactly that should be classified because they are something that could put us in peril if they were released. It's a judgment call all the time about what should and shouldn't be classified. But the fact of the matter is, we did pass a law in this country, to take some of the public's material off the desk from the public. That grates the media very much--many of the media, not all of them of course--and they feel that they have a right to know everything. I took an oath, John took an oath, I'm sure the Admiral took an oath, that we would uphold the secret law, the secrecy provided by law for matters properly classified, and that challenges against the need to go out and tell our message about what we needed in our country to our American citizens is the harder part of the job and God bless all of those who listened and

God bless all of those who tried because we got through a tough time but it is never easy.

Slick: Thank you for that Mr. Director. May I ask just one follow-up question on that? You made that transition from Capitol Hill out to Langley about the same time as the Report of the 9/11 Commission was coming forward and that obviously was a great moment and informed the intelligence reform law that was passed several months later. Now one of the recommendations as you know, that panel was to reform the committee structure in the Congress for overseeing intelligence. Now this is a bit of an old saw, it's been around for a long time, but it's been 11 years since that report that Congress has not taken the steps that the 9/11 Commission had recommended they take. And moreover, you'll remember from the report where they said that, "If this one recommendation is not implemented, perhaps all of our recommendations will have no impact, will not matter and make the country safer." Do you think the time is past or is there still some reform to be done in the Congress?

Goss: I certainly had very strong feelings about that at the time and made them known, primarily because Senator Bob Graham leading on the Senate side as a Democrat and myself leading on the House side, had done the joint inquiry which was the basis for the Hamilton-Kane, Kane-Hamilton, whichever way you like, Commission Report, the 9/11 report. And we did an awful lot of the early discovery and we did it in a way that is seldom done. It's a great rarity to have the House and the Senate actually doing a joint inquiry. If you go back in history, you'll find it doesn't happen very often and there's a lot of reasons for that. This was a very good working, cooperative exercise and I believe that it yielded outstanding results, which we profited from. We all recognized that the oversight was imperfect; that was clearly a lesson that came out of it. We needed to do a different way to have the relationship between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch, work in a more effective way, in a more trusting way, and a simpler way so that the situation would build trust. It couldn't be gamed by the Executive Branch on the one hand, but it couldn't be abused by the Legislative Branch on the other with members of Congress trying to tell the Director of the agencies how to run their agencies. It's a really tough call. We came up with a number of different ideas. I favored those ideas rather than the ones that were put partially in place with the formation of the Director of National Intelligence. That being water over the dam, I will go back and say to my knowledge, to this day, the changes that we could have made on the oversight committees have not been made. I feel it's unfinished business that needs attention.

Slick: Terrific, thank you. Chancellor McRaven, while you were commanding our Special Forces and you were credited with having built a superb relationship with

the House and Senate committees that oversee the Department of Defense activities and since moving to Austin, you haven't escaped those responsibilities. I read "The Statesmen" every day and you have extensive dealings with the state legislature, the people's representatives. So in your view, what are the keys to operating in that environment dealing with elected officials and providing them the information they need to do their jobs while also completing your mission?

McRaven: Yeah, thanks Steve. Folks have asked me a number of times, "How difficult was the transition from running U.S. Special Operations Command, to coming and running the University of Texas system, and I think my answer always surprises them, which is, the number of parallels would be amazing to most folks. As you said, I spend a lot of time working on Capitol Hill. Week one into this job, we had the Texas Legislative Sessions, over the next 140 days, I was with them. U.S. Special Operations Command, I had subordinate commanders, 12 subordinate commanders, much like the Presidents of universities and if there were medical centers. So you had to be respectful of their autonomy, while at the same time, providing the strategic guidance. I actually had a small university that required accreditation, I had a small medical school that required accreditation, we had a very large budget. So all of these things really, for me, all I had to do every morning when I woke up was figure out what color a tie I was going to wear and the suit. That was the hardest part about the transition in some cases. But everything else seemed to fall in place. I very much enjoyed working with the Texas Legislature and I've said this a number of times publicly and frankly, as Texas citizens you ought to be very, very proud of your Legislators. They come in, they are citizen Legislators, they spend 140 days, they get a budget passed, they get bills passed, you don't always agree with all of them, but you understand that they are there to do the work of the state and I think the same thing is absolutely true up in Capitol Hill. My dealings with House Arms Services Committee and the Senate select committees and House select committees for intelligence, they are there to do the nation's business and it was never--I didn't sense at least in my time dealing with Capitol Hill--it was country first. The politics were very much secondary and that was always very refreshing to see. There was great bi-partisan support in both Houses when you were talking about national security. That piece, that aspect of working on Capitol Hill and that aspect of what I see in the Texas Legislature has been very similar.

Slick: Terrific. Thanks. I have to apologize in advance Director Brennan but I wanted to ask you a question about Congressional oversight as well. I know you have spoken publicly and firmly and with conviction about CIA's adherence to its obligations and the strict need for fair intelligence oversight for events that you were not responsible for about a year ago this time. A public controversy erupted between the Central Intelligence Agency and certain members of the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence, regarding the report that they prepared on rendition, detention, and interrogation programs that they had studied. And now without getting into the substance of that, which I'm not interested in doing, but rather looking back on it now from the standpoint of process and lessons learned, what can you distill from that experience about how the agency can improve going forward, how that folks on the Hill can improve going forward, and do strict and fair oversight and prevent this from spilling out into the public and creating a negative impression for people about how this all works because I know day to day, it works fine in an effective fashion and you do as well.

Brennan: Well, as Porter pointed out, the joint inquiry was unusual because it was both the Senate and the House but also, it was bi-partisan. Porter is Republican, Senator Graham is a Democrat and that non-partisan and bi-partisan approach to national security issues I think is critically important when we're dealing with issues of such great importance, as far as the national security is concerned. Unfortunately, I think there have been times where that bi-partisanship and non-partisanship has fallen by the wayside and that there have been some partisan agendas that have come in to the discourse, which is unfortunate. The recent report that was done by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the agency's detention/interrogation program started out in a bi-partisan fashion but ended as just one party's product. Yes, it was voted on by the committee but it was drafted by the Democratic staff and of the committee. And my concerns with that representation was that, it really did not do justice to the great work that the CIA men and women did after 9/11, in terms of keeping this country safe. As I mentioned before, CIA made mistakes but what I didn't like about that report was that it conflated those mistakes that were made, that were outside the bounds of what was authorized with those activities that the CIA was directed to engage in that were deemed to be lawful. We can have a long discussion about whether or not the enhanced interrogation techniques should've been used or whether or not they were right or whatever and I think it's an appropriate discussion. But I think that it was a bit one-sided in terms of its presentation. Looking back on it now, I think as Porter said, striking this balance between, what is it that you share with your overseers in terms of details and other things because of the great need for secrecy. And the agency operates in some very, very dangerous places and our success relies heavily on our ability to keep secrets and if those secrets come out, then our ability to stop what could be very devastating attacks, is undermined. I think looking back on it, I think there were a lot of lessons that were learned. We in CIA as a result of the reviews that we did and it wasn't just under my tenure, under previous tenures as well, you always try to make course corrections if you believe that the system is not working as optimally as it could and I like to think that where we are right now in terms of the conduct of covert action, is as strong as it can be from the standpoint of incorporating those lessons we learned, not just

what we have to do with our overseers but also what we have to do from a management perspective. And again, I have a responsibility as Director of CIA, when the President directs us to carry out some type of activity, whether it be on a collection's side or the covert actions side and it is reviewed and is deemed to be lawful, then it is up to the agency to do it to its best ability. And what we can't do is to stray from the boundaries that we're given and when we do, we have to be held to account both individually and institutionally. And again, I think that the experience of the last decade has made us, I think, a better and stronger organization but again, as a result of things that have taken place over the course of many directorships and many years.

Slick: Thank you John. The issue of transparency and public engagement is an interesting one, you mentioned it in your opening remarks and I actually attended a conference that you hosted in June of 2014 down at Georgetown, with an interesting title as well, "Ethos and the Profession of Intelligence." And I remember you saying there, I'll quote this exactly, "We must engage our fellow citizens and to the extent we can, explain the work we perform on their behalf and articulate our motives, values, and objectives." Obviously, this call for direct public engagement by an intelligence leader with the public was a significant reversal from position taken by many of your predecessors, leaders of the intelligence community since 1947. The question I had or would like to solicit your views on is, what's really changed in the intervening years? Is there something about the nature of intelligence that's changed? Is there a technological imperative here that's caused the change or is it the American public may have changed in terms of what they expect out of their intelligence community? When you think about this, how did we get to this situation where now, you're here, that's to our benefit, but you're also out speaking to the American public, directly making your case about who you are and what you do. It's a new practice. So how do you think about that?

Brennan: Well, I think 2015 is much different than 1947 when the CIA was born and there have been tremendous changes just in societies, talked about the terms of the digital environment, cyber, but also I think there is a great microscope that is put right now on whatever the government does and that quite honestly, the perception of the agency and the view of the American people as well as the international community, does affect our ability to carry out our work because we rely on our Legislators, we rely on appropriations, we rely on the partnerships we're able to forge with our partners overseas. And so if there is a lot of misrepresentations and mischaracterizations, I think it hurts. And also, I think CIA officers really are ones that operate, not only in the shadows but also operate silently. We don't do things so that we have ticker tape parades and our successes are not ballyhooed in the press. There are a lot of things that we do that we take

silent pride in what we do. And we believe and are sure that we do helps advance the interests of this country and the American people. And I think there needs to be articulation of what it is the CIA does, but also separating out that which can be discussed so that we can in fact attract some of the best and brightest, including from the University of Texas to join us but also that which must be protected. As I mentioned I think earlier today, when at least when I was in school, covert and transparent were not synonyms and I think too frequently now, people are trying to equate the two. The release that we're doing tomorrow are documents of well over 40 years old. We were holding them, we were not releasing them. I think the American public has a right to understand better what its government was involved in and what the intelligence community was doing. But at the same time, I think as Porter mentioned, I have now a statutory obligation to do whatever I can to protect source of methods, in order to ensure the national security interests of this country. I do think that there is greater scrutiny as well as greater requirements and demands for explaining a little bit more about what the CIA does but also I think importantly what the CIA doesn't do and I think that is probably as important. As I said, those people who had spoken up earlier, I have had the opportunity to talk to some of those people after incidents like this, be able to sit down with them and try to tease out what it is that they are reacting to and a lot of it is borne out of ignorance and a lack of understanding of what CIA's role is. And so to the extent that we can and I know Porter speaks to a variety of groups, we need to be able to engage as appropriate with the American public.

Slick: Thanks for that. Do you also think, and you mentioned this clearly that, there are limits to this. And so when you go out and speak to groups and speak to people, you're also going to have to explain that this comes to a close and there's certain things, a point beyond which you can't go in terms of explaining how we collect information, who we may be dealing with overseas, and what we're doing day in, day out. Do you have confidence that the public will understand, not only what you want to share with them, what you're allowed to share with them, but also the fact that there's a limit and they're not going to get information beyond that point? Is that something you've found people are receptive to?

Brennan: It really is a spectrum and there are people who fully understand it and also, do not want us to reveal things that are not in our national security interest to do but there are also a lot of people who are seeking to disclose, uncover, things that we're doing, purely for the sake of disclosing/uncovering them. And I must say, I have had several incidents in the last two years since I've been at the CIA where I have talked to members of the media who happened upon information that I believed, strongly, was going to pose a risk to either individuals or different types of intelligence activities. And some of these members of the media were very

honest in saying, "John, things are different now. We're competing with bloggers and others that are out there." Major, major publications and quite frankly, I believe in a responsible press; I don't believe in an irresponsible press. And I think there is a certain amount of responsibility that we all have as just members of society, irrespective of whether or not we're part of the intelligence community. So there are people who will adamantly disagree that there is anything that should be protected, while there are others who I think rightly respect the need for that type of secrecy.

Slick: Thank you John. And for context, people should know that the Director made 45minutes of his time available for meeting with the media just prior to this and all very cordial and very productive from both sides.

Brennan: I haven't read the reports yet. [*laughter*]

Slick: We'll open the paper and find out. Chancellor McRaven, just out of curiosity that the U.S. Armed Forces underwent a significant transformation as well in the last '70s, give or take with the end of the Vietnam conflict and also the end of the draft. And so, steps were taken over a period of years to build the right kind of relationship between the Armed Forces and the American public and you've spoken publicly about the bond of support that exists between the U.S. Special Forces community, which operates in secret as well to be successful and the American public. Are there any lessons for the intelligence community as they look out and as the Director described, undertake efforts to improve the level of understanding and support and confidence in their work. Are there lessons there from what the military went through?

McRaven: Yeah, thanks Steve. First, let me go back and address something you said earlier about the--you're talking about the ethics and the ethical behavior of the CIA officers. I will tell you, I've worked with the CIA for 37 years. In the military, we talk about duty, honor, and country. I have never met more honorable, more noble, more professional, more patriotic men and women than those in the CIA and people need to know that. The 141 stars that are on the agency wall means something. Nobody does more to protect this nation than the CIA. And John, I want to thank you personally for all the work you've done and, Porter, you before him, but for all those men and women. I've served with them, I've watched them die, anybody that ever forgets that, needs to go back and take a hard look at history and check whether or not they are in fact the patriots that they need to be because these are the men and women that are working hard every day to make that happen. [*applause*]

Slick: Well, said. Thank you.

McRaven: To get to your other question though, I do think that there is a distinction between what we do in the military under Title 10 and what the CIA is by law required to do under Title 50. It was hard from the time of 9/11 on to make sure that we kept those lines very clean. We worked very hard to do that but the fact of the matter is, from 9/11 on, the relationship, the partnership between the military and the CIA and not just the special operations. Frankly, there was a CIA officer stationed with every major military unit in Iraq and Afghanistan so that the strategic and the operational and technical intelligence that the CIA was getting, was in fact getting to those young soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines on the ground. Sometimes people think that this was just special operations. We had a great relationship but no, it was about the phenomenal intelligence that the CIA gets and making sure it was getting to the right folks. But I do think as we look at how we have evolved as a military and our ability to really get out there and showcase the things we do and as John said, in the military we do get credit for the things we do. It goes back to Napoleon talking about that little piece of ribbon and all you need is that little piece of ribbon to keep a soldier moving forward, that being the medals and the ribbons on their chest and there's a lot of truth to that. Unfortunately, the agency folks, the officers don't have an opportunity publicly to receive that kind of acclaim; we do. So recognizing that there are some clear distinctions, I think what you found over time, certainly since 9/11, is the respect the military has for the CIA and I think I can say, the respect the CIA has for the military, has allowed us to again, appreciate each other's strengths but again, in terms of public exposure, I think there's got to be a clear dividing line certainly when it comes to sources and methods that John has to deal with every day.

Brennan: Let me jump in here just for a minute.

Slick: Please, of course John.

Brennan: When Bill was the Commander of Special Operations Command, he had a great Deputy, John Mulholland, a great Irishman, who now serves as the Associate Director of Military Affairs at CIA. His office is right down my hall and we see each other many times every day because of the importance and the imperative of making sure that we in the military are **lashed** up as closely as possible because we are serving together in so many different parts of the world and that integration and interoperability is stronger than I've ever seen before and it's because of people like Bill, like John Mulholland, and others, who have worked with us, who understand what we bring to bear, in terms of capabilities and also people within CIA who have worked with Bill very closely, cheek to jowl, who

understand what the military capabilities/authorities are. And so there's more and more of that seamless interaction.

Slick: Now to argue even that testimony should be reassuring to the public from two senior officials like yourselves from the civilian and the military **side**.

Goss: Can I add to it?

Slick: You may. Please.

Goss: It was not just coincidental that my Deputy happened to be the Senior Seal I brought in because we saw the **lash up** coming, very definitely this need back then as we were trying to examine the new world we were in, the new danger we were receiving, trying to understand where the danger was, what the parameters of it were and what the operational responses would be and what actionable intelligence would lead to what action and who would do the action. And I would like to publically say thank you for saving our rear ends a number of times too.

McRaven: Happy to do it.

Slick: Terrific, thanks. I heard something I want to follow up on before we open this up to questions from the audience. I heard ethics, I heard moral compass. We're going to ask our students if we can during the year to look at some of the less conventional constraints on intelligence and national security activity and I would argue that the role of morality and personal responsibility is not to be dispensed with here. Director Goss, I'll start with you if I may. You've seen this intelligence business from every conceivable angle. You used the word compass. When is it appropriate for a public servant, a legislator, an intelligence officer, under what circumstances does that come into play, somebody's personal compass, their own sense of what the right decision is given the circumstances? In a largely bureaucratic environment, this is something that a person develops on his own.

Goss: I use the term for the way I first heard it when I was a young case officer and those were very different days. You swore never to reveal that you'd even heard of the CIA. Things have changed obviously very much. But the reason that we used the term so much, was that we were given authorities to do things overseas, to break laws of other countries, not our own laws, but the laws of other countries. And it required judgment and the accountability question lay more likely with you, yourself, than with a regulatory body because if the regulatory body in that country found you, you were probably in some trouble. The whole concept of having to have this idea of what the truth is and pursuing the truth and the honor

that goes with that was just paramount to the recruitment and the esprit that we had in those days. That phrase of maintaining true north, there are so many distractions in Washington that **go on**. You have policy pressures, different people, different Chairman talking to you, personalities, a lot of stuff going on, public pressure, the media. You have to stay true and remember where your accountability is; it's to the United States of America. And that question, whenever we get away from that true north compass, we run into questions of confidence. The President himself gave the very eloquent statement in the State of Union a couple of years ago. He said, "We're having a crisis of confidence. Who do you trust? Do you trust your government," in his State of the Union speech. And he said, "When people don't trust each other, bad things happen." And that's why, as John alluded to, occasionally we've gotten into this dystopia where people aren't talking to each other; they're running to their corners. And the way you get out of that, as far as I'm concerned is, you go back to remembering where true north is and that's the compass line you follow. And when you do that, you find most of the honorable people who are doing the nation's business, can come together and get the problem solved.

Slick: Thanks. Director Brennan. Some of your media critics have bestowed on you priestly powers from time to time. I know you don't accept that, but I know you've thought deeply about this. How would you describe the role of ethics and morality as a constraint, as a guide for individual officers or even for an institution, an agency like the CIA?

Brennan: I've struggled with this over the years. I think they refer to me sometimes as whatever in the religious context because my undergraduate degree was Fordham University. I was Jesuit trained. And in addition to being a political science major, I spent a lot of time in philosophy and including on issues such as just war theory and trying to understand why man is here and our role in society and all of those various philosophical issues. I think we all have individual moral compasses. We all have a sense of our own ethics and values and I have been comfortable at CIA in terms of what it is that I have done, what I have been asked to do, that this is consistent with my moral compass. I have told officers that I don't want to do them something that they feel is inconsistent with their personal ethics and values. Ad people keep pointing to that ethics, values, whatever, as thought there is a very clear list of what they all are. And I say that's inconsistent with our values. Well, I know what our laws are. It's very clear and so we have to make sure that we carry out our duties consistent with all of the laws and legal limits that we have. When you get into issues of morality and ethics and whether or not asking somebody to commit treason against their country is consistent with your ethics and values. Is it some of the things that the agency has been involved in over the years, whether it be on the covert action front or others, is that

consistent with an individual's values. Everybody, when they wake up every day, they make moral, ethical, value decisions about how they carry out their lives, whether it be about adherence to tax laws or the way they conduct their relationships with friends, family, and others. What we want to do within CIA is make sure that we have an institutional perspective in terms of the role that we play, the importance that we have in terms of carrying out our legally authorized responsibilities. If there is ever an officer inside of CIA who feels that they can't do something because it is inconsistent with their morals or values, they need to speak to their supervisor, they need to speak with me, but I'm not going to direct somebody to do something that they say, "I can't do that." Again, it is sometimes in the conduct of what they do and how they do it that I am going to rely on the judgment of individuals and also recognizing that the work they do is critically important to this nation's security. That, in my mind though, does not justify doing anything, by no stretch of the imagination. We have to make sure that we are going to be an institution that we're proud of in terms of what it is that we've done. And as I said, we've made mistakes, I think we've tried to acknowledge them, stand up to them, we've made mistakes as an institution because we didn't have the management system in place that was going to ensure that our officers stayed on the straight and narrow but also we've made mistakes as individuals and I think it's healthy for an organization to acknowledge when things need to be enhanced and improved.

Slick: Thanks for that. Chancellor McRaven, can I bring you in on this?

McRaven: Sure.

Slick: Special operations are not unlike intelligence operations. It's a team sport on one level but on the day, it's very often an individual who's out there. As Porter referred to, there's only one case officer at that agent meeting, only one person gets to write the cable and describe to Washington what happened. What is the role of a personal moral compass, of principle, and of character and can you build that in an organization or do you have to go out and find it and hire it?

McRaven: I would tell you that the role of the moral compass in the American military is no different than it is in any other aspect of, I think, American society or American government. The one thing that helps constrain us somewhat is that we have very well defined rules of engagement, we have laws and again, we are not in a position under Title 10 as military officers to break the laws of another country, because that's not within the authority of Title 10. So sometimes we don't have to have those internal debates. Having said that, every day on the battlefield, soldiers are having to make decisions about who lives and who dies in the middle of a fire fight, and there are many times when you have to make decisions about

the nature of the threat versus the nature of the potential civilian casualties. So these are things that everybody has to struggle with and I can tell you, I've had times in my career when a tactical officer who was preparing to conduct a strike, who felt that the collateral damage from the strike was more than he was prepared to accept based on again, all of the appropriate law of armed conflicts and the rules of engagement but he wasn't prepared to accept that, I understood that completely. We removed him from that position and we put somebody else in. Because again, these are very, very tough, difficult situations when you're in combat or even more so I think when you're slightly removed from combat and in the case of some of our unmanned aerial vehicles, when you're having to conduct a strike and you're not even in the theater of war and you know that you're being asked to press the button that might cause collateral damage, you have to make sure that their moral compass is absolutely pointed north, not only at the time of the strike but afterwards because you want to make sure that what you haven't done is somehow damaged the psyche of an individual by causing them to do something that was really against their moral nature. And I think as war evolves and to some degree, again make no mistake about it, war is still very, very personal and I think that today people believe that everything is very sterile and you can do everything from a UAV or from a Predator or drone or you can do everything remotely, absolutely not the case. The folks and whether they're agency officers or military officers, enlisted, they're in close in combat, certainly every day they were in Iraq and Afghanistan and that creates problems. But having said that, you begin to the see the distancing of the fight a little bit and I think as that happens, as again, people are pulling the trigger from New Mexico or somewhere else, it becomes much more of a moral dilemma because the threat isn't immediately to them. If you're a soldier in a fire fight, your training takes over and hopefully you make the right decision because somebody's shooting at you. The hard part is, if you're not in that fire fight and you've got a cup of coffee by your side and you're in an air conditioned facility and now somebody's asking you to press the button, that is a much tougher moral dilemma and we spend a lot of time making sure that the folks that are doing that, understand the nature of the business, the threshold under which we expect them to act, and also the threshold over which we understand if they don't act and we take appropriate steps to mitigate that.

Slick: I would argue that's a source of considerable strength in our military and our intelligence services that we can account for that.

McRaven: Absolutely.

Slick: We're going to open this up for questions in just a minute, hear what the audience want to talk about. But I wanted to give you one last chance Director Brennan, I

presume that there's a future Director of Central Intelligence Agency out there, if not a Secretary of Defense, a President of the United States. Any advice? How should they spend their time preparing here at the University of Texas?

Brennan: Maybe spend more time in school as opposed to the Armadillo World Headquarters like I did.

Slick: Don't do what I did. Is that your advice?

Brennan: Learning is much about how the world has changed and continues to evolve. The 21st Century is going to see changes that are unfathomable right now. A lot of it is a result of the technological revolutions that are taking place almost on a regular basis. And so one of the great things about the agency is that, we have so many different occupational areas, more than 50, that we are looking for a specialist, whether it be in a digital domain or linguistic skills, engineers, technologists, doctors, others because we are a large organization with a lot of requirements. I was just very fortunate to be able to be in the right place at the right time. You have as much right to be Director of CIA as I do because of your experience. We just happen to be at different places at different times. And so one of the great things about the agency is that once you get into the organization, you can really I think spread your wings and explore areas that you want to work in. I started out in the agency in the Director of Operations. I was a career trainee just like Porter was. I didn't become a case officer because I had an opportunity to experience what the analytical side of the House was like and switched over early on. So the agency has tremendous opportunities I think for individuals who believe in national security and also want to work with some of the smartest, most talented, hardest working individuals and patriotic individuals that you will find. And we really do treat people as a family because we entrust with them such sensitive information. I would just also say that one of the qualities that we're looking for of applicants is patience because you have to go through an application process that sometimes gets into background investigations that may go on a bit longer than you would like. Stick with us, take that job at 7/11 in the interim period but then keep CIA as well as the rest of the government in mind. And one of the things that Bill McRaven also other storied military officers like **Stan LaCrystal** have really pushed for is that the importance of public service, I can't over-emphasize that enough. We all benefit from the great, great opportunities that this country has to offer and we rely heavily on the private sector and people doing their business and daily activities, but I really do think that if people have the opportunity to give back to their society, whether it be federal government, state, local, community, public service is something that keeps the juices flowing long after you look at the financial statements or your checkbook at the end of the month.

Slick?: Porter confessions of a failed case officer again.

Goss: What I've wanted to say is thank you for the invitation to come here because it uplifts my spirits to see so many people interested in intelligence. When I was at a small college in New Haven when I graduated a long, long time ago, there was the draft and I made the choice to go into ROTC--there was also ROTC in New Haven in those days. It was permitted and I have always thought and Bob Graham and I shared some things after coming out of our 9/11 study, that we needed to have some formalized way to get the intelligence community on the same footing as the military has been able to do to get the youth of America interested and it's a quality, honorable career to look at. And certainly if you look at the recruiting numbers and the number of people who apply to the agency, I think it's no secret that it probably outnumbers all of the applications to Yale, Harvard, and Princeton in a given year. There's a tremendous interest but it's not fully understood. It's not Austin Powers and it's not James Bond; it's serious business. And to come here and see this and see what your program is and the fact that there are bi-partisan institutions focused on this, it's just terrific to me. It's happening elsewhere too and you talk about public service, my public service now as a retired person is to go around and try and stimulate this interest among our young people and clarify some of the confusion among some of the other people my age, including me, about things that have happened. It is really the strength of our country because you remember the Constitution required that we have an informed electorate and we need a good intelligence community and that means we need an informed electorate to support it and get the representatives in Washington to stand up for it and the people like John to serve. So this is to me a very inspirational day and I haven't even started on the military and the admiration I have for the Seals and all the stuff they do; it's just another page in the same book of what's great about America.

Slick: Alright thank you. So we're now going to open up the floor to questions for our distinguished panelists. Please, there are microphones coming around, please identify yourself and try to be succinct with your question and we'll handle as many as we can before we run out of time. First rights, Larry Wright if I may. I'm not sure if you guys know Larry.

AQ: Hi, Lawrence Wright with The New Yorker. First of all, Director Brennan I want to salute you for your new program of engagement. I think this is a great step forward for the agency and making the public more aware of what the agency does. Both you and Director Goss have spoken about accountability and I want to ask you about that. There were several instances that I would refer to, one is in January of 2002, Al Qaeda highjackers came to America 20 months before 9/11.

According to the CIA's own Inspector General, as many as 60 people inside the agency knew of this by March of that year and failed to communicate that to the FBI agents who were working the Al Qaeda case until three weeks before 9/11. One senior CIA official, when pressed for evidence that the CIA had actually communicated to the FBI said she had hand carried this information to the Bureau Headquarters, an apparent lie because there was no evidence she'd ever been in the Bureau Headquarters. In the case of Jose Rodriquez who apparently on his own authority destroyed video tapes of torture, the CIA's Inspector General once again found that the agency had improperly accessed the Senate torture report computers. In each of these cases, the CIA's own Inspector General had come to these conclusions. It wasn't outside oversight; it was the agency looking at itself. And I'm wondering, has anybody actually since 9/11 been held accountable for these and other deeds?

Brennan: Well, a couple things there, one is that there's a lot that you reference that I would take issue with in terms of its factual base, number one. Number two, accountability is an obligation on the part of management and leadership of individual agencies to make sure that we do hold people responsible and therefore accountable. A lot of times you have to get a little beneath the surface to understand exactly, okay what went wrong, why did it go wrong, what were the motivations behind certain actions that were taken or not taken, what were the concerns and judgments that went into making a decision. And sometimes these judgments are tough, in terms of whether or not you're going to share something or you're going to take a certain action because there are sometimes pros and cons associated with it and a lot of times what comes out in the press is the very summarized version which leaves off a number of details. And I'll take issue with the one you said that the CIA officers had went into the computers of the **sissy**. That was a computer system that was CIA operated that was in a CIA facility, that the CIA had statutory responsibility to make sure the integrity of those computers was as strong as possible and when it became known to CIA that Senate staffers had inappropriately accessed some information that was on a firewall on the other side of that, it was our obligation to address it. And so I know that there were versions of this story that came out that looked at, "Oh my goodness. CIA is getting into Senate computer systems." That was not the case. CIA went forward with an Inspector General investigation. We also held an accountability board that I had former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Evan Bayh, as well as a former White House council, people from outside take a look at what it was we did and they determined that there was in fact justification for what CIA did in terms of trying to understand whether or not the computer system that was in place, was vulnerable to intrusions from outside. And so, there was one aspect of it where I apologized because agency officers who reviewed some of the material there should not have basically taken a look at some very

innocuous and very minor emails that were there and it was inconsistent with the understanding we had. And so I told Senator Feinstein and others that if I found that CIA officers did anything whatsoever wrong about what happened there, that I would acknowledge it and I did. At the same time, I said that I hoped that the Senate would look at what it did, what its staffers did, and I am awaiting that review. [*laughter*]

AQ: So the answer is that no one--

Brennan: No that's not the answer, Larry. The answer is that the agency over the course of many years has had many different Inspector General reports, many different accountability boards. I have personally had to take action against individuals who went beyond what their authorities were. There are numerous cases of that and we take those actions very seriously. All of our Inspector General reports are shared with the committees, both the House and the Senate. So we do take it seriously. But sometimes, there are going to be differences of view in terms of what an individual should be held accountable for. Again, people who are working, sometimes all out and make some judgments and decisions, maybe it was the wrong one in retrospect but what was it in fact that led to that wrong decision? I am most interested in addressing systemic problems and failures and shortcomings that contribute to that. So when you talk about what wasn't shared between CIA and FBI years ago, is because there was walls between those two organizations that have since been brought down. And I would argue that that type of problem or issue is not going to be repeated because of the adjustments that were made. We have to hold this system and the institutions accountable, as well as individuals. But believe me, agency officers had been held accountable and some of them have been dismissed because they went beyond what their authorized responsibilities were.

Slick: Can I give Porter an opportunity to talk about accountability?

Goss: You're the Lawrence Wright who wrote "Looming Tower"?

AQ: Yes, Sir.

Goss: That's a wonderful book. It was very informative to me and at a critical time. So I want to thank you for that. It opened a lot of doors and windows for me. I will tell you that if you'll ask that question, you came into the agency and asked the workforce in the agency if they felt they had been accountable at the time I was there, you would've gotten a very loud response, yes, because we had nothing but investigations going on by the DOJ. We were making referrals of things that were out of bounds that we thought might be the IG had brought forward. There

was accountability. There were investigations and there were conclusions in the system at the time. There are some people who were, I guess they were contractors or, there were some people who misbehaved, did things wrong, were out of bounds, but it was accounted for. I myself reviewed one of the accountability reports with the Inspector General, who was then at the time John Helgerson who is here incidentally. I'm not sure he's in the room but he'll be here tomorrow and we went over the whole thing and we had a difference of opinion. We worked out a conclusion and the conclusion ended up being reported to the Senate. So that to me is accountability. Now the fact there wasn't a public hanging or scalping doesn't mean there wasn't accountability and that's what a lot of people feel, wow something terrible happened here and what John has said is right. If the system breaks down, we got a problem. If we lose true north, those kinds of indicators are out there and as far as I know, the cover up level is zero. I come away with a clean conscience saying, "I can explain everything that happened," but I'm not going to do it in great detail because it's an endless list. But I can explain everything that happened and there's another side to the story that may or may not be public. So don't rush to judgment on this. There is an equal side but if we got into each one of those cases, we'd be here a long time.

Slick: Next question. Can we get a student? Mark. Olivia thanks.

AQ: Hi gentlemen thank you for joining us. I'm Mark **Battjes**. I'm a second year Ph.D. student in the history department and I'm an active duty Army officer, in the Army's Advance Strategic Planning and Policy Program. All of you in your careers have served across the line, in both policy making jobs and then either in operational jobs or the IC. So my question for you is, are we doing enough to ensure that there's a crossover between the IC and the operational communities and the policy making communities, so that policy makers understand what the IC can and should do and that policy makers understand the questions they should be asking the IC to help them with.

McRaven: No, thanks. Throw that one over _____[1:17:41, *cross talk & laughter*]. Well, Mark you heard us earlier in the discussion, I talked about it in my role as the SOCOM Commander and as also the Joint Special Operations Commander, I had an opportunity and a number of times to spend time in the White House when John was there and then I spent two years in the Bush White House. And as you all know, the military has always talked about the best military advice. And that is our way of being able to say in a very apolitical way, "Mr. President," or, "National Security Advisor," or whoever it happens to be, "Here is our best military advice. You may not like it, but recognize that it is based on our experience as military officers and all the experience we bring as the Department of Defense Institution, on what we think may be the best for Iraq, for

Afghanistan." Again, that's not to say that we don't get into frankly heated discussions and I'd be misleading you if I said we don't stray into the policy world because when you sit around a small table and you talk about issues, it's hard if you're living there in Iraq or living there in Afghanistan and a policy maker says, "Well, what do you think about this? How should we frame this policy?" We think they're asking that question based on your military experience and we will provide them that information. And that is a great framework from which we in the military have operated for several hundred years, recognizing that we support whoever is in the White House, whoever the policy makers are, but we provide as best we can, the unvarnished truth based on our best military experience.

Brennan: I think increasingly you're going to see CI officers in many different positions through the course of their career, much more so than years passed. Right now, there are many CI officers who are serving as Directors and Senior Directors down at the National Security Council. Steve did, he was Head of Intelligence Programs down there as Senior Director. That's a policy making role. And I think more of that cross-fertilization that takes place between policy and intelligence, that's very healthy. The same thing is true in terms of our interaction with the military and we have a mantra right now at CIA that "We are intelligence officers first." What that means is that, we may have specialties and operations or analysis or engineering or whatever, but we are all at CIA in order advance our intelligence mission and responsibilities and advance the national security interests of the United States. And to me, some of the best officers are the ones who have had that exposure, know what the capabilities are of other organizations because I think it is very enriching and allows them to then go back to their trade and perform even in a more optimal fashion. So I think agency officers today, looking back over the next 20 or 30 years, they're going to have much more of a purple career than individuals who had grown up in the agency in years past.

Slick: I think I would suggest, that's exactly the right course as Director Brennan describes. Serving 100 yards from the Oval Office for a number of years is the best thing that could ever happen to a CIA Operations Officer. You understand intimately why you're out there collecting that information, what happens to it, who presents it to whom, how they react to it, you see the whole process which takes place thousands of times every day, in a way that you wouldn't otherwise if you just stayed at the agency and went back and forth between the field and headquarters. Porter, please.

Goss: One of the things you have to do is prioritize your assets. You don't have enough to get everything all the time everywhere, and inevitably the policy matters of the day are the areas you have to focus some assets to get information on. So we always pretend that we inform the policy; we don't make it. I don't know what

that means, but that's what I said too. [*laughter*] A little lesson in history, one of the jobs of the Director of CIA--I don't know if it's still true or not--used to be to vet State of the Union speeches. And we had a running rule that, "You can say anything you want Mr. President but these are the things we can back you up on."

Brennan: It's true.

McRaven: If I can add just one more because one of the things as you all know, since Goldwater Nichols in the military we have been required and John used the word purple, which means that the military Lexicon is now coming in to the inner agency in a great way because we do look at the purpleness of the inner agency or the jointness of the military. And of course really since 9/11, what we have become is much more inner agency. So you see as John said, my former Deputy John Mulholland is there working in the agency. We obviously have agency officers at special operations command, agency has folks at FBI, we have folks at FBI. And this ability to have an opportunity to cross-pollinate really does give you as an officer in the intelligence community or a military officer a much better perspective and frankly, much better postures you, when you're sitting there in the Situation Room and somebody is asking you the hard question that has a policy implication to it, you have an ability to be able to say, "Well, I remember my dealings with the FBI and the CIA and DIA and NGA and all those," and it makes for a better officer all around.

Slick: Terrific, thanks. Professor **Suri**. Can we get a microphone down there? Thanks.

AQ: Thank you again for being here. I'm Professor Jeremi Suri, I'm a Professor in the LBJ School and the history department and various other fun things around campus. My question is about efficacy. We're asked as scholars and as citizens and as public commentators all the time, to assess the effectiveness of our intelligence organizations, how effective are our intelligence organizations in the Middle East, how effective are we in Russia, for example. How would you like us to do that? When I'm asked, what should I say and how should I go about figuring out how to assess what to do and how to assess what the University does, I look at the students and the faculty and I either assess what our diplomats do, I can follow that along until it's out in the open. I know how to assess the military to some extent, a lot of that's open. How should we assess what you do? What is the right way for us to go forward?

Brennan: What I would like you to say is, "The CIA is the most effective organization you've ever encountered." [*laughter*] And leave it at that. It's a very good question and we struggle with that ourselves as far as, what are our metrics in terms of how we should measure our contributions to national security. It's not

just a question of carrying out some programs and meeting milestones, but what have we done in order to advance the protection of the promotion of national security interests. And a lot of times there are reports of intelligence failures, "Boy, we didn't see this happen and didn't see that happening." Well, a lot of times developments take place because of policy decisions that are made, including in Washington, as far as one action will beget another action and so on and so forth. And a lot of times we're asked, "Okay, so what is Putin's next move," whether it's the Ukraine or the Middle East or somewhere else. A lot of times, there are a lot of factors and considerations that Putin takes into account as he determines what his next chess move or checker move is going to be. What we try to do as organizations is to be able to inform as best as possible, our policy makers so they understand what are those elements that come into play and I must say that the recent signing of the JCPOA, the deal with Iran, there's a lot, a lot that went into what our negotiators were able to accomplish and a lot was a result of the tremendous intelligence, insights, expertise, assessments, analysis, and other things that were done in terms of understanding the Iranian nuclear program, what its capabilities are, and what would the limitations mean as far as their ability to either try to circumvent or pursue a nuclear weapon. And when you receive personal notes from Secretaries of State and Defense and the President and National Security Advisors about, "Boy the work that you guys did on this issue was instrumental," to me, that's a good metric. I think what we need to do is continue to work at how we're going to determine efficacy, particularly on things like on covert action, how is it really advancing those goals and objectives. Every covert action the CIA is involved in, is a result of what's called finding, which is the articulation on what our foreign policy goals are and how the agency, through covert action, is going to advance those goals and objectives. So we're held to account for that in terms of, did it really contribute to it but a lot of times sometime it's in the eye of the beholder about whether or not what we did was instrumental. But it's something that we inside the agency also are working through.

Slick: Probably our last question if I may, Sir. We'll get you a microphone, just one second.

AQ: Chairman my name is Frank _____[1:26:53] and my question pertains to combat intelligence. In World War II, we only had one rule of engagement--that was to win. Now, with that, how is intelligence gathered in combat zones today, processed, evaluated, and timely delivered to the combat troops, whether they be in defense or attack modes? Thank you.

Slick: We've got both ends of that for you here. Admiral McRaven.

McRaven: Well, thanks Frank for that question. Great question. Really the tactical intelligence that we receive today is candidly exponentially better than what you received during World War II and a lot of this has to do with the technical aspects of how we employ, again, our unmanned aerial vehicles, our technical surveillance. So no kidding, that private that is in that foxhole can have a visual picture of what the battlefield looks like in front of him, he can have a contextual picture based on the technical intelligence that we have pulled down, and he can to some degree have a strategic picture based on, how do we think the enemy will react if we do, this, this, or this. That information today is available in the hands of the privates and sergeants, in a way that it never has been before. Now having said that, we have to make sure that the privates and sergeants understand the value of that and how to use that in a team environment and we have to make sure that we've got the right protocol so that the individual soldier doesn't go off and do something that is contrary to what is in the best interest of the team. As you begin to work up, the intelligence frankly continues to get better, in terms of now if you're a battalion or if you're a brigade or if you're a division the battlefield, you're now seeing that across the depth and the breadth of the battlefield. A lot of that intelligence, a whole lot of that intelligence comes from CIA. And it comes from CIA's unique sources and methods, it comes from the programs that the agency runs, and as I mentioned earlier, in Iraq and Afghanistan and frankly around the world everywhere, it is not just their partnership with the special operations community; there is a CIA officer that is generally partnered with every unit, **gone down** to the battalion level so that again, the information that's received in Langley and elsewhere around the world, is available to that soldier. It is a magnificent relationship with the military and the intelligence communities in ways that I don't think ever would've happened, were it not for 9/11. 9/11 as tragic as it was, and it was incredibly tragic, has led to what I would contend as the finest military in the history of the world. And I think you could make that case based on how these young men and women are fighting and the fact that I know their fathers and their grandfathers and their great-grandfathers before them would be incredibly proud of how these young men and women are doing today and the intelligence they get, unparallel.

Slick: Gentlemen would you like to add anything?

Brennan: It's mindboggling what's intelligence can be brought to bear at the pointing of the spear, in the foxhole, or for the war fighter. In terms of bringing the geo-spatial intelligence, the imagery with the signals intelligence, with the human intelligence, as well as with the analysis and doing it in such a timely fashion. And we've all been out in different parts of the world and some of the far reaches of Afghanistan where our war fighters, as well as our intelligence officers are working, there is a such a premium on timeliness because you can get great

intelligence, but if it's not shared or it's not provided in time, it's not of benefit. And the integration of those capabilities and the innovation that people use now to try to bring it to bear, is exceptional. There's more we need to do because one of the challenges is trying to process all of that intelligence, integrate it in a timely fashion and to ferret out the wheat from the chaff on that so that we are able to take the action, whether it is a war fighter, whether it is a border control officer, whether it is a law enforcement officer, or whether it is a security officer outside of an Embassy so that they can stop something from happening. The speed of the intelligence now that's being delivered to all of those various elements is unprecedented but still there's so much more to do because in many respects we're being overwhelmed with data. The explosion as we talked a bit before in terms of social media, there's so much that is out there and incorporating the most sensitive types of intelligence that's collected clandestinely, together with that which is available in open source and bringing it together so that it's a force multiplier and it provides sort of a delta to people again, whether or not they are armed with a weapon or they have a responsibility to take action in an urban setting. It really is phenomenal and that's why I'm hoping that the best minds here at UT are going to look to public service, intelligence community, the military, to be able to bring their talents and innovation to bear.

Slick: That's a great way to close. Would everybody please join me in thanking our guests. [*applause*]

[*End of Recording*]